Pakistan’s latest precision strikes inside Afghanistan have pushed an already volatile frontier into a more coercive phase. Islamabad is no longer treating Afghan-based TTP sanctuaries as a matter for demarches, mediated pauses and Taliban assurances; it is signalling a line of action in which militant infrastructure across the border will be targeted when Kabul refuses to act.
The immediate trigger was the June 9 attack on a Federal Constabulary post in Musa Dara, in the Hasan Khel area near Peshawar. The attack led to an intense gun battle in which six FC personnel were killed and several others wounded, according to the Ministry of Interior. Conflict journalist Iftikhar Firdous described it as a “major attack on a surveillance post” near the Peshawar-Kohat confluence. “The TTP’s associated media has published pictures of the kidnapped paramilitary personnel,” he added. That detail matters because it shows that the assault was not only designed to kill. It was designed to humiliate, circulate fear and tell Pakistani security forces that the frontier has once again entered the psychology of the 2007-08 war years.
A security source familiar with on-ground developments said the next six months would be decisive in reducing the current militant surge to manageable limits.
Within hours, Pakistan released footage of what it said were precise strikes against terrorist targets across the border. Information Minister Attaullah Tarar said 26 armed combatants were killed and four targets were completely destroyed, including a training centre, a hideout, an ammunition cache and centres linked to TTP commanders Aleem Khan Khushali and Akhtar Muhammad Jani Khel. Tarar placed the operation inside a longer chain of attacks: the Musa Dara assault, the June 2 vehicle-borne suicide attack in North Waziristan and recent attacks in Bannu.
“Pakistan has always strived for maintaining peace and stability in the region, but at the same time, the safety and security of our citizens remains our top priority,” he said, adding that the counterterrorism campaign under Azm-i-Istehkam would continue “at full pace.” He also described the strikes as “precise and calibrated”, based on credible intelligence.
The Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, offered the expected counter-version, claiming Pakistani strikes hit Kunar, Khost and Paktika, killing 11 children, one woman and an elderly man, while wounding 14 other women and children. He called the strikes a “humanitarian crime” and an act of aggression. Islamabad has rejected the claim, saying its targets were militant hideouts and support infrastructure.
This dispute over facts has itself become part of the war. Pakistan releases footage, names commanders and cites recent attacks. Kabul invokes sovereignty and civilian casualties while denying that Afghan soil is being used by the TTP. Between these two narratives lies the central question: how long can Pakistan absorb attacks planned or enabled from across the border without responding militarily?
Afghan affairs expert Zahir Shah Sherazi has argued that the latest assault on Pakistani personnel recalls the darkest days of militancy in 2007-08, adding that international condemnation is no longer enough when armed groups continue to operate from Afghanistan. That assessment reflects a wider shift in Islamabad’s mood. Pakistan has paid for counterterrorism with blood, budgets and broken towns. It is no longer willing to let Kabul convert denial into policy.
The argument has already moved beyond bilateral complaint. At the UN Security Council earlier this week, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative, Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, warned that Afghan soil was being used by the TTP, BLA, Majeed Brigade, IS-K and ETIM. Islamabad also pointed to India’s alleged use of Afghan space through anti-Pakistan proxies.
Nor is Pakistan alone in questioning Taliban behaviour. At the same UNSC discussion, the US urged Council members to condemn what its representative described as the Taliban’s sheltering of terrorist groups and refusal to implement counterterrorism commitments. That matters because Kabul’s line has long depended on presenting Pakistan’s concerns as a bilateral grievance. The more the issue gets placed in multilateral language, the harder it would become for the Taliban to hide behind the word “sovereignty” while armed groups operate with impunity.
There is a separate but revealing echo from New York. A Taliban commander, Haji Najibullah, was sentenced by a US court to 42 years in prison for hostage-taking and providing material support for terrorism in the kidnapping of American journalist David Rohde, Afghan journalist Tahir Ludin and their driver Asadullah Mangal. The case belongs to an earlier phase of the Afghan war, but its moral relevance has returned with force. Hostage-taking, prisoner propaganda and the use of captives as bargaining material are not accidents in this militant ecosystem. When TTP-linked channels circulate images of kidnapped Pakistani personnel today, they are speaking a language the Taliban world has understood for decades.
In April, during Pakistan-Afghanistan talks in Urumqi, China, Islamabad reportedly put forward three core demands: Kabul must formally declare the TTP a terrorist organisation, dismantle its infrastructure and provide verifiable proof of action. These are not extravagant demands. They are the minimum conditions any state would place before a neighbour whose territory is being used by militants attacking its security forces.
A security source familiar with on-ground developments said the next six months would be decisive in reducing the current militant surge to manageable limits. The challenge, the source said, was not only cross-border logistics and support from hostile intelligence networks, but also pockets of local facilitation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, aggravated by politically divided governance.
This is where the policy burden becomes all the more heavier. Pakistan’s right to strike terrorist infrastructure cannot be a substitute for ignoring governance at home. The TTP feeds on sanctuaries across the border, but it also feeds on local fear, weak policing, political confusion and communities that have lived too long between militants and the state. Still, the central responsibility lies with Kabul. The Taliban regime cannot demand the respect owed to a sovereign state while behaving like a custodian of armed proxies.
This is where Pakistan’s Afghan policy has had to shed old illusions. Lord Palmerston’s old rule of statecraft still holds: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual.”
The Taliban’s past proximity to Pakistan cannot outweigh the present cost of TTP sanctuaries, suicide attacks and cross-border propaganda. If Kabul wants the privileges of sovereignty, it must accept the obligations that come with it. To borrow from American President George W Bush, “The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”
The writer is OpEd Editor (Daily Times) and can be reached at durenayab786 @gmail.com. She tweets @DureAkram.