In a region where the silences between capitals often disclose more than their official communiqués, the simultaneous messages issued by senior Saudi and Emirati media officials–followed by photographs of an apparently cordial encounter–were plainly intended to reassure audiences at home and allies abroad that the estrangement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi had not crossed the point from which old friendships become permanent rivalries.
That reassurance was necessary, although it would be premature to confuse it with reconciliation. The differences that have surfaced over the past several months have involved neither protocol nor wounded pride alone: Saudi Arabia and the UAE have supported opposing forces in Yemen, quarrelled over the management of oil production, adopted different attitudes towards the war involving Iran, and watched a strategic partnership, once presented as the organising centre of the Arab Gulf, become increasingly burdened by competition for commercial, political and military influence. The UAE’s departure from OPEC gave this divergence an institutional shape that carefully worded social-media posts cannot by themselves erase.
The timing becomes all the more conspicuous, considering how the Houthis have threatened Saudi shipping and Red Sea ports, and insecurity at Bab el-Mandeb now risks joining the Strait of Hormuz as another choke point through which war may threaten countries far removed from the battlefield. An estimated seven per cent of global oil exports could be exposed to serious disruption, while Brent crude has already climbed above $90 amid fears that the region’s waterways are becoming extensions of its wars.
For Pakistan, which has friendships in the Gulf too old and interests there too deep to remain complacent as the entire region stands on the edge of a precipice, the correct response is neither triumphal mediation nor nervous neutrality. Islamabad has consistently stood by Saudi Arabia and the UAE when their territory and vital installations have been attacked, yet it has continued talking to Tehran. More ominously, it has defended the sovereignty of Gulf states without accepting the proposition that peace requires Iran’s permanent isolation, all the while treating deterrence, dialogue and regional ownership as parts of the same architecture rather than rival doctrines.
That approach has acquired substance in recent weeks. Pakistan’s foreign minister has recently spoken with his Iranian and Saudi counterparts, urging restraint in both conversations, while Islamabad continues to invoke the memorandum reached between Iran and the US on June 18. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt have themselves participated with Pakistan in consultations intended to preserve that fragile opening.
The Saudi-Emirati thaw should therefore be welcomed, although Pakistan should quietly encourage something more durable than an agreement to lower the temperature of television studios and social-media accounts. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi must reopen serious consultations over Yemen and accept that Gulf security cannot be collective when danger approaches from outside but competitive when internal influence is at stake. *