In the end, the man who had launched Operation Searchlight felt he had done no wrong. The fault for the breakup of Pakistan was all Mujib’s
On the 25th of March, 1971, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, the president of Pakistan and the commander-in-chief of the army, ordered the Eastern Garrison to open fire on the leadership of the Awami League with the goal of crushing what he said was a secessionist movement fomented by Sheikh Mujib.
The action resulted in a horrific civil war that lasted for months and culminated in a full-scale war with India. In less than two weeks, the Eastern Garrison surrendered, bringing about the very secession that Yahya had sought to prevent.
In the process, hundreds of thousands died. Even more were maimed, dislocated or traumatised. Could anything have been done to prevent what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would later memorialise in his book, ‘The Great Tragedy?’
Yahya glossed over the fact that despite its two wings, Pakistan was one country with one constitution, one general election, one president, one army, one currency, and one seat in the UN. The challenge to ‘human ingenuity’ was just a challenge to those in West Pakistan who could not for a moment entertain the thought of being governed by the East, which they had governed for almost a quarter century
In retrospect, the answer is obvious. All that Yahya had to do was hand over power to the Awami League, since it had won an absolute majority in the National Assembly. Even Yahya himself had referred to Mujib as the future prime minister of Pakistan. So why did that not happen?
He had hoped that the elections would yield a hung parliament, leading to a coalition government, which would allow him to continue as a strong military president. When Mujib’s party won an absolute majority, he lost his nerve and launched Operation Searchlight.
But that is not the explanation that Yahya gave to the Hamoodur Rahman Commission (HRC). He began by protesting his innocence, saying that he had no desire to take over the country on the 25th of March, 1969.
He said that “The whole country lay desolate politically, administratively and economically, and I was landed with the task of running the country (because) I was the senior most soldier in the country at the time as C-in-C Army.”
When he met Mujib in January 1971, Yahya said he tried to persuade the Sheikh to meet Bhutto before the convening of National Assembly session in Dacca in March. He explains why he wanted Mujib to meet Bhutto because after “the general elections in 1970, a picture emerged which was both peculiar and challenging. In East Pakistan, the Awami League emerged as the dominant political party but without a single seat in West Pakistan. Similarly in West Pakistan the PPP emerged as a majority party but without a single seat in East Pakistan. In a contiguous country this would have presented no problem, but separated as our two wings stand the position was a challenge to human ingenuity.”
Yahya glossed over the fact that despite its two wings, Pakistan was one country with one constitution, one general election, one president, one army, one currency, and one seat in the UN. The challenge to “human ingenuity” was just a challenge to those in West Pakistan who could not for a moment entertain the thought of being governed by the East, which they had governed for almost a quarter century.
Seeking to resolve the conundrum, Yahya said he asked Mujib to form a coalition with Bhutto: ‘It is nothing new in the world. It has happened before. It has happened in countries which are contiguous. In our case of Pakistan, with two widely separated wings, it becomes all the more necessary to get going. After some time both the parties, ie Awami League and PPP, could spread their political activities in both the wings and in a future election they could fight elections as national parties as opposed to regional parties.’
Again, he seemed oblivious of the fact that coalition governments are only formed when there is no majority party. The Awami League had a clear majority in Pakistan.
Yahya said Mujib was indifferent to this suggestion, not realising that anyone whose party had an absolute majority would have felt the same way. On returning from Dacca, Yahya called on Bhutto in Larkana: “He (Bhutto) was quite prepared to talk to Sheikh Mujib and wanted some time for these discussions before the National Assembly session was called. These talks did take place at Dacca when the PPP leaders visited East Pakistan. After several meetings, the PPP team returned to West Pakistan.”
On “the 2nd or 3rd March,” Yahya met with Lt-Gen Yakub who had just been appointed as the governor of East Pakistan in place of Admiral Ahsan who had “panicked and lost complete control of the situation.”
Yahya is equally harsh on Yakub. After Mujib issued his four demands on March ‘6th or 7th’ (lifting of martial law, transfer of power, inquiry commission to go into firing in Dacca, and return of the army to barracks), Yakub “sent a signal to GHQ stating that he was handing over charge to his second in command” and resigning. Yahya said that “this move of Yakub was most unprecedented in the history of any professional army.” Yahya could not appreciate the fact that Yakub had resigned on moral grounds, since he did not want to open fire on his countrymen.
On the “14th or 15th of March,” Yahya arrived in Dacca to hold talks with Mujib. He states, “Sheikh told me quite bluntly that he could not live with West Pakistan on the old basis anymore. I must accede to his four demands … and have two separate sessions of the National Assembly — one consisting of East Pakistan MNAs and the other of West Pakistan MNAs. After the two assemblies have formed their own constitutions, then the two assemblies could meet in a joint session to see if there is any basis of living together and so on, so forth.”
Yahya said he argued with the Sheikh at length over several days and explained to him that his demands were unworkable but to no avail. So he “decided to send for the leaders of parliamentary groups of the National Assembly from West Pakistan.”
He said he put the whole case before these politicians and asked them for advice. He says they “were completely surprised at this change in the stance of Awami League. After they all saw Sheikh Mujib collectively and individually, they all came and told me that Mujib’s demands were totally unacceptable to them, and amounted to complete secession.”
Yahya says all these politicians but Bhutto told him to do what he thought was best for the country. Bhutto instead “advised me to restore the authority of the government,” given Yahya the excuse to launch Operation Searchlight.
Bhutto seemed to concur. After the army opened fire on the Awami League leaders and their supporters, he returned to West Pakistan and exclaimed, “By the Grace of God, Pakistan has at last been saved.”
Yahya concluded, “Any doubts about Mujib’s complicity with Indians in this sordid affair of cessation (sic) of East Pakistan should become crystal clear after his post-release behaviour of going to London and Delhi to pay homage to Indira Gandhi and his shameless statements.”
In the end, the man who had launched Operation Searchlight felt he had done no wrong. The fault for the breakup of Pakistan was all Mujib’s.
Yet the HRC found Yahya guilty of war crimes and called for his court-martial. It never happened.
The author has written, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan. [email protected]
Published in Daily Times, March 25th 2018.