The US’s retreat from Afghanistan and the Middle East poses a critical question about the future of its alliances in South Asia and the Middle East. US concentration in the Middle East is likely to reduce but it is not going to disappear completely due to certain reasons. But a South Asian country, Pakistan, which followed the US footsteps without any future planning and dragged itself into an unending war a decade ago, will be facing multiple challenges in the coming year when its major ally will be leaving the region without consulting it vis-à-vis the regional security strategy. Above all, the future of the alliance is also uncertain. Alliance-making is a common and, undoubtedly, an old practice in international relations. States forge alliances to secure themselves from external (also internal in some cases) threats. Pakistan is not an exception to this practice. The patterns of threat perception in the country constrained its leadership to forge a strong military alliance with one of the two superpowers during the 1950s. And, in this way, Pakistan became a US ally to ensure its sovereignty against external threats. However, the level of warmth in the bilateral relations kept increasing and decreasing according to the situation, need and cooperation. Today, the ‘love story’ of the Pak-US alliance is almost 60 years old, but the future of this story is in serious doubt. There are two possible scenarios of what likely is going to happen in the post-withdrawal period. There are certainly two directions: first, the US abandons Pakistan as it did after the Soviet Afghan war, and second, it keeps Pakistan as an ally. Let us examine why the US may abandon or retain Pakistan as an ally. Keeping the alliance with Pakistan can benefit the US in pivoting the Indo-Pacific region, counterterrorism and avoiding an undesirable use of force in the region. The US has already started focusing on the Asia-Pacific region, as the most recent definition of the US core national interest describes the Indian and Pacific Oceans as of primary importance. In simple words, the US does not seem to be in the mood to leave China free to monopolise the seas in its surroundings, or even to develop a blue-water navy, equally powerful in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In the case of increasing US projection of a military presence in the Strait of Malacca or any other choke point in the region, China’s first choice in South Asia is certainly Pakistan. And, definitely, the US would never welcome it with open arms. Secondly, terrorism has inevitably made Afghanistan (which is a neighbouring country of Pakistan and a member of SAARC) important for the whole world, because this country has produced two generations of guerrilla warriors (labelled as terrorists in contemporary discourse), whose organised struggle can pose an existential threat to any state ranging from Russia to the Maldives. Last but not least, the US does not want any unwanted use of force in the region, especially between India and Pakistan, because both states are equipped with nuclear weapons and have already fought three major wars, besides dozens of skirmishes. In this regard, the US will probably prefer a strong alliance with the military leadership of Pakistan, as the military force of the Islamic Republic is one of the most important reasons for the existence of this alliance. However, one may argue that the US can also do this by using diplomatic pressure on both India and Pakistan (especially Pakistan). In fact, it does not seem unreasonable to argue that the US is going to follow the traditional practice of foreign policy, which claims that friends and foes are not permanent but national interest is. There is strong evidence that the US is likely to opt for the traditional foreign policy practice. As stated above, the superpower is in retreat. It might find ‘reducing its economic burden’ and ‘concentrating on areas of utmost importance’ useful to ensure its dominance in future. The US has spent billions of dollars and received thousands of body bags as the price of hegemony after invading Afghanistan and Iraq, but it could not manage the friction of the war against terror in an appropriate manner. US forces have already been withdrawn from Iraq and now remain in Afghanistan, where the Taliban seem ‘an organised force awaiting the US exit to capture Kabul’. In addition, the major non-NATO ally in the region, Pakistan, is also not in a position to either handle or continue this war. In fact, a visible majority of the Pakistani political leadership finds it more comfortable to negotiate with the Pakistani Taliban groups (mainly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) to reach a win-win end; after all, it is an unending war. Secondly, any of Pakistan’s unwanted military moves in the region (skirmishes with India, growing naval cooperation with China or supporting freedom fighters either in Indian-administrated Kashmir or Afghanistan) can cause discomfort for the US in the continuation of the alliance with the country. The recent months have witnessed an increase in the blame game between India and Pakistan. Pakistan accuses India of shelling border areas in Pakistan-administrated Kashmir, while India labels Pakistan as responsible and supportive of infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir through the Line of Control. If this situation persists in the coming months, the US might find ‘pressurising Pakistan’ a useful technique in order to benefit from its partnership with India for greater interests. The future of this alliance is uncertain till the end of 2014. However, one thing is clear: the warmth of this alliance, bilateral aid and American support on several fronts will inevitably decrease. It seems a better option for Pakistan to start preparing itself for the post-withdrawal scenario where Talibanisation is likely to increase but the US support might not be available. The writer is a visiting scholar at Ball State University, USA, and can be reached at shoaibm37@yahoo.com