On Wednesday, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Austria Ayesha Riyaz in Vienna formally applied for Pakistan’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The ministry of foreign affairs subsequently announced this on Friday. The application was addressed to NSG Chairman Rafael Grossi in which Pakistan’s positive nuclear safety record and efforts to curb nuclear proliferation were highlighted as the key points. The application letter stated that Pakistan has the expertise, manpower and infrastructure, as well as the ability to supply NSG-controlled items, goods and services for a full range of nuclear applications for peaceful uses. The envoy’s letter further added that Pakistan attached high priority to nuclear safety and security, as the state has taken legal, regulatory and administrative measures to bring nuclear safety and security at par with international standards.
The application was filed in response to India’s largely failed efforts to join the group for a number of years now. Moreover, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry also announced that Pakistan has the right credentials to join the elite nuclear trading group.
Looking into the historical context, the NSG was actually formed in response to India’s launch of the Smiling Buddha nuclear test in the Rajasthan desert in 1974. The objectives of the group included controlling export of nuclear-grade material for only civil energy and medical purposes, including promotion of non-proliferation of weapons-grade radioactive materials, such as highly enriched Uranium. However, it is ironic that some key global powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom support India’s membership for the elite nuclear club that was initially formed due to India’s actions.
In terms of nuclear safety and security track record, Pakistan because of its robust mechanism of security and deterrence is in a much stronger position to join the NSG as compared to India. Despite major security challenges owing to terrorist attacks and fundamental extremism in the last few years, Pakistan’s National Command Authority and Strategic Plans Division (SPD) has consistently managed to streamline and secure nuclear-grade material for both civilian and military usage. Although the secret proliferation programme conducted by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan’s Kahuta Research Laboratories tainted Pakistan’s image on a global level in February 2004, the subsequent mechanisms adopted by the SPD under its former director-general Lt General (retd) Khalid Kidwai were considered foolproof, and were also widely lauded around the globe. The screening process for recruiting individuals in sensitive nuclear installations was also significantly improved, and background checks were carried out regularly for security clearances.
In contrast, there have been a number of cases in India where nuclear safety and security was compromised. Nuclear materials have not only been misplaced and stolen but also found in residential areas in cities such as New Delhi. Nuclear scientists have also been hacked to death in the past for unspecified reasons. This should be the real cause of concern and reason for not allowing India’s membership for NSG, which India’s vying hard for as of now. Since both Pakistan and India did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), allowing India’s membership into the club would hamper South Asia’s security as the civil nuclear deal it signed with the US in 2006 is also allegedly being used to divert radioactive material for weapons development.
The world must realise that Pakistan’s efforts are sincere in curbing nuclear proliferation and China’s role in backing it for NSG membership is quite positive given the historical ties between the two states. If India is eventually allowed into the NSG then Pakistan too has the same right. It is hoped that the NSG’s governing body would be impartial in assessing Pakistan’s membership application rather than bowing to Indian pressure during the NSG’s next meeting in June.*