The latest U.S.-Iran strikes have turned the four possible futures of Hormuz from strategic theory into an urgent choice between negotiation, devastating war, prolonged economic strangulation and a regional settlement.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis has entered a new and far more dangerous phase. What only days ago remained a tense diplomatic standoff has now descended into a violent cycle of American strikes and Iranian retaliation. The United States has attacked scores of Iranian military targets along the coast, while Tehran has fired missiles and drones at American-linked military facilities across the Middle East. The fragile peace arrangement reached in June is now close to collapse.
Freedom of navigation gives Washington a legitimate international interest in safe passage, but it does not automatically make the U.S. Navy the administrator or political manager of the Strait.
The latest developments make one reality impossible to ignore: the four scenarios facing Washington and Tehran are no longer academic possibilities.
The first scenario is a return to the MoU. Washington and Tehran could suspend military operations, restore the 60-day diplomatic process and resume negotiations. Iran would immediately halt attacks on commercial vessels and guarantee safe passage, while the United States would stop further strikes and withdraw its threats against Iranian civilian-supporting infrastructure.
But a simple return to the MoU may no longer be enough. The original arrangement contained an unresolved Hormuz question. Its relevant provision envisaged Iran and Oman discussing the future administration and maritime services of the Strait during the interim period, with other Persian Gulf littoral states involved and the sovereign rights of coastal states recognised.
Instead of allowing that process to mature, an American-supported passage closer to Omani waters emerged as an alternative to Iran’s preferred route. Washington viewed it as a safe route for international shipping. Tehran saw it as an attempt to bypass Iran’s remaining leverage and determine the future of Hormuz before negotiations had reached a settlement.
Oman’s participation was particularly damaging to Iranian trust. Muscat has historically been one of the Gulf’s most respected mediators between Iran and the United States. By helping facilitate a route that Tehran interpreted as an American-backed bypass, Oman risked compromising the neutrality that made its mediation valuable.
The second scenario is now frighteningly close: full-scale war. The scale of the latest American strikes shows how quickly limited retaliation can expand. The United States has already targeted a large number of Iranian coastal military facilities, missile and drone infrastructure and naval assets. Iran has responded across the region. Each side now possesses its own justification for another round of escalation.
President Trump has already threatened Iran’s energy infrastructure. The conflict will move from military degradation towards the systematic destruction of Iran’s economic foundations.
For the United States, full-scale war would mean another open-ended Middle Eastern military commitment without a clearly defined political end state.
Israel may initially welcome further degradation of Iran’s military capacity. A weakened Iranian missile force and damaged command structure could improve Israel’s immediate strategic position. But Israel would remain a principal target of Iranian retaliation and could face another prolonged period of missile and drone attacks.
The Gulf states would face perhaps the greatest immediate danger. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and other countries host American military facilities. Iran may regard those installations as part of the American war structure regardless of the wishes of the host governments. The latest Iranian retaliation has already demonstrated how quickly Gulf territory can become part of the battlefield.
The global economic consequences could be catastrophic. Millions of people who have never seen Hormuz would pay through higher fuel and food prices. Vulnerable economies carrying heavy debt and weak currencies could face recession and renewed poverty. Iran does not claim leadership of the global economic system. The United States does. With that claim comes responsibility for calculating the global consequences of military escalation.
The third scenario is neither peace nor full war. It is a prolonged low-intensity confrontation. Indeed, the present situation may already be moving in that direction. Iran attacks or pressures shipping. Washington responds with large but geographically limited strikes. Tehran fires missiles at American-linked facilities. Regional states intercept them. Sanctions and oil restrictions intensify. Mediators attempt to reopen diplomatic channels.
Then the cycle begins again. The greatest danger is miscalculation. One missile killing dozens of American personnel, one U.S. strike causing mass Iranian civilian casualties or one tanker disaster killing an international crew could destroy the invisible limits of low-intensity conflict within hours. The third road therefore offers no peace. It simply stretches the crisis over a longer period and distributes its economic pain across the world.
That brings us to the fourth scenario-the only option that attempts to remove the cause of confrontation rather than repeatedly suppressing its symptoms. A comprehensive regional Hormuz settlement is now urgently required.
The United States must accept an equally obvious reality. It is not a coastal state of Hormuz. American military superiority does not create geography. Freedom of navigation gives Washington a legitimate international interest in safe passage, but it does not automatically make the U.S. Navy the administrator or political manager of the Strait.
Iran and Oman should form the geographical core of the arrangement. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and other directly affected Gulf countries should participate in a broader maritime mechanism. International maritime institutions can provide technical expertise and independent verification.
Iran must guarantee non-discriminatory commercial passage and permanently stop attacks on civilian vessels. Any future environmental, navigation or maritime service charges should be transparent and regionally negotiated rather than imposed through military coercion.
In return, the United States should step away from direct management of Hormuz and should not attempt to become the traffic authority of a Strait thousands of miles from the American coastline.
This fourth road gives every party space to retreat without surrender. Washington can claim that it secured free navigation and prevented unilateral Iranian control. Tehran can claim that its legitimate coastal role was recognised and that Hormuz did not become an American-administered military corridor.
Oman can recover its historic position as peacemaker. Muscat should understand that the United States can change presidents, military doctrines and strategic priorities. Oman cannot move away from Iran. Geography will remain when aircraft carriers eventually leave.
Pakistan should now urgently help revive mediation as the four roads are now clearer than ever. A return to the MoU may temporarily stop the fighting but could fail again if Hormuz remains unresolved. Full-scale war would devastate Iran, expose Israel and Gulf states to retaliation and trap America in another unpredictable Middle Eastern conflict. Prolonged low-intensity warfare would slowly strangle regional and global economies. The fourth road is different because it addresses the central dispute. The fourth road is no longer simply the best option. After the bloodshed of July 9, it may be the last sensible road still open.
The writer is a former press secretary to the president; former press minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France and former MD (SRBC).