After twenty-eight years of the nuclear tests at Chagai, the strategic environment in South Asia has shifted in ways that Pakistan’s original deterrence architects could not have imagined.
Pakistan’s shift from Credible Minimum Deterrence to Full-Spectrum Deterrence was rooted in the assumption of the threat of conventional invasion, mass mobilisation, and decisive ground offensives. These old threats have not disappeared. But the nature of these threats has changed dramatically because modern conflicts are now not limited to just a single domain; rather, they are fought across multiple domains.
The conflict between India and Pakistan in May 2025 highlighted this shift more clearly than ever before. Neither side crossed the nuclear threshold. Yet the confrontation was marked by the exchange of precision missiles, armed drones, electronic warfare, satellite-enabled surveillance, and naval signaling; all these things happened under the nuclear shadow. Nuclear weapons did their job, but only in the narrowest sense: they prevented a full-scale war. But unable to prevent the use of force.
Experts have argued that the creation of the ARFC is recognition of the fact that conventional deterrence is becoming increasingly relevant and important, and that it provides decision-makers
a wider range of response options before reaching the nuclear threshold.
Islamabad recognized the changing character of warfare. On August 13, 2025, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced the creation of the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC). Unlike Pakistan’s nuclear force, it is established as a wholly conventional organization. It operates outside the Strategic Plans Division. The ARFC is tasked with centralising the country’s surface-to-surface missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones under a single command chain. This model is inspired by China’s PLA Rocket Force.
The signal is clear. Pakistan’s military leadership is no longer content to depend on nuclear deterrence in crisis management. Instead, it is building a conventional deterrent layer that can impose real costs without triggering nuclear escalation. The Fatah missile series has become the centrepiece of this effort. On April 28, 2026, the ARFC test-launched the Fatah-II, which is a 400-kilometre-range supersonic precision missile guided by inertial navigation and satellite systems. Earlier this May, Pakistan unveiled the Fatah-3, which is a ramjet-powered supersonic cruise missile. Reports now suggest that Pakistan could test Fatah-5 with an estimated range of 1,000 kilometres before the end of 2026. If it is accurate, Islamabad would, for the first time, possess a conventionally armed precision-strike system capable of reaching deep into Indian strategic depth
Experts have argued that the creation of the ARFC is recognition of the fact that conventional deterrence is becoming increasingly relevant and important, and that it provides decision-makers a wider range of response options before reaching the nuclear threshold. The logic is straightforward: if precision conventional systems can deliver calibrated and meaningful military effects, they reduce the pressure for early nuclear signalling and raise the practical ceiling for nuclear use.
Lt Gen Nauman Zakaria, commander of the newly formalised ARFC, warned that emerging technologies are creating new vulnerabilities. While speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, he highlighted the risks of miscalculation and of compressing decision-making timelines, and how they are fundamentally altering the nature of interstate conflict and strategic deterrence. This is not an abstract concern. Modern dual-capable systems, such as missiles that can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, are blurring the line between conventional and nuclear signalling. An adversary detecting an inbound Fateh-series missile cannot always determine the type of payload it is carrying. The risk of misreading intent under time pressure is a real strategic concern.
Pakistan’s deterrence posture has always been a response to India’s strategic doctrine. Full-Spectrum Deterrence with systems like Nasr was designed to counter the threat of a rapid and limited ground offensive under India’s Cold Start doctrine. But Indian military thinking has evolved. The Balakot crisis in 2019 underscored the growing role of airpower and precision-strike capabilities in crises. The May 2025 conflict reinforced this trend and demonstrated that standoff weapons, armed drones, and electronic warfare can shape the battlefield and can impose high costs without crossing the nuclear threshold. So, in other words, India has found room to operate.
The formation of ARFC is the first step to address this challenge. But the development of the capabilities is not enough; the doctrine must evolve as well. Pakistan’s concepts of Full-Spectrum Deterrence and the quid-pro-quo-plus approach were designed for a strategic environment that was dominated by conventional military intrusions. But today’s security landscape is far more complex, so there is a need for reconceptualisation of existing concepts of strategic stability because conventional deterrence now needs more emphasis, not as a substitute for nuclear deterrence, but as the first line of response in a crisis.
None of this implies a departure from Pakistan’s nuclear posture or assumption that conventional parity with India is achievable. But it does mean something more measured and strategically important, which is a recalibration of the relationship between nuclear and conventional deterrence so that the overall framework reflects the realities of the battlefield of 2026, not the threat perceptions of 2004.
One year after the conflict that proved limited war under the nuclear shadow is not just a theoretical concept; it has become a reality. Pakistan now has the institutional building blocks in place. The ARFC exists, and the Fatah series is maturing. The conventional deterrent layer is taking shape.
What still needs to be done is the more difficult work of turning institutional change into doctrine, and doctrine into a coherent strategic framework that clearly signals to adversaries, partners, and most importantly, Pakistan’s own decision-makers what the new rules of the game actually are.
The writer is a freelance columnist.