The funeral procession of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran was not arranged merely as a farewell. It was staged as an answer. Iran had lost its supreme leader to war, yet the state wanted the world to see streets filled with mourners, flags, chants and a carefully managed message of defiance.
This is how embattled states use mourning. For Iran’s leadership, the procession was aimed as much at Washington, Tel Aviv and the Gulf capitals as at its own people. The point was to show that assassination and airstrikes had not broken the symbolic machinery of the Islamic Republic.
The more serious story, however, lies beyond the procession. Iran is trying to convert survival into bargaining power. The war did not erase its geography, its regional networks or its ability to unsettle energy markets. Tehran understands that its nuclear programme may draw the headlines, but the Strait of Hormuz gives it a form of leverage that missiles alone cannot provide. Roughly a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows through that narrow waterway. No serious regional settlement can ignore that fact.
This is why the current diplomatic moment is so fragile. Washington wants a settlement that prevents Iran from reviving its nuclear ambitions and reduces the danger of another open confrontation. Tehran appears to want something larger before it returns seriously to the nuclear file: recognition, formal or informal, that it cannot be treated as a defeated power around the strait. The 60-day ceasefire may have been designed to restore diplomacy, but diplomacy itself has become a contest over what the war changed and what it failed to change.
Israel reads that danger clearly. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has denied any serious rupture with President Donald Trump, saying the relationship is “fine” and that there are only “differences of opinion” between close allies. That may be true in the larger sense. The US-Israel alliance is not collapsing. But the need to publicly insist that there is no rift tells its own story. Israel fears that American diplomacy may freeze a new reality rather than reverse it.
Netanyahu’s opposition to the possible sale of F-35 warplanes to Turkiye should be seen in the same light. Israel’s anxiety is not confined to Iran. It also reflects unease over a Middle East in which Washington may have to rebalance among several powerful actors. If Ankara regains access to advanced American military technology, Israel will read it as another sign that its privileged strategic position is being tested, even if not overturned.
Khamenei’s funeral showed that Iran remains capable of staging resistance. The harder question is whether the region’s leaders are capable of turning this moment into diplomacy before Hormuz once again finds itself on the cusp of catastrophe. *