President Donald Trump insists that the Islamic Republic “really wants to make a deal” with the United States and that any agreement “will be a good one for the U.S.A. and those that are with us”. He urged critics to “sit back and relax” and complained that political “chirping” from Democrats and some Republicans made it harder for him to do his job. Yet his posts came just hours after U.S. forces struck Iranian drone-and-radar sites and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards fired ballistic missiles at a U.S. base. Even as he talked of peace, the guns around the Strait of Hormuz – through which a fifth of the world’s oil flows – kept blazing.
Fareed Zakaria, CNN host, summed up the contradiction earlier this month: “Does Washington want to change certain policies of Iran, or does it want to change Iran?” He noted that for Tehran, US recognition “is a prize worth many concessions”. If Trump secures an accord, Zakaria argued, he may end up giving Iran the legitimacy it has sought from the “Great Satan” since 1979.
Historian Ayesha Jalal warns that some in Washington and Jerusalem are no longer talking about regime change but about Iran’s collapse, claiming that external pressure and internal unrest are pushing the debate “beyond regime change… toward the collapse of Iran.” That shift matters. Toppling a government is one thing; dismantling a state is another.
Taking a peek at the thinktank culture in Washington DC, one can easily concur that the US policy debate now features at least four camps.
Taking a peek at the thinktank culture in Washington DC, one can easily concur that the US policy debate now features at least four camps. Electoral realists worry that an unpopular war will hurt Republicans in November. This was eloquently echoed by James-Lindsay of the Council on Foreign Relations as he warned that “an unpopular war with Iran will put more political pressure on Republican congressional candidates the longer it persists”. Ideological hawks, meanwhile, argue the Islamic Republic cannot be moderated and must be confronted until it collapses. Transatlantic analysts fret that Europe has been sidelined. For instance, Philip-Gordon of the Brookings Institution pointed out that many European leaders initially hoped “a short war might bring about the Islamic Republic’s fall” but now recognise that assumption was “mistaken.” Nevertheless, maximum-pressure advocates such as Rebeccah-Heinrichs of the Hudson Institute insist the US should “sustain maximum pressure until Iran is no longer willing or able to threaten freedom of navigation in the strait or resume its nuclear weapons work”. There seems to be both an overlap and cross-pollination among these groups, but the clash of narratives is real.
The White House has oscillated. No qualms about that. Trump had paused a planned attack in mid-May after receiving an Iranian peace proposal via Pakistan, saying there was a “very good chance” of a nuclear deal. Two weeks later, his negotiators and Iran’s envoys were reportedly close to a memorandum of understanding that would extend the ceasefire for sixty days and reopen the Strait, though nuclear issues were deferred. Iran, for its part, signalled that any agreement must include a ceasefire in Lebanon and protections for Hezbollah forces battling Israel. Foreign Minister Abbas-Araghchi warned that “the ceasefire between Iran and the U.S. is unequivocally a ceasefire on all fronts, including in Lebanon. Its violation on one front is a violation… on all fronts”.
Against this turbulent backdrop, Iran’s state-aligned Tasnim news agency reported on Monday that Tehran had suspended indirect exchanges with Washington through intermediaries to protest continued Israeli attacks in Lebanon and would not resume until their demands on Gaza and Lebanon were met. That announcement briefly rattled markets and hardened the view among hawks that Iran never negotiates in good faith.
Then came an unexpected twist. Hours after Tasnim’s report, Pakistan’s foreign ministry revealed that Araghchi had telephoned Islamabad to thank Pakistan for its constructive diplomacy and to request that it continue using its “good offices” to de-escalate tensions and maintain the ceasefire. Iranian media later confirmed the call. The contradiction speaks volumes.
“They want to make a deal,” Trump says. They may, but only on terms that protect their regional proxies and nuclear leverage. Pakistan has been at the centre of these indirect talks. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government has hosted marathon sessions in Islamabad and has shuttled messages through Oman, Qatar and China. Islamabad also worries that the Iran war could spill over into Afghanistan and feed extremist movements on its own soil.
When Foreign Minister Ishaq-Dar met US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington last week, he conveyed Pakistan’s “concerns regarding the use of Afghan territory by terrorist groups against Pakistan” and “stressed the need for enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation.”
Europeans, who initially cheered the US-Israeli offensive on the assumption it would be short, now worry about oil prices, shipping insurance and a possible migrant surge. Gordon notes that Europe miscalculated: a quick war was supposed to yield strategic gains; instead, it has deepened transatlantic strains. Lawmakers in Paris and Berlin are asking whether a US-Iran deal will be real or just a pause before the next crisis. Meanwhile, Israel continues its offensive in Lebanon, and the US House of Representatives is considering a National Defence Authorisation Act that would deepen technological integration with Israel, including AI and quantum computing.
Nothing reflects this uncertainty more than global markets. Brent crude and West Texas Intermediate rose more than 3% on Monday after tumbling the previous week as traders weighed the prospect of a ceasefire against the risk of wider war. Economists warn that repeated closures of Hormuz could tip the global economy into recession. Interestingly enough, Gulf ports like Duqm and Salalah are advertising themselves as alternatives to Hormuz.
Iran’s goals are no less complex than America’s. According to negotiators, Tehran wants an end to US naval blockade measures, access to some of its frozen assets, assurances on Lebanon and Gaza, and respect for what it calls its sovereign right to enrich uranium. The war has already shown that Iran can disrupt shipping and fire missiles deep into the Gulf. However, contrary to victory-peddlers, it has also highlighted the country’s vulnerabilities. US strikes have degraded Iran’s radar and drone infrastructure, and Israeli commandos have targeted Iranian sites in Syria. The regime faces domestic dissent, though not yet at revolutionary levels.
Iranian hardliners say they will not negotiate under “pressure, threats or siege”. More pragmatic voices see a temporary deal as a way to relieve economic pain, buy time, and keep nuclear options open. Still others dream of a maximalist outcome: a US withdrawal from the Gulf, the end of sanctions and recognition of Tehran’s regional role. These ambitions collide with reality.
Three plausible scenarios loom. In the first, the US and Iran agree to an interim memorandum: shipping lanes reopen, some assets are released, and the nuclear issue is kicked down the road. This would calm markets and allow Trump to declare a win while giving Iran breathing space. In the second, talks stall but a tacit “managed stalemate” continues; strikes flare intermittently, but Hormuz stays partly open, and both sides avoid crossing red lines. In the third, diplomacy collapses; Iranian attacks on U.S. forces intensify; Washington responds with wider strikes; oil prices spike; and Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Iraq unleash fresh violence. Hawks in Washington and Tehran will say collapse is inevitable, as moderates will warn that collapse is a catastrophe.
Which path prevails largely depends on whether Americans and Iranians can each agree on what they want. As Zakaria observed, no strategy works “unless it is clear about its desired end-state”. Right now, Washington’s end-state is a question mark. So is Tehran’s.
The writer is OpEd Editor (Daily Times) and can be reached at durenayab786 @gmail.com. She tweets @DureAkram.