Intelligence-based operations in North Waziristan have again demonstrated the lethal reach of Pakistan’s counterterrorism apparatus. Over the past 72 hours, the military says it targeted multiple hideouts around Miran Shah and killed 21 militants, including four alleged ring leaders.
These latest strikes come just days after another operation in the same district reportedly killed 27 militants, according to the ISPR. The numbers are significant, and there is little doubt that such operations have degraded insurgent capabilities.
Elsewhere in Karachi, hundreds of kilometres from the battlefields of Waziristan, the Sindh Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) and a federal intelligence agency have arrested a man accused of supplying the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with drone components, batteries, controller boards and other electronics. CTD officials say the suspect purchased the equipment from local markets and online platforms and admitted that it was intended for improvised explosive devices, suicide jackets and drone-based attacks. Investigators also recovered explosives, a drone and a remote control.
The juxtaposition of these events reveals a shifting battlefield. Militants entrenched in North Waziristan continue to test the state’s resolve, and kinetic force remains necessary to disrupt and dismantle armed networks.
But recent developments speak volumes about how insurgent groups are diversifying their tactics and supply chains. Off?the?shelf drones, mobile phones and lithium batteries are dual?use items that can be purchased legally, assembled in urban safe houses and turned into crude weapons. This technology diffusion, thus, widens the threat beyond mountain hideouts.
Effective counterterrorism must therefore move beyond reactive raids. Law-enforcement agencies need to work with regulators and industry to flag unusual bulk purchases of dual?use items, monitor online sales and track financial flows.
Intelligence sharing across provincial boundaries should identify procurement networks before they deliver components to militants. The state must also continue pressing the Afghan authorities to deny safe haven to TTP leaders, but diplomatic rhetoric alone will not close the backdoors.
This fight is entering a new phase. Urban facilitators, global e-commerce and cheap flying platforms are giving old militant outfits new tools. *