There is too much talk about talks between the dithering government and perfidious Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The whole nation is watching the developments anxiously as it matters in their day-to-day lives and their safety. Meanwhile, the divide between Pakistanis who are pro-talks and pro-military operation is widening every day. Even the ruling party is either divided or it is consciously playing the game of blow hot, blow cold. Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar is talking as an apologist of the TTP, while Defence Minister Khawaja Asif is blowing tough messages. The biggest opposition, the PPP, is also sending out confusing messages. While its young chairman, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, is talking of taking a tough stand against the TTP, the party’s leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, Khursheed Shah, is diplomatic on the issue.
Another important leader, Imran Khan, is vacillating between a pro-Taliban position and a half-hearted effort to wash off his ‘Taliban Khan’ image to retain his educated middle-class vote bank. He is obsessed with the Islamist narrative that Pakistan is fighting ‘America’s war’, contrary to the hard fact that, had the Pakistani establishment been with the US in this war sincerely, it would not have been supporting the Afghan Taliban’s war. Pakistan has not only provided a safe haven to Afghan Taliban leaders but has been supporting the militant insurgency in Afghanistan. Without Pakistan’s active and covert support, the Taliban would not have been in the negotiating position they are today. What will be the outcome of the talks and why does each party want talks at this crucial juncture? Let us take up the latter first.
The Pakistani Taliban are under pressure from the Afghan Taliban’s Mullah Omer to postpone their ‘jihad’ for sharia in Pakistan and focus on rallying all forces for the major insurgency in Afghanistan after the ISAF forces’ drawdown in summer. Most analysts agree that the Pakistani establishment and Afghan Taliban realise that they cannot take over Kabul as they did in 1996. The reason: all the world’s powers are not going to abandon the Kabul government this time and Pakistan would also not like strong Taliban control in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani establishment, from the reports I gathered, has realised that Afghanistan can become a haven for Pakistan jihadi groups if the country is controlled by the Afghan Taliban. Do not forget the fact that, contrary to US claims that al Qaeda has been operationally weakened in Afghanistan, its main leadership still hangs around our country and, more importantly, its ideology is alive and is flourishing among Islamist groups, uncontested by the state.
On the other hand, Sharif’s government has too many Islamists in its rank and file. Its prime concern is to keep at least Punjab safe from terrorist activities, which might increase many times if a military operation is unleashed against the TTP. This is their Faustian choice.
The military establishment, it appears, wants to clear the deck before the ISAF forces leave and a more pro-India government takes over in Afghanistan after the coming elections there. It is also apprehensive that the Afghan Taliban insurgency, assisted by Pakistani jihadis, after the ISAF forces leave will bring the Pakistani forces face-to-face with the Afghan National Army (ANA) who may use the right of hot pursuit against the insurgents. Sceptics view the talk about the military and Sharif government being on the same page as hubris. Next, the most asked question by Pakistanis and all Pakistan-watchers: will the talks succeed? So far, the chances are slim. The good development is what analysts like me have been drumming for many years — talks should be held from a position of strength is now being said by the Sharif government as well.
However, the main issue is what we are going to trade off with the terrorists, who cut off the heads of our people and display them with pleasure, for stopping terrorism. TTP demands like the release of prisoners and the imposition of sharia infused and confused with medieval tribal customs are not acceptable to the people of Pakistan. The majority of Pakistanis are conservative Muslims but they are not believers in ‘Saudi’ Islam. They believe in a modern Pakistan with more tolerant religious values, immersed in the subcontinent’s Islam.
The government is faced with a hydra-headed terrorist organisation. While the government will have to commit as one entity, terrorists have many heads like the Ahrar-e-Hind and Ansarul Islam, which will continue with their operations. The TTP very conveniently denies that these groups are part of their alliance. The most probable scenario is that the talks are going to fail in a few weeks and, even if both parties reach some agreement, this accord will be short-lived. Indeed, if the military operation is started, the TTP and its allies will increase terrorist activities in the cities. However, the fear in some middle-class intellectuals that the Taliban can take over the cities is misplaced for a number of reasons, mainly that Pakistan is not Afghanistan.
Let us look at some of the positive factors that are likely to resist the Talibanisation of Pakistan. One, the ethnic and religious diversity of Pakistani society is likely to be its saving grace. The tradition of democratic struggle against the military-civil bureaucracy dictatorship in Pakistan has been remarkable. Each time the military has captured power, it has been challenged by the people on the streets of the country.
Two, Pakistan has experienced democracy, imperfect it may be, but people have stood for it and enjoy more political and social freedom as against Afghanistan, which tumbled into one form of dictatorial system to another with a weak history of democratic struggle. However, in the last 10 years it has seen some institution building, though still in its nascent stage. Three, Pakistan is economically more developed with a large urban population. The capitalist relations of production are dominant in urban Pakistan and are even penetrating the rural areas with the modernisation of farming, as against predominantly tribal relations in Afghanistan.
Four, though both Pakistan and Afghanistan are multi-ethnic countries, in Pakistan each ethno- linguistic group has a different religious ethos. It may be true about Afghanistan also but the Afghan Taliban, who are predominantly Pakhtuns, steamrolled other ethnic groups and suppressed all the sects not from their school of thought, which resulted in the division of the country. In Pakistan, the Taliban are mostly from the tribal areas and have some support of the Islamists in other ethnic groups. They do not have the support of the majority of Pakhtuns in the country. The majority of the population belongs to the Barelvi sect and there is a large Shia population also; these sects will resist the Talibanisation of Pakistan.
The writer is the author of What’s Wrong With Pakistan? He can be reached at [email protected]