In a rare glimpse of what diplomacy can achieve when it is exercised with much gusto, the world saw Iran successfully limit (read legitimise) its nuclear capabilities last week. After marathon negotiations that tested not only the wits but also the physiological limits of the participants, Iran was able to reach a deal with the P5+1 countries — permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany — over a gradual phasing out of sanctions in exchange for limiting its nuclear aspirations.
While Iran’s importance in the Middle East has sometimes been overlooked, this new deal signals Iran’s ascension to the big league. Decades of sanctions have hit the Iranian economy hard and while the state has been able to limp forward, the hardliners have had to cede crucial political space to the moderates, as is evident from the results of the recent polls in the Shia-majority theological state. In such a scenario, giving up uranium enrichment for procuring basic amenities seems like an easy choice but the history of US-Iran relations is replete with much acrimony, which is why this deal is such a landmark achievement.
The US too can pat itself on the back for foregoing the usual intervene-before-you-think knee-jerk reaction and sticking to months of negotiations even in the absence of any meaningful developments earlier. While Obama’s domestic clout has been constantly waning, his international stature has been growing with equal consistency. Under his presidency, the US has slowly disengaged itself from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, at the same time, has engaged with old foes to reverse historical positions.
There is an interesting explanation for why all this might have come to fruition. In 2010, the Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Bob Woodward wrote a book titled Obama’s Wars. In this text, he berated the Bush presidency for its failure to engage Iran over its nuclear programme. Woodward maintained that the lack of compromise from the Bush administration pushed Iran towards confrontation and since the WMD fiasco in Iraq was all too fresh in the public’s memory, the US had to back down from direct involvement in Iran. The author highlighted how North Korea had seen the Iranians defy a superpower by sticking to their guns and threatening to enrich more and more uranium, and it was then that Kim Jong-Il decided to play the belligerent state card to reasonable success.
Going against public opinion at the time, Woodward maintained that any US president desirous of a nuke-free Iran had to stick to diplomacy even in the face of failure and by applying enough pressure through sanctions and other measures, the Iranians would ultimately open up. As Iran and the US enjoy their newfound bonhomie in the coming days, one can feel that Woodward’s lessons just might have found resonance in the White House.
But while Iran and the US can finally put their feet up, there are others who are shifting uncomfortably in their cosy abodes. If the Saudis were paranoid earlier on about encirclement on all sides from Iranian forces, this new deal will surely give them nightmares. When the original deadline of March 31 to reach a deal in Lausanne passed amidst interludes of Saudi bombardment in Yemen, the 10 or so strong coalition of Arab states was smugly satisfied. But the fact that the contours of the deal were still finalised has put an interesting but dangerous spin on the balance of power in the Middle East. Since then, the skirmishes in Yemen have blown into a full-on civil war in the past 10 days and the violence is showing no signs of receding anytime soon. In fact, the regularity with which nationals of different countries are being allowed to evacuate the country leads one to believe that the war could rage on for a while.
Part of the reason why Middle Eastern politics is so muddled is because everyone has their hands in everyone else’s pockets and everyone is busy scratching everyone else’s back. The US supports the Yemeni government against which the Iranian-backed Houthis are fighting but it also supports Iranian security forces in their fight against Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. To add to the conundrum, Iran and the US are also head-to-head over the matter of regime change in Syria.
Similarly, Qatar on the one hand supports the government in Libya against Saudi wishes and, at the same time, has to provide support to the Yemeni government as a partner in the coalition driven by Saudi Arabia. But while the true loyalties of states might be in question, one thing is certain: the conflict in Yemen might just stop short of escalating into a regional war but the battle for supremacy in the Middle East is just getting started.
As the joint session of parliament decides Pakistan’s role in Yemen, it would do well for decision-makers to keep the mesh of alliances and loyalties in mind. So far, Pakistan has refrained from diving in headfirst in the face of lukewarm demands of involvement from the Saudis but, sooner or later, Saudi Arabia will start to press harder. With the new Saudi king eager to stamp his arrival on the Middle Eastern political scene, the way Pakistan acts today will decide the course of the Pak-Saudi relationship for the next couple of decades to come. The best course of action would be to just say, “No, thanks” and break the cycle. But the trouble is that the cycle cannot be broken by the very people who are its product. Let us hope that securing Pakistan’s internal security takes precedence over annoying the Saudis.
The author is a freelance columnist with degrees in political science and international relations