Recently, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published a fallacious and highly biased opinion article by Sadanand Dhume, which drew a comparison between Iran’s nuclear program and Pakistan’s. It puts a question mark over the credibility of the highly reputable WSJ. It starts with the assertion that Israel’s destruction of Iran’s nuclear program was a favour to the world, endorsing it and also mentioning Israeli attacks on Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. It goes on to draw a parallel with Pakistan’s nuclear program, asserting that, following Israel’s example, India should also not have allowed the nuclear program to develop. It then adds the sprinkling of the two-decades-old issue of the A.Q. Khan network. These assertions not only endorse the unlawful bombings of sovereign countries that go against international law, but also try to put Pakistan’s nuclear program in the same category as Iran, and an attempt to rewrite Indo-Pakistan history. Many claims in the WSJ article “Iran’s Nuclear Pursuit and the Pakistani Example” need to be corrected and put in proper perspective.
India’s path to nuclear weapons is paved with theft, deceit, and major powers willing to look the other way.
First and foremost is the assertion that acquisition of Pakistan’s nuclear capability was a ‘combination of theft, charity and clever diplomacy.” It may be prudent to refresh memories here. India’s so-called ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ of 1974 was achieved by diverting nuclear fuel from Canadian reactors, which were supplied for peaceful purposes. Thus, it was the most glaring example of proliferation, and India achieved the distinction of being the first country to divert peaceful nuclear technology for weapons use. Ironically, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created precisely to prevent such proliferation acts in the future. Thus, India’s path to nuclear weapons is paved with theft, deceit, and major powers willing to look the other way. In contrast, Pakistan’s nuclear program was in response to India’s nuclear test of 1974. Pakistan was forced to follow a path to nuclear deterrence in the absence of any security guarantees from major powers like the US. To date, Pakistan’s nuclear program is security-driven, India-specific, and meant to ensure strategic stability in South Asia. Pakistan has followed a doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence and Full Spectrum Deterrence that is aimed at countering a spectrum of nuclear and conventional threats from India.
Secondly, the reference to A. Q. Khan also ignores several facts. This was a black market network that acted outside of state control. It also fails to mention that India was reportedly its 4th customer. It omits the fact that Pakistan has worked hard to achieve a robust export control regime, related legislation, the establishment of the National Command Authority, and command and control that is aligned with global standards. Moreover, it is one of the ardent supporters of the global non-proliferation efforts. It has been a responsible nuclear state and never indulged in nuclear brinkmanship, unlike its neighbouring India.
Thirdly, there is no comparison between Iran and Pakistan’s nuclear programs. Iran is a signatory to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, as such, pledged to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. Pakistan has never signed the NPT and has not violated any international law by developing nuclear weapons. A reminder here is pertinent that Pakistan only decided to pursue a nuclear program after India’s test of 1974. Moreover, Pakistan has time and again proposed the establishment of South Asia as a Nuclear Weapons-free Zone (NWFZ), and also suggested a nuclear restraint regime. In fact, Pakistan made 6 such proposals over time, which were all rejected by India.
Fourthly, the article harps on the mantra of terrorism, trying to put forth a narrative of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear materials or even making dirty bombs, which are essentially crude bombs that use nuclear materials to spread limited radiation. Pakistan’s nuclear security and a stringent nuclear command and control system ensure that nuclear materials are never accessible to unauthorised personnel. Speaking of dirty bombs, such a potential threat exists in India with the existence of a nuclear black market since the 1990s. There have been dozens of incidents of theft, illegal trade of nuclear and radioactive substances that could be used in dirty bombs that threaten India’s neighbours.
Dhume’s article tries to rewrite history. It is analytically thin and devoid of academic honesty. It fallaciously tries to portray that India, along with the U.S., is entrusted to be the regional policemen. Portraying Iran as a mirror of Pakistan is not only fallacious but risks legitimising military preemption. The article toes the Indian line where New Delhi has tried to establish ‘surgical strikes’ within Pakistani territory as the ‘new normal.’ Contrary to the article’s assertion, Pakistan’s nuclear program was not a ‘strategic blunder’ by India, but Pakistan’s response to India’s so-called ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ of 1974. The myriad half-baked ideas in the Dhume article are misleading and dangerous.
The writer is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad with a career spanning nearly two decades, advancing arms control and disarmament research.