Last week, Joe Biden, former US Vice president, in a statement said that his country’s future counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan can become successful if the US reestablishes military bases in Pakistan. Biden was commenting on President Trump’s decision to cancel talks with the Taliban and ongoing discussions related to American military presence’s future in the region.
Essentially, former Vice President recommended moving U.S. troops from Afghanistan to Pakistan, from where they could run counter-terrorism operations.
While currently, there are no US bases in Pakistan, Biden’s comments do have a historical context. After the September 9/11 attacks, Pakistan-US signed an agreement to enable logistical support for the U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. The US has fought most of its Afghan war via logistical support that it received support from Pakistan’s air and land corridors.
Under current circumstances, the argument of Pakistan providing logistical support and bases to the US is problematic to consider for the country for several reasons. One of the key reasons is the ballooning history of mistrust between the two countries and the emblazoned understanding in Pakistan that Washington cannot be trusted. More importantly, as long as costs of a military cooperation far outweigh anticipated gains, any such proposal won’t be considered seriously by Pakistan’s ruling elite.
“We can prevent the United States from being the victim of terror coming out of Afghanistan by providing for bases – insist the Pakistanis provide bases for us to airlift from and to move against what we know,” Biden said. “We don’t need those troops there. I would bring them home.” Biden’s comments didn’t consider political and security veracities on the ground – neither on the Pakistani side nor on the US side. Biden may not be part of the current government but he should know that if Islamabad were to consider any such proposal, Washington will have to make serious concessions.
Hypothetically, let’s consider that Islamabad is willing to discuss the US’s proposal of deploying counter-terrorism units in Pakistan. In such a situation, Islamabad would have to consider the domestic and regional political, diplomatic and security costs that the cooperation might entail. How will the Afghan government or other political stakeholders react to US’s decision of housing its counter-terrorism in Pakistan? Can Pakistan take into confidence regional players that do not want to see the US’s military deployment in the region? What if an attack originated from Pakistan kills civilians or members of the Afghan Taliban? How will that impact Pakistan’s relationship with some political groups? How will domestic political and religious clusters read into the situation? Does the public opinion allow that the ruling elite endorses an open U.S. military deployment? Will the government and its support base be giving away a powerful propaganda weapon to its adversaries? Can Islamabad be sure that it’s not going to be scapegoated or sanctioned once the utility of the cooperation ends?
In general, it makes sense that going forward, Pakistan would want to keep some sort of direct military engagement with Washington that can become a direct line of communication between the two countries
On the other hand, does the current government in the US has a political will and capacity to accommodate some of Pakistan’s demands if the latter is to out weight the likely costs of such cooperation? Can Washington help Pakistan in dealing with the Kashmir situation and take away some pressure from its economy? Will the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon condemn India’s decision of occupying Jammu and Kashmir? Will the US offer Pakistan complete support at the UNSC against India? Is Washington willing to sign a major trade agreement with Pakistan? Can the US sign a civil nuclear agreement with Pakistan, granting NSG waivers to the country? Can Washington take away the mounting FATF and IMF pressure? If President Trump is willing to discuss some of these terms in the context of a post-Afghan withdrawal situation where it can establish bases in Pakistan, Islamabad might be expected to consider some sort of implicit or explicit deployment of U.S. troops.
In general, it makes sense that going forward, Pakistan would want to keep some sort of direct military engagement with Washington that can become a direct line of communication between the two countries. In a situation where the US has withdrawn from Afghanistan but keeps small counter-terror deployment in Pakistan, can increase Islamabad’s political efficacy for Washington.
Only time will tell how badly President Trump wants to resolve the Afghan conundrum and if it’s willing to pay the costs. One thing is certain, this time around, Pakistan’s cooperation won’t come easy.
The writer is a freelance journalist