The year 2025 stood out as an important milestone for two of the world’s leading international groupings, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Both held high-profile summits that highlighted their rising ambitions and expanding influence in global affairs. BRICS came together with an energetic agenda that blended calls for institutional reform, fresh ideas on financial cooperation, and a wider embrace of new partners. At the same time, the SCO gathered in Tianjin, presenting itself as a unified Eurasian alliance committed to strengthening security, promoting development, and laying the groundwork for long-term regional stability.
The BRICS Leaders’ Summit was held from 6 to 7 July 2025 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, under the theme ‘Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance’. The Rio de Janeiro Leaders’ Declaration was published on the official Brazilian government and BRICS presidency pages. Later in the year, Brazil organised a virtual session of leaders that concentrated heavily on the issues of global tariffs and protectionism. This second meeting was unusual, but it kept BRICS in the spotlight. Taken together, these two gatherings shaped the group’s 2025 story, with the Rio summit setting the agenda and the September virtual meeting offering a quick reaction to global trade developments. In contrast, the SCO Heads of State Council convened from 31 August to 1 September 2025 in Tianjin, China. This was the organisation’s 25th summit and the fifth time it was hosted by China. Official accounts highlighted the adoption of the Tianjin Declaration as well as a long-term development strategy, and media reports from multiple outlets confirmed both the timing and the outcomes. The Tianjin meeting stood out for its scale, being the largest SCO summit to date, and for its sense of continuity with China once again in the host’s role. It also reflected a wide-ranging agenda that covered security, finance, and development. In essence, BRICS projected leadership through its combination of in-person and virtual summits across the year, while SCO demonstrated organisational consolidation with a major in-person summit that culminated in a formal declaration and a forward-looking plan
The question of which summit in 2025 was more successful depends on whether success is judged by global influence or institutional depth.
BRICS shaped its 2025 agenda around the idea of an “expanded BRICS.” The Rio Declaration formally welcomed Indonesia as a new member and also introduced a group of partner countries that included Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Nigeria, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. This arrangement widened the circle of participation while stopping short of granting full membership, creating a flexible framework that allowed broader engagement without immediate accession. The virtual summit held in September extended this inclusivity even further, with leaders from Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates also taking part. Taken together, these steps showed that BRICS in 2025 had become more far-reaching and adaptable in its design than in previous years.
By contrast, the SCO entered its Tianjin summit as a compact group of ten members, with Belarus having joined formally earlier and receiving repeated mention in the 2025 coverage. The Tianjin Declaration mapped the organisation’s geographic presence across Eurasia and reflected its commitment to a more tightly bound, treaty-based membership rather than the flexible partner model of BRICS. The SCO’s central institutions continued to revolve around the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and functional bodies such as the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, with new proposals introduced in 2025 to strengthen financial mechanisms. In short, BRICS is experimenting with a more fluid approach that brings in a wider array of countries without over-formalising their status, while the SCO prefers to maintain a smaller, cohesive membership and build its influence through established institutions.
The BRICS agenda for 2025 was built around four major pillars: reform of global governance, financial coordination and payments, climate leadership, and the regulation of emerging technologies. In the Rio Declaration, member states called strongly for reform of the United Nations Security Council, arguing for broader representation of emerging markets and reiterating their backing for Brazil and India to play larger roles. The declaration stressed the importance of amplifying the voice of the Global South within international institutions. Leaders also directed ministers to continue the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative and highlighted work on settlement and depository infrastructure as well as reinsurance capacity. These steps were framed as pragmatic measures to reduce financial vulnerabilities in a world increasingly shaped by sanctions and currency risks. On climate issues, the summit produced a Framework Declaration on Climate Finance and endorsed a set of Principles for Fair, Inclusive and Transparent Carbon Accounting designed to balance development needs with decarbonization. The Rio Declaration further affirmed the ongoing expansion and governance strengthening of the New Development Bank under the leadership of Dilma Rousseff. Later in September, the virtual BRICS summit struck a sharper tone, denouncing what leaders described as tariff blackmail. This session positioned BRICS as a platform for coordinating responses to unilateral trade measures and for mitigating the impact of protectionist shocks on developing economies.
At the same time, the SCO in 2025 broadened its traditional focus on both security and economic cooperation. Leaders meeting in Tianjin adopted the Tianjin Declaration and set out a long-term development strategy covering the period from 2026 to 2035. This strategy was intended to position the SCO as a rule-of-law platform for Eurasian cooperation, with commitments that extended well beyond the normal annual cycle. A major outcome was the political decision to establish an SCO Development Bank to help finance connectivity and infrastructure projects across Eurasia, with Chinese sources highlighting new platforms for regional cooperation. Although the Tianjin Declaration addressed economic and cultural themes, it remained clear that security lay at the heart of the SCO’s identity. Counter-terrorism coordination and regional security dialogues were again prominent in 2025 reporting around the summit. Taken together, the outcomes reflected two distinct approaches: BRICS foregrounded systemic reforms in governance and the strengthening of financial mechanisms, while the SCO emphasised continuity, institution-building, and the reinforcement of its security credentials.
The question of which summit in 2025 was more successful, the BRICS gatherings in Rio and later online or the SCO meeting in Tianjin, depends on whether success is judged by global influence or institutional depth. BRICS proved more effective in shaping international debates and securing visibility. The Rio Declaration called for reform of the United Nations Security Council, backed greater roles for Brazil and India, and strengthened the voice of the Global South. It advanced initiatives such as the Cross-Border Payments Initiative, climate finance principles, and a pilot for Multilateral Guarantees under the New Development Bank. The September virtual session reacted swiftly to U.S. tariffs, showing agility and unity. SCO focused on regional consolidation, adopting the Tianjin Declaration and a ten-year strategy while agreeing to establish a development bank. Although significant, these steps lacked the immediate global resonance of BRICS.
The writer is a PhD (Media and Crime), Founder of CASRO (Crime Analytics and Security Research Organisation), and can be reached at dr.nasirkhan.jasak @gmail.com