When critical decisions are taken without complete understanding of the reasons that brought success and provoked failure, the almost certain outcome is failure. This is a theme in my upcoming book, coauthored with former United Kingdom Defence Chief Lord David Richards.
In Vietnam, Afghanistan and the second Iraq war, a militarily superior US was doomed to fail because its leaders did not heed this. And so in analysing the war with Iran, a simple question encapsulates our work: Does anyone on the US side understand Iran’s mosaic defence?
Iranian leadership comprehends this reality of military imbalance: In a conventional war with the US or Israel, Iran cannot win. Its already outdated air force and trivial navy have been “obliterated,” according to President Trump. Iran cannot project sustained conventional power beyond its borders.
The strategic response to this dilemma was a mosaic defence – neutralising an adversary’s strength by making a country impossible to decapitate or too expensive to occupy using ground forces.
Beginning in 2005, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Centre for Strategy, headed by Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jafari and chief strategist Hassan Abbasi, took on resolving this challenge. The second Iraq War was the starting point. Saddam Hussein’s centralised command structure was eviscerated by American military superiority. Iran could never match American military power. The lesson was clear.
The test came with Operation Epic Fury, which initially killed Iran’s supreme leader and a substantial portion of senior Revolutionary Guard leadership.
These strategists concluded that decentralisation was the new strategic centre of gravity for Iran. By 2008, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had restructured itself into 31 separate provincial commands, each designed to operate with pre-delegated authority, assuming that the most senior leadership concentrated in Tehran was destroyed or neutralised. The simple theory was that a network not dependent on a single point of failure could not be defeated by a single decisive attack or even continuing attacks.
Three interlocking pillars were shaped by the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, when Iraqi missiles struck Iranian cities, and Iran could not retaliate.
First, ballistic and cruise missile forces, dispersed and hardened, provided Iran with military capability independent of air superiority. Today, drones have greatly enhanced this capability.
Second, a regional network of allied forces across Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria – including Hamas and Hezbollah – extended Iran’s strategic reach. This complicates the enemy’s calculus and expands the geography of any conflict. These are not just proxies: they are essential to a mosaic defence.
Third, and most importantly, this decentralised command architecture was based on redundant, geographically dispersed nodes with overlapping authority. The design ensured that decapitation strikes, such as the February 28 attack that killed much of Iran’s leadership and disrupted command and control, would have minimal impact.
It is not clear that the US fully comprehended this. It may have believed that decapitation would have brought an immediate regime collapse.
Winning by mosaic defence is based on outthinking the enemy, mitigating its military strength and targeting doctrines. The aim is to maintain the country’s capacity to fight no matter the damage. As in Vietnam, war would disintegrate into a costly, unpredictable and prolonged conflict. And the longer it persisted, American support would deteriorate, making the war unsustainable. This is winning through endurance – the ultimate means to defeat the US.
The test came with Operation Epic Fury, which initially killed Iran’s supreme leader and a substantial portion of senior Revolutionary Guard leadership. This was the scenario that would prove the mosaic strategy’s value. Provincial and local commands continued to function under pre-delegated authority once the central command was destroyed. This may be one reason why a local commander in the Strait of Hormuz may have attacked a merchantman without central authorisation.
A mosaic defence has imperfections. Delegation of authority defeats central control. The possibility of miscalculation, unwanted escalation and the inability to control implementing a ceasefire or negotiation are complicated.
Yet so far, Iran seems to be fighting the US to a draw, despite its military inferiority. For the US side, the best strategy to defeat this decentralised system has not yet emerged. More bombing does not seem to be the most effective action.
Either way, unless the US grasps the nature of the mosaic strategy, it cannot prevail.
The writer is a senior advisor at Washington, DC’s Atlantic Council and a published author. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.