And China largely reciprocated, thereby criticizing America’s response to the public health crisis and the cascade of social, economic, and political problems that flowed from it. The U.S. rejoined the climate accord on day one of Biden’s presidency but the administration remains mum on whether it would rejoin the TPP-11. Washington was also left out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the Asia-Pacific region’s largest trade pact. Biden’s interim security guidance also foregrounded the urgent need for the U.S. to retain its edge in advance technology, where “global leadership is up for grabs.
“With cooperation from both sides, the better angels in China-US relations will beat the evil forces,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told a press briefing. She said Biden had used the word “unity” several times in his inauguration speech, and that it was “precisely what is needed currently in US-China relations”. Trade pacts will also be putting pressure on the United States to engage, said Wendy Cutler, former assistant trade representative in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).The pacts include the Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is seen as a China-backed alternative to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and is touted as the world’s largest free trade agreement. The United States is asserting its presence in Asia-Pacific with alternate arrangements, including “the quad” – an informal grouping of Australia, India and Japan and Washington – to counter China’s political, commercial and military influence in the region.
Retaining America’s lead in the tech sector will involve robust investment in research and development as well as a sound immigration policy to attract top-notch talent, according to the document. The superpower competition between the US and China will continue to dominate under a Biden administration,’ said Kunjal Gala, lead global emerging markets portfolio manager at Federated Hermes. ‘Instead of a full reset of Trump’s tariffs and technology restrictions, the Biden administration is likely to deliver recalibrations. These ‘recalibrations’ could also entail a change in rhetoric.
Yet while the Biden administration offers the possibility of a reset in US–China relations, powerful structural factors within the United States make it likely that zero-sum competition will continue to dominate its approach to China
Europeans are finding it increasingly difficult to align with the U.S. government’s view on China because of the Trump administration’s policies and approaches toward the European Union, particularly the imposition of trade tariffs and President Trump’s often stated views that the European Union is a “foe” or “worse than China.” Europe, as Luis Simon puts it, is at the same time “subject and object” of the growing tension between the United States and China and has become again the “battleground of great power competition,” as Constanze Stelzenmüller presents it.2 Neither a great power nor a state, but something different, the European Union and its member states are experiencing pressure from: the United States, to decouple or distance from China; Russia,
The Indian factor plays a crucial role in the US- China relationship. Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that have elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflict—though in different degrees. Each sees a role for the other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with the other sends a signal to China, but neither wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and China. However, both India and the U.S. seem envious of China’s rise as a global power via its mega BRI project. Neither would like to see what some have outlined as President Xi Jinping’s vision of Asia, with a dominant China and the U.S. playing a minimal role. India and the U.S. recognize that China will play a crucial role in Asia—it is the nature of that role that concerns both countries. Their anxiety has been more evident since 2009, leading the two sides to discuss China—and the Asia-Pacific broadly—more willingly. They have an East Asia dialogue in place. There is also a trilateral dialogue with Japan and talk of upgrading it to ministerial level and including Japan on a more regular basis in India-U.S maritime exercises.
The North Korean factor also holds importance with regard to the future ties between US and China. Washington has tried to pressure Beijing to lean more heavily on Pyongyang and leverage China’s economic influence over the North by imposing sanctions on firms or individuals contributing to its ability to finance nuclear and missile development. Some measures target North Korean funds in Chinese banks, while others focus on its mineral and metal export industries, which make up an important part of trade with China. Others have targeted Chinese businesses and individuals believed to be facilitating North Korean financing in violation of sanctions.
Now, how the relations between the two countries evolve will largely depend on whether Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden get along better or friction points take the center stage. Zhiqun Zhu, Head of the International Relations Department at Bucknell University said, “There is a bipartisan consensus in Washington to be tough on China.” The new pick for the secretary of state Antony Blinken holds that he agrees with his predecessor Mike Pompeo about the need to be tough on China. Mr. Blinken has further said that he sees US revitalizing alliances to counter growing rivalry with China and Russia. The speed with which the U.S.-China rivalry is intensifying, and the bipartisan nature of U.S. opposition to China have created an especially precarious situation for the future of global peace.
Some still argue that Biden may follow a Eisenhower strategy toward China, which fosters a policy of strategic restraint. Nonetheless, Biden’s method of dealing with China would slightly differ from his predecessor. “President Biden committed to pursuing practical, results-oriented engagements when it advances the interests of the American people and those of our allies”, the White House stated. He had also consulted his allies and partners before talking to Xi. He intends to take his allies and partners along with him and has emphasised on multilateralism. A task force comprising 15 experts has been established to work out the details of the policy to deal with China.
Yet while the Biden administration offers the possibility of a reset in US–China relations, powerful structural factors within the United States make it likely that zero-sum competition will continue to dominate its approach to China. However, many politicians and experts in international policy warn of the strategic danger in possibly misunderstanding and treating China badly and the potentially enormous costs of deterioration of the U.S.-China relationship. A restraint US strategy– on the issue of the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—accompanied by an urge to promote a soft power relationship between Washington and Beijing is highly suggestible. Concluded
The writer is an independent ‘IR’ researcher and international law analyst based in Pakistan