The ceasefire between the US and Iran holds, but its fate seems extremely fragile. The strategic coercion in the form of the twin blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, mutual brinkmanship and US compellence strategy may bring the two back to the brink. Will talks resume, or is a second round of confrontation likely?
There is optimism that talks between the US and Iran will resume, and both parties will show rationality and responsibility by not choosing the reverse track. Both have immense domestic, regional, and global pressure to ensure the ceasefire holds, and the Strait of Hormuz opens for free and fair navigation, without anyone gaining space to collect fees/tolls. There is enormous pressure on President Trump, from his public, Congress, and democrats alike, not to consider renewed strikes on Iran. Trump’s internal political voting ballot is already draining, domestic inflation has skyrocketed, and the economy is straining. The partners, such as the European Union (EU), are not moving an inch and repeatedly state that their economy is connected to the Strait of Hormuz, and the corridor should be set free for smooth passage. The Asian, small, and middle powers, alongside the larger giant, i.e., China, exhibit a significant reliance on the Strait of Hormuz and are demanding the imminent lifting of the twin blockade.
Pakistan is already walking on the tightrope of foreign policy balancing.
On the other hand, neither Iran nor the US have yet confirmed whether they will resume talks anytime soon. It seems that both are evading each other’s maximalist demands by exerting economic coercion and adhering to a policy of Brinkmanship to push the other to comply with the demands. In the pre-settings of the second round of talks, which was planned to be held in Islamabad, Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces visited Tehran, used his leverage over Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, which in turn was reciprocated by the US’s announcement of a Lebanon ceasefire. Indeed, the US also used its influence over Israel to back it off from Southern Lebanon, where the latter was busy carrying out extensive and deeper airstrikes. Presumably, Trump’s advisors immediately proposed a naval blockade to gain maximum concessions from Iran at the negotiation table. The US retreated from its position, imposed a naval blockade of Hormuz, and started the seizure of the Iranian ship, thus violating the ceasefire and widening the trust deficit with Iran. Thus, the second round of talks did not hold; however, the Iranian delegation visited Islamabad for bilateral consultation and proceeded to Oman and Moscow for additional discussions. In turn. Iran also returned to blockading the Straight by mining sea lanes, harassing and seizing ships. For Iran, if its exports are choked, then nobody else’s will exit without restrictions.
The US is employing a strategy of strategic brinkmanship, economic coercion and compellence to make Iran meet its maximalist demands. Iran reciprocates the same way. The mutual brinkmanship is in play, where each side is testing the limits of the other. This high-stakes game of poker is in testing where one is harassing the other to wink first.
What is next? The US is reviewing options for renewed strikes. Precision, short but prevailing strikes packages are proposed to President Trump to target the Iranian military and strategic infrastructure. However, a full-scale ground invasion is not on the cards for now. The US already has the means to strategically strangulate Iran, inflict a heavy economic blow by blocking its shipping lanes and oil exports, imposing stress on the Iranian domestic economy. The prevailing perception in the US’s strategic ranks is that rising inflation combined with a declining economy may lead to increased hostility among the Iranian public towards the Iranian regime. The US, thus, is likely to avoid an expansion of full-scale military conflict in order to minimise collateral damage and preserve its global political prestige. More so, a proposal for an international maritime coalition to reopen Hormuz is on the US table in parallel. There is no confirmed report on the US ground invasion of Iran. It may be a conceivable contingency, not an action plan. Strategically, a ground invasion would be highly costly, politically constraining, and militarily unwinnable given Iran’s geographical terrain and its asymmetric warfighting competencies. However, renewed air/missile strikes are being aggressively considered.
Renewed strikes will bring severe economic shock to regional and extra-regional economies. The world will face an immediate oil price explosion, and rising energy prices will lead to higher production costs and expensive goods. Higher inflation will then lead to a shortage of fuel, electricity, transport, and food. An energy crisis will increase power outages, and disruptions to oil and LNG supply (especially from Qatar), thereby allowing many countries to place restrictions on fuel rationing, reduced working days and close academic institutions.
Renewed strikes will open up immense security challenges for bordering countries such as Pakistan, which shares a 900 km border with Iran. The second round of strikes will give rise to cross-border militancy, smuggling and proxy conflicts. Millions of Pakistanis work in Gulf countries, and broader regional instability will lead to their job losses or disruptions, impacting remittances. Iran-Pakistan border trade will be disrupted. Regional connectivity projects, i.e., energy pipelines, will stall. All states, including Pakistan, will face maritime security threats and disruption of shipping routes. Given the above worrisome dynamics, Pakistan, along with multiple regional and extra-regional stakeholders, should pressurise the US administration and the Iranian regime to extend the ceasefire, come to the negotiation table, and drop the consideration for a second round of military strikes.
Pakistan is already walking on the tightrope of foreign policy balancing. It has good relations with the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia. So far, Pakistan has taken no sides and played a vital role as a mediator, calling for a ceasefire by taking the three conflicting parties from the brink. Pakistan needs to move a step ahead by merely being a mediator and host to a real architect of a permanent Peace Process. This can be achieved by establishing a permanent trilateral (Pakistan-US-Iran) Peace Secretariat in Islamabad. Instead of forcing Iran to sign a deal right away, which ideally is not acceptable to Iran, Pakistan should consult with the US to break the format into segmental parallel tracks. The parallel negotiation pathways should focus on the Nuclear track (including technical experts and the IAEA representatives), Track on Sanctions Relief (including economic and legal experts), the track on Regional security mechanism (to deal with opening and governing of toll-free Hormuz, mitigating of proxies in the region) and Humanitarian confidence-building (to manage and deal with human loss and crisis that also includes displacements and refugees by involving UN led agencies).
Instead of a big pledge led by maximalist demands, initiate a process of genuine, mutually respectable and acceptable for the resolution of the conflict. Pakistan alone lacks leverage over both sides. Therefore, it’s important to get involved with other stakeholders, such as Oman, which holds the diplomacy expertise and global standing, Qatar for economic leverage, and Turkey to use political influence, and possibly the EU and UN (for technical credibility and political influence, respectively). Pakistan should reignite the backchannel using military/intelligence-level, confidence-building, front channel using official diplomatic rounds.
Pakistan should table the regional energy corridor initiative along with mechanisms for reconstruction and trade that include both parties. The initiation of a regional stabilisation pact, an economic security agenda, and the establishment of a regional security community framework are essential. In a nutshell, to satisfy domestic audiences, both the US and Iran necessitate successful face-saving outcomes in their diplomatic engagements.
The writer is a Professor of IR at NUML, a non-resident fellow of CISS, Islamabad, and a visiting fellow at the Central European University in Austria.