Few storms end without a rainbow. As the Zurich sky cleared after a will-they-won’t-they round of tense diplomacy between the US and Iran, a bright arc of colour briefly appeared over Lake Lucerne. For Pakistan’s delegation, led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, Zurich/Bürgenstock was not another photo-op. It was the culmination of months of painstaking back-channel work that turned Pakistan’s rare access to both Washington and Tehran into diplomatic currency.
On the side of a mountain resort, where the world’s press gathered to watch long-time adversaries share a table, a middle power long viewed through crisis suddenly became indispensable.
The public phase of Pakistan’s mediation opened with a reminder that war leaves little room for egos. In his remarks at Bürgenstock, PM Sharif expressed hope for productive talks and emphasised that diplomacy had triumphed over despair. He singled out Field Marshal Munir, praising the chief’s “consistent efforts, perseverance and patience.”
When the US and Iran seemed poised to return to the battlefield, leaders in Islamabad spent long nights on secure lines, sometimes at the risk of domestic criticism, pushing both sides back to negotiation.
US Vice President JD Vance acknowledged as much, describing the talks as “historic” and stressing that “peace requires give and take.”
In a moment of candour, he joked that he had “two very, very important people” in his life:
“The Indian is my wife, and the Pakistani is Field Marshal Munir.” He added that he had “probably talked to Field Marshal Munir more than anyone else over the last few months.”
Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, also called the meeting “historic” and “a very important step for regional security, global security and the world economy”. He affirmed that Qatar would “remain committed to supporting this mediation until a solution is reached” and publicly thanked Islamabad for its “documented and continuous efforts” in supporting the negotiation process. Switzerland’s foreign minister, Ignazio Cassis, joined in, noting that his country – long a patron of good offices – “values Pakistan’s important role” in supporting continued discussions on implementing the memorandum of understanding.
Recognition also came from Washington. In an interview reported this week, President Donald Trump said Pakistan had “really helped” Washington with the Iran MoU. “They knew the Iranians, they knew the people, and they were good,” he said. He also acknowledged that Pakistan had urged restraint, saying Islamabad had asked him “please not to do any more” because of its closeness to Tehran.
Previously, a resolution introduced by Democratic congressman Al Green had described Pakistan as a “neutral and reliable” mediator and argued that those working to bring peace in a war marked by “loss of life and immense suffering” deserved commendation.
Indian defence analyst Pravin Sawhney, in a widely shared video clip, put Pakistan’s strategic weight in unusually blunt terms. “The Pakistani military knows exactly how and when to negotiate,” he said, adding that this was why “the US, Iran, China and Russia listen.” His conclusion was even sharper: in fast-shifting dynamics, Pakistan is the “ultimate option” and “the only choice.”
Coming from across the border, the assessment carries its own weight. It suggests that Pakistan’s role in the US-Iran process is being read not merely as diplomatic luck, but as evidence that Islamabad has recovered a measure of regional centrality at a moment when Asian power equations are being rewritten.
That discomfort has also been visible across Indian social media. Beyond the usual partisan sparring, a sharper question has begun to make the rounds: why was Pakistan in the room while India, despite its claims of global leadership, was watching from outside it? Some Indian users framed the moment with open sarcasm, saying Pakistan had become the “Vishwa Guru” while India’s foreign policy had failed. Others asked more plainly why New Delhi could not mediate between Washington and Tehran when it has long advertised strategic autonomy, close ties with the US, energy interests in Iran and influence in the Gulf. Even the counter-argument–that Pakistan was merely a “messenger” and not a mediator– betrayed its own unease. States that do not matter are not asked to carry messages between adversaries.
To borrow from former diplomat Jauhar Saleem, “It’s not a question of what changed between April and June. It’s rather an example of a never-give-up approach in diplomacy where an honest broker respected by both sides can eventually help overcome an overwhelming trust deficit.”
Analysts outside the region noted the shift as well. Michael Kugelman, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, recently remarked that Pakistan had gone from “something close to a pariah to a peacemaker” and that even if talks failed, Islamabad would still come out a winner. He also argued on social media that the origins of Pakistan’s Iran mediation could be traced back to the earlier Iran conflict, when Munir and Sharif visited Iran, Trump hosted Munir at the White House, and Trump and Marco Rubio praised Pakistan for knowing Iran well and being willing to mediate.
Former US ambassador Ryan Crocker also observed that Pakistan “played them very well” in terms of timing and substance, noting how Islamabad understood the personal and transactional style of Trump-era diplomacy. The Atlantic Council went even further, stating that Pakistan was among the biggest winners of the deal. It noted that perceptions of Pakistan had long been negative because of terrorism and economic distress, but that the country was now being hailed as an influential global actor and peacemaker.
Pakistan has a history of delivering unexpected diplomatic breakthroughs. In July 1971, it served as Washington’s secret channel to Beijing. Declassified US records show that arrangements for Henry Kissinger’s first trip to China were finalised “through messages relayed through the Pakistani Government”. President Yahya Khan had then assured Kissinger that “absolute fool proof arrangements will be made” and invited him to Islamabad for the clandestine flight. That back-channel opened the door for Nixon’s visit to China the following year.
For months, Pakistan’s advantage lay not in military might or economic leverage, but in relationships. It had credible access to Tehran, functional access to Washington and trust in Doha. This relational leverage allowed Islamabad to keep back-channel communications open when official contacts were frozen. When the war looked poised to spiral, Pakistan’s access became the mechanism for de-escalation.
Still, the sun may be shining bright for Islamabad today, but it will only last if the architects of peace remain patient, if the technical talks produce enforceable commitments, and if the world’s shadows stay at bay.