Pakistan’s latest strikes along the Afghan border have brought the relationship with Kabul to one of its most serious points since the Taliban returned to power; the writing on the wall screams out loud that the state’s patience with cross-border terrorism has been exhausted. According to the government, the operation killed 26 militants and destroyed four terrorist facilities, including a training site, a hideout, an ammunition cache and centres linked to senior TTP commanders. The operation followed attacks in Musa Dara, North Waziristan and Bannu, each adding to Islamabad’s view that warnings to Kabul have produced little more than familiar denials.
There is no mystery about what is driving this hardening line. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has again become the frontline of a war Pakistan has fought before, paid for before and buried too many people for before. Police stations, military posts and paramilitary units are being targeted with a frequency that cannot be explained away as local disorder. The province witnessed a significant rise in militant violence last year, with more than 500 attacks reported, marking a 50% increase compared to the previous year. Therefore, Pakistan (or any other sovereign state, for that matter) cannot be expected to keep issuing protests while its citizens and security personnel are killed.
The Taliban regime in Kabul must now confront a fact it has tried to evade since returning to power: a government that demands respect for its borders must ensure that its territory is not used to attack its neighbours–especially when this sat at the centre of its commitments at the Doha Accords.
The Afghan Taliban cannot continue describing the TTP as Pakistan’s internal problem while refusing to dismantle the infrastructure that enables that problem to survive.
Pakistan has not asked Kabul for rhetorical sympathy. It has asked for verifiable action: dismantling of militant infrastructure, denial of space to anti-Pakistan groups, and evidence that such action has actually been taken. These demands have been raised bilaterally, through regional mediation and at the UN Security Council.
The latest operation also places a burden on Islamabad. Military action is necessary, but it cannot become the only language of counterterrorism. Precision strikes can disrupt camps and command centres, but they cannot by themselves protect vulnerable districts, rebuild local trust or dismantle facilitation networks.
Nor can Pakistan afford a confused public message. The state should continue releasing evidence when it strikes terrorist targets, because information warfare is now part of the battlefield.
The international community also has no excuse to look away. Engagement with the Taliban was always tied to the expectation that Afghan territory would not again become a platform for transnational militancy. Pakistan’s concern, therefore, should not be treated as a bilateral grievance alone. Kabul must be pressed to take verifiable action against the TTP and its allied networks. *