The Chinese have probably
passionately prioritised the historical statement of the father of China’s ‘Opening Course’, Deng Xiaoping, who once stated that the nation should pursue the foreign policy course on “hiding its talent, biding its time and seeking concrete achievements.” The nation kept its talent hidden for two decades, but it does not seem unreasonable now to argue that the nation has started attaining concrete achievements.
China is on its way to become the most influential economic and political actor in Central Asia. Despite entering late into the politics of neighbouring Central Asia, China is likely to reduce US and Russian influence in the region. Although Russia has been present there for the previous one and a half centuries, the Russians seem scared of the growing Chinese involvement, especially in the economic affairs of the region.
The Chinese president has recently visited four Central Asian countries, and took part in a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Bishkek before attending the G-20 conference held in Russia. Xi’s inauguration of joint projects and his efforts to bolster promotion of a bilateral and strategic partnership with every state individually testify to China’s growing influence in the region. And interestingly, the Chinese leadership has been successful in adopting extremely measured policies, which were shaped to prevent formal or even informal ignition of ‘great power politics’ in the Central Asian countries, which, in case of turmoil, can pose a direct threat to Chinese national security.
The incumbent Chinese leadership appears following in the footsteps of the third and fourth generation of the leadership. The leadership has sought to win their Central Asian counterparts by showing respect, offering soft loans, investing in industry and keeping themselves at a distance from their domestic political issues. On the other hand, the leadership in the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have found this approach appealing, because China does not compel them like Russia or the US on their domestic issues. In simple words, China is giving them what they desire to get from a great power.
The priority list of China is more acceptable to the Central Asian leadership because the other two available options bind them in comparatively tough restrictions. Russia wants the remaining CARs to become a part of the Russian-proposed ‘Free Custom Union’, which comprises Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. On the other hand, the US has continuously encouraged the leadership in the CARs to set a timetable for internal political reforms. In this situation, where they have the silent but rich and helpful China on the one hand, and the demanding US and Russia on the other, they are likely to go to China’s side of the court.
The leadership of the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union have probably realised that China needs them the most. China is a ‘resource-hungry’ state, whose consumption and demand for energy resources is increasing with the passage of time. Secondly, China has much more to offer them than the Russians and Americans because China immensely needs maintenance of peace, eradication of religious fundamentalism and terrorism in these countries for its own development. This is the reason that Central Asia has become an area of core importance for China in recent times. None of the US presidents have ever visited the CARs. In fact, there have only been a few trips by US vice-presidents and secretaries of state to the region. On the other hand, the leadership of the third, fourth and fifth generations (Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping) have paid visits to the CARs during their presidencies.
In addition to demonstrating respect, Beijing has made substantial investments in the energy sector in Central Asia. China has funded the construction of a pipeline network across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that would supply energy to China. During his recent visit, Xi joined his Turkmen counterpart, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov in inaugurating the operationalisation of the world’s second largest gas field. Earlier in 2009, Hu Jintao had visited Turkmenistan to inaugurate a gas pipeline. Interestingly, these energy deals have added to the strength of the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) because the CNPC has started development of energy fields without taking the help of any major international energy giant.
The leading role of the CNPC means the end of the Russian monopoly on energy supply routes. This might exacerbate the sense of urgency among the Russian leadership for finalisation of a gas export deal with China. China and Russia have been negotiating on export of East Siberian gas to China since 2006. But ‘price’ remained the most important impediment to a final agreement. However, delay in this deal might reduce Russia’s options to sell gas to China. On the other hand, final agreement on proposed price would mean that China is going to pay one-third of what the Europeans pay to Russia.
Furthermore, delay in this deal is not likely to hurt Russo-Chinese relations. But it is likely to weaken the Russian position in the region because, in case of delay, China might go for another energy deal with Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. Such a deal would help China to become the largest trading partner of all Central Asian states, because the socialist republic has already become the second largest trading partner of many of the NIS, for instance Uzbekistan.
China’s growing partnership with the CARs does not imply that Russia and the US have been fully banished from the region. Although they still remain substantial players in the region, the Chinese strategy of development, investment in mutually beneficial projects and avoiding interference in domestic political issues has made the socialist republic an increasingly attractive partner for the Central Asian countries.
The writer is a visiting scholar at Ball State University, USA, and can be reached at [email protected]