The post-Cold War international system was once described as a rules-based order anchored in institutions, norms, and managed competition among great powers. Today, that description sounds increasingly anachronistic, more aptly “The rules-based world order no longer exists”, as said by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the opening of the annual Munich Security Conference. The kidnapping of Venezuela’s president and the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader are not merely dramatic headlines; they are symptoms of a deeper systemic decay. These events, when viewed through the lens of structural realism, signal that the architecture of restraint painstakingly constructed after 1945 is giving way to a harsher, power-centric environment. The world is tumbling downhill from a somewhat regulated order toward something far more primordial and akin to pre-West Phalian Europe.
At the heart of this transformation lies the normalisation of kinetic force as a primary instrument of statecraft. Sovereignty, once treated as sacrosanct in the United Nations Charter, now appears negotiable. The repeated resort to unilateral or quasi-unilateral military operations, particularly by the United States and Israel, has steadily eroded the authority of multilateral institutions. What was once framed as exceptional action justified by extraordinary threats has become more acceptable or “new normal”. The cumulative effect is corrosive: institutions designed to manage conflict are bypassed, and the threshold for force is lowered. The United Nations Security Council, envisioned as the custodian of collective security, stands increasingly redundant if not paralysed. The frequent use, and critics would argue, abuse of veto power, especially in matters concerning Israel, has defanged the Council. This paralysis is not merely procedural; it is existential. When the veto is employed not as a safeguard of last resort but as a strategic shield for allies, the legitimacy of the entire institutional framework is compromised. For smaller states, this draws sobering conclusions that in the current global order, power, not principle, is the real currency of global governance and geopolitical outcomes.
Power transition theory of A.F.K Organski and Thucydides Trap popularised by Graham Alison warns that such periods, when a rising state approaches parity with a dominant one, are historically volatile, where conflicts become inevitable.
Woodrow Wilson, on 8 January 1918, in his speech to Congress, introduced his fourteen points and imagined an international order where cooperative mechanisms would temper raw power, would turn the ‘jungle’ of international politics into a ‘zoo’, where competition persisted but was bounded by rules. That vision, already imperfect, now seems remote. In this environment, as reflected in the VUCAII framework, clarity of norms is replaced by ambiguity; legal arguments give way to application of force; and credibility is measured in coercive capacity rather than institutional fidelity. Words like liberalism, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence feel increasingly displaced by deterrence, compellence and escalation dominance.
The erosion of arms control compounds this instability. The expiration of the New START Treaty marks not simply the end of a bilateral agreement but the fraying of an entire arms control ethos. For decades, even amidst rivalry, sanity prevailed, Washington and Moscow recognised the madness of nuclear escalation and thus came up with the existential logic of restraint. Post New START, no meaningful architecture caps the expansion of strategic arsenals among major powers. The absence of constraints fuels worst-case planning. As nuclear powers accelerate modernisation, the US is resuming nuclear weapons testing, and emerging technologies like hypersonics, autonomous systems, and cyber capabilities further complicate deterrence calculations. In such a context, strategic stability becomes precarious, prone to strategic miscalculation and accentuates risk escalation.
To understand this drift, one must decipher the structural drivers of the current geopolitical environment. The United States remains determined to preserve its global primacy status with a unipolar international system principally through its overwhelming military power. From the perspective of offensive realism, a hegemon will resist decline and seek to prevent peer competitors from emerging. Russia, conversely, seeks restoration of lost stature and influence, perceiving NATO expansion and Western encroachment as existential threats. China’s steady ascent presents perhaps the most consequential challenge. Through economic expansion, military modernisation, and technological ambition, Beijing signals its intention to contest the reigning superpower. Power transition theory of A.F.K Organski and Thucydides Trap popularised by Graham Alison warns that such periods, when a rising state approaches parity with a dominant one, are historically volatile, where conflicts become inevitable. While status quo power seeks to preserve a system that enshrines its advantages, challengers argue that the existing order is selectively applied and structurally biased. This clash of narratives intensifies mistrust. The more the dominant power relies on coercion to defend its position, the more challengers accelerate balancing strategies. Regional actors such as India and Israel, each navigating distinct security environments, pursue strategies aimed at maximising power and ensuring regional preponderance. The cumulative effect resembles a powder keg, where a small spark can trigger systemic reverberations with repercussions far beyond the region. The consequences for smaller and developing states would be particularly grave. These countries often lack the material capacity to shape outcomes and are acutely vulnerable to external shocks. In the absence of credible institutional intervention, erosion of collective security mechanisms removes buffers that once offered at least nominal protection. For such states, the emerging order presents existential dangers.
Institutional liberalism once posited that dense networks of interdependence and international organisations would mitigate anarchy. While such networks persist, their restraining capacity appears diminished. Economic interdependence no longer guarantees political moderation; indeed, it is weaponised through sanctions, export controls and financial leverage. Instead of serving as bridges, institutions increasingly resemble tools for contestation or instruments of strategic manoeuvring. The contemporary global system, unfortunately, resembles a vast store of combustible material marred with a volatile mix of nuclear arsenals, unresolved territorial disputes, ideological polarisation, and technological volatility, which awaits spontaneous ignition. In a domino effect, the more norms erode, the more actors rely on self-help, the more self-help dominates, and the more mistrust deepens. In such a cycle, prudence becomes scarce, and brinkmanship proliferates.
If kinetic operations continue to supplant diplomacy as witnessed in recent events, if vetoes persist in shielding allies irrespective of morality and legal scrutiny, and if nuclear arsenals expand without constraint, the cumulative effect will be a systemic breakdown. The Doomsday Clock, long a symbolic warning, may one day feel redundant, not because the threat has diminished, but because catastrophe will have ceased to be hypothetical and become inevitable. For now, the world stands at an inflexion point. The choice is stark: recommit to managed competition under revived institutional norms, or drift further into a realm where power alone dictates outcomes and rules fall victim to systematic rupture. In that realm, smaller states will suffer first, but no actor would remain immune. History demonstrates that even in periods of intense rivalry, restraint can be institutionalised. The Cold War, for all its perils and mistrust, produced arms control agreements and crisis management mechanisms between superpowers precisely because leaders recognised the abyss. The pressing question is whether those who hold the greatest power possess the wisdom to exercise it with restraint, before the fire engulfs friends and foe alike.
The writer is a PhD Scholar of International Relations at the School of Integrated Social Sciences, University of Lahore, and Deputy President Maritime Centre of Excellence at Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore.