In most developed democratic polities, the appointment of a new military chief would not be as big news as it is in Pakistan. It was the lead story in the media last week. Anywhere else, it would have been a simple two column headline. The appointment of the defence minister, who is supposed to be the chief of army staff’s (COAS’s) boss, should be more important but on November 27, 2013, the appointment of General Raheel Sharif was the top story, and rightly so. Why?
Everybody in Pakistan and abroad knows why, in this wretched country, we have to give as much importance to the COAS as to a prime minister in a decent democracy. In Pakistan, the military has ruled for half of its life directly, and has indirectly managed elected governments. If the elected governments were not compliant they were booted out. Thus, the importance of the army chief is beyond question. That is realpolitik.
Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif has picked up General Sharif, who was third on the seniority list, perhaps thinking that he would remain obliged to the PM for this out-of-turn position. He did the same when he promoted General Musharraf, who ousted him in 1999. This time around, the situation has changed diametrically: the army is faced with internal insurgency by the Baloch insurgents and terrorist groups fighting to impose their brand of sharia on the country, terming the present constitution un-Islamic.
At the same time, skirmishes on the Line of Control (LoC) are keeping the eastern border simmering. This is not all. While withdrawing from Afghanistan, NATO countries and the Kabul government’s pressure is increasing on Pakistan to reign in the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Cozy Kabul-Delhi relations are also worrying Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In this situation, the army is not in a position to intervene in politics but whether the civilian government will be able to claim back its rightful space in leading the national security and foreign policies remains to be seen. In this game, the chances are that the two Sharifs, at best, will be able to draw the match.
General Sharif is likely to take a few months to settle down. This is the time for PM Sharif to show that he has exhausted his best efforts to talk to the jihadi organisations to give peace a chance whilst remaining within the remit of the constitution. The military establishment is, however, not hopeful about the success of the talks as many agreements with various groups of the Pakistani Taliban were flouted by the latter.
Eventually, the civilian government will have to take bold and courageous decisions for dealing with the Islamist terrorists and stop its appeasement policy. As pleaded in my earlier analysis in this space, the government should not be seen begging for talks. It should not be seen blaming the US for killing the terrorists who are wanted for their crimes in Pakistan. On the contrary, it should first exert maximum pressure to put the heat on al Qaeda franchisees in Pakistan and then talk to them after they are weakened.
On Balochistan, the case is different. Both the Sharifs will have to first meet on the same page regarding how to deal with the militant movement. The present tactics may have further aggravated the situation. This situation is also exploited by other countries for varied self-interests.
Every nationality can only be persuaded to restore peace by resolving the political and economic issues between the Centre and different nationalities living in Pakistan. The recent example of Scotland should be studied closely. The UK has learnt a lesson from its Ireland follies but we have not, in spite of our blunders in East Pakistan, which resulted in its secession. The beginning has to be made by the federal and Balochistan governments resolving the issues politically.
Though the PM would also like to take charge and fast-forward the peace process with India, the Indian elections may not allow New Delhi to respond to this positive desire in the same spirit until late 2014. The military has also been showing signs that it wants to resolve issues with India peacefully.
In India, the hawks, supported by a jingoist media, are holding the weak Congress government hostage. On my recent visit to India, I maintained that being a big power of the region, India should demonstrate sagacity and magnanimity to resolve issues with its smaller neighbours. The policy to pressure and ignore neighbours has not proved productive so far for India; on the contrary, almost all South Asian neighbours are not happy with India.
The US administration will also have to reassess who is the real boss in Pakistan. Up until now, they focused on discussing Afghanistan-related issues with the army chief who called the shots. Though US intervention is much hated in the country, they would do Pakistan a favour by discussing policy issues with the elected government instead of bypassing them and pushing the military to take the lead. However, only the objective realities will push incremental changes in the civil-military balance.
In his book Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, Mazhar Aziz has aptly quoted economic historian Douglass C North to explain: “Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand today’s choices…without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions” and that “Once a development path is set on a particular course…the historically derived subjective modeling of the issues reinforce the course.”
The argument alerts us to the importance of understanding the historical role and subsequent growth of the military as the most powerful institution in Pakistan. The role played by human agency in change of developed institutions is in direct proportion to the leadership quality, charisma and ability to lead from the front. The reports published about General Sharif portray him as a traditional soldier, who may not be inclined to radically change the institution’s way of thinking. However, the promising information is that he has played an important role in developing counter-insurgency tactics and training in the military.
The writer is the author of What’s Wrong With Pakistan? He can be reached at [email protected]