On July 17, the United States (US) proscribed a militant group called The Resistance Front (TRF) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and Specially Designated Global Terrorist. India claims that the TRF is an offshoot of the banned Pakistan-based militant organisation, the Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), which had already been proscribed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
On April 22, immediately after the Pahalgam attack in Indian-held Kashmir, via the Telegram messaging app, the TRF claimed responsibility for the attack, resulting in the deaths of 26 tourists. However, a few days later, the TRF withdrew its statement saying that its account had been hacked. On April 25, the UNSC condemned the attack. However, backed by China, Pakistan remained successful in omitting any direct mention of the TRF or LeT in the final statement. Pakistan’s main argument remained that the TRF could not be blamed for the attack.
The real challenge to Pakistan may not come from the FATF but from India’s next move to select a new target (place) to attack, in the name of disrupting a terrorist network.
The history of the TRF can be traced to October 2019, in the wake of the abrogation of Article 370, which changed the status of the Indian-held Kashmir. There is no available physical address of the TRF; instead, its formation was announced on social media. The organisation claims its roots in Indian-held Kashmir. It is still a mystery as to why Pakistan opposed the TRF’s mention in the final statement of the UNSC?
Though India could not get the TRF condemned at the level of the UNSC, India became successful in getting the TRF ostracised by the US. China was bypassed. To avoid embarrassment, China had to issue a statement saying that “the regional countries must strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation to work collectively to safeguard regional security and stability.” Here, China remained overly cautious about not annoying Pakistan by using the words “both countries”. Instead, China used the words “regional countries”. China did not oppose condemning the TRF.
Whereas Pakistan’s efforts to protect the TRF from any international condemnation, the US’s act of designating the TRF a “foreign terrorist organization” is an interesting contrast, defining the contours of Pak-US relations. Nevertheless, this act of the US is impregnated with five main repercussions. First, the US sided with India, which found obstacles removed from its stance that it was a victim of cross-border terrorism coming from Pakistan. Second, the US agreed with India on the point that the TRF was a front and proxy of the LeT. Third, the US approved India’s act of launching missile strikes against Pakistan (and Pakistan’s part of Kashmir) on May 7 in order to disrupt the terrorist network. Fourth, the US proved its stature was higher than China’s support available to Pakistan internationally. Fifth, the US strengthened India’s case to knock on the door of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which will hold a plenary session in August.
The real challenge to Pakistan may not come from the FATF but from India’s next move to select a new target (place) to attack, in the name of disrupting a terrorist network. Launching a pre-emptive strike is now a globally recognised phenomenon. Furthermore, Pakistan has been overlooking the fact that the world has not forgotten the LeT-sponsored 2008 Mumbai attacks, which consumed the lives of American tourists as well. On April 09, the US extradited a Pakistani-Canadian citizen, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, to India to face justice for his role as a co-conspirator of the Mumbai attacks. It simply means that his role has been established. On this development, a Pandora’s box is bound to open soon.
On June 28, in Karachi, while addressing the passing out ceremony of the cadets of the Pakistan Naval Academy, Pakistan’s Field Marshal, General Asim Munir, said, “What India labels as terrorism is, in fact, a legitimate and lawful struggle for freedom, recognized by international law.” Though the statement narrowly missed, it implied the words “freedom fighters”; this was an additional stance of Pakistan, approving of an armed conflict. For instance, in January 2002, in the wake of an attack on the Indian parliament, through his televised address, the then President General Pervez Musharraf said, “Pakistan will keep on extending its moral and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris in their struggle for the right to self-determination… Pakistan rejects terrorism in all its forms and manifestations… Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world.” Now, expounded by the Field Marshal, surpassing “moral and diplomatic support”, Pakistan’s improved stance is bound to invite challenges.
There is another dimension of the contrast. On the one hand, rooted in self-defence, the US approves the pre-emptive strike (Bush) doctrine which gained currency in 2003 when the US attacked Iraq, whereas on the other hand, Pakistan still admires the role of freedom fighters as existed in the past especially before 2003, though Pakistan also resorts to pre-emptive strikes against militants hiding in Afghanistan. Pakistan has to decide on which part of the divide it is: either right or left of 2003?
On July 8, an Indian journalist, Karan Thapar, interviewed Bilawal Bhutto for The Wire. Right at the outset, Bhutto took an unswerving stance that Pakistan itself was a victim of terrorism coming from Afghanistan. For that matter, Bhutto blamed Afghan Jehad and its ramifications for all the ills engulfing Pakistan, Kashmir and India. This was the same stance that Khawaja Asif had taken publicly before the start of the four-day Pak-India war. Both Asif and Bhutto implied that during the Afghan Jehad, from 1979 to 1989, Pakistan was too naïve to understand the implications. Kids were running the country. Now, Pakistan has grown mature enough to fathom the drift of history.
Against this background, omens are aplenty that the next war is approaching, whether or not immediately. Pakistan has to weigh its options.
The writer is a former diplomat and freelance columnist.
