In its 70-year history, Pakistan has experienced at least nine coups, of which six have succeeded. The coups have yielded 33 years of military rule and dominated the defence and foreign policies of the country for another 25 years. How does Pakistan’s experience with coup propensity and military dominance compare with that of other countries? According to military strategist Edward Luttwak, the world experienced a total of 616 coups from 1945 to 2010.Of these, three-quarters were carried out by the military and the rest by political factions. Most coups were carried out in 1965-85. Only half of the coups succeeded. The success rate of the coups was the highest in the fifties and sixties. The region with the most coups in that period was Latin America. That questionable honour then shifted to Sub-Saharan Africa. Why has Pakistan’s coup propensity and success rate been so much higher than the global average? Curiously, Luttwak’s handbook, “Coup D’état,” does not discuss Pakistan but it provides an excellent database on coups elsewhere that can be used to answer the question. To quote Luttwak, the coup d’état “is a special form of politics that requires guns as an aid to persuasion, although coups rarely succeed if guns are much used and fail if the situation degenerates into civil war.” In much of the world, the ultimate driver of the coup is corruption. Generals who seize power can enrich themselves enormously, “The corrupt rulers of even the smallest and poorest countries can swiftly become billionaires.” Pakistan’s democratically-elected rulers need to work hard to coup-proof the country and prevent “the wolf-hound from turning on its master” once more It is, of course, difficult to predict when a coup will occur in a particular country since each has its unique history of civil-military relations. Furthermore, civil-military relations vary over time within a country. But while it is difficult to predict a coup, several factors raise the risk of a coup. First is an economic crisis, accompanied by large-scale unemployment, or runaway inflation. Gen. Ayub Khan, the CINC of the army, seized power in 1958,largely because of the slow economic progress of the 1950s and the second factor. Second is chronic political instability. Chronic political instability in the late sixties along with an economic slowdown allowed Gen. Yahya Khan, CINC, to depose President Ayub in 1969. He did not care that Field Marshal Ayub had hand-picked him for the CINC position in 1966. Burgeoning political instability marked the closing years of Gen. Zia’s reign. That factor, coupled with a desire to put an end to his long tenure, may have precipitated a coup which resulted in that still-mysterious plane crash in 1988. The third is a major defeat in a war, or a prolonged and unsuccessful war, or an insurgency. Pakistan’s massive defeat against India in December 1971 which led to the secession of East Pakistan was used by Lt-Gen. Gul Hasan, the army chief, and Air Marshal Rahim, the air force chief, to depose Gen. Yahya and install the populist Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in office. This was the only time a coup was carried out by two armed services. Fourth is a perception among the top brass that the civilian government is threatening its corporate interests. In the case of Pakistan, that means the army’s total dominance over the country’s defence and foreign policies, and especially its relationship with India comes under threat. This factor has been used thrice to dismiss Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Fifth is bad chemistry between the army chief and the civilian government. When Z. A. Bhutto began to rub General Zia’s nose into the mud in 1977, a coup became unavoidable. The execution of a coup usually involves seven steps, regardless of the country. First, co-opt the political establishment. Variants of the king’s party have been used to get the political elite to buy into the coup and to share in the ensuing rents. When the military-installed Z. A. Bhutto, it hoped that he would stay beholden to them. Sensing a threat, Bhutto removed the very two flag officers who had installed him within three months, accusing them of Bonapartist tendencies. There was no counter coup because public opinion was totally against the military at the time. Second, if there is a schism in the military, use skilful off-the-cup diplomacy to isolate and block off the loyalists. Third, execute the coup with maximum speed. Otherwise, disaster lurks in the wings, This was seen in the recent failed coup in Turkey. Within days, the coup makers were arrested. A few days later, they were paraded on TV wearing prisoner fatigues, grim faces, and repenting for their sins. Fourth, send the troops to secure the commanding heights, such as TV stations and power stations. Once the targets have been seized, the loyalist forces isolated, and the bureaucracy neutralised, the active phase of the coup is over. Fifthly, stabilise the country. Other leaders within the military have to be prevented from carrying out a counter-coup. President Iskander Mirza failed to do this and was deposed by Gen. Ayub within three weeks in 1958. Sixth, gain public acceptance, usually by speaking to the nation. Luttwak identifies several colourful phrases that coup makers have used to herald their arrival on the political scene. The military has taken over to wash clean the disgrace suffered by the army; a new era of equality between all citizens has been inaugurated; this action has been taken to create a strong and united country free from corruption and internal strife; the deposed ruler treated the country as if it was his private property; and the economy was about to collapse. Similar expressions abound in the maiden speeches of generals ranging from Ayub to Musharraf, all designed to project them as the saviour of the nation. In the seventh and last step, the judiciary is coerced, and if necessary judges replaced, to confer the proverbial fig leaf of legitimacy on the treasonous act. For a limited period, political stability will be restored, and economic growth stimulated. But the calm will invariably be followed by a storm of repression, arrests of opponents, and widespread corruption. Coups are much more likely in developing countries with weak political institutions than in developed countries. But not all developing countries are going to experience coups. Communist China and Democratic India have never experienced one. A country with prior coups, such as Pakistan, is more likely to have another coup. The most important decision of the prime minister in Pakistanis unquestionably the choice of the army chief. The chosen army chief should must be one who agrees to coup-proof the country by changing the culture of the top brass. As Samuel Huntington puts it, “the top brass should obey the elected officials not because they share their world view but because they accept that as their professional duty.” Pakistan’s democratically-elected rulers need to work hard to coup-proof the country and to prevent “the wolf-hound from turning on its master,” to use Stanley Wolpert’s memorable phrase. The author has been writing on civil-military relations ever since Musharraf’s coup. Ahmadfaruqui@gmail.com Published in Daily Times, March 12th 2018.