The joint statement by EU and UK envoys regarding cross-border terrorism originating from Afghanistan validates Pakistan’s long-standing position, a claim the Afghan Taliban have rejected since assuming power. This is not an isolated case. Previous reports by UNSC monitoring committees and SIGAR had also highlighted similar concerns and urged the Afghan regime to fulfil its commitments under the 2021 Doha accord.
Apart from spreading chaos through TTP, the Taliban have built a harsh system of state discrimination inside Afghanistan. They issued more than 230 orders that took away the basic rights of women and girls. Because of this, global experts call it “gender apartheid”.
Over 2.2 million Afghan girls are still banned from high school and university. Women cannot work, travel freely, or take part in public life.
This bad governance has created a huge humanitarian crisis. 21 million Afghans need urgent help, and about 65% of the people live in severe poverty due to the regime’s exclusive and ideological policies. Every day, there is a new story of fighting between different ruling groups over the distribution of resources and the share in government. The latest in this regard is the removal of Zabul’s Deputy Governor Haji Jumma Khan Fateh, disputes over gold mines in Badakhshan, and the ongoing removal of Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara commanders show that ethnic divisions inside the Taliban government are getting worse.
Although the Taliban claims to run a national government, power is actually held by a small group of Kandahari Pashtuns. They control politics, security forces, provincial offices, and economic resources. At the same time, non-Pashtun leaders are being removed through arrests, dismissals, killings, and exclusion from key positions.
Over 2.2 million Afghan girls are still banned from high school and university. Women cannot work, travel freely, or take part in public life.
Ethnic exclusion is now the main feature of Taliban rule. About 90% of 1,185 top positions are held by Pashtuns, even though Pashtuns make up only 40-45% of Afghanistan’s population. Tajiks hold just 5.3%, Uzbeks 2.5%, and Hazaras only 0.6%. This proves the Taliban’s claim of “inclusive government” is false.
In the 49-member cabinet, there are only 2 Tajiks, 2 Uzbeks, 2 Baloch, and 1 Nuristani. The Hazara representation is almost zero, and no women are included at all.
Haji Jumma Khan Fateh was removed as Zabul’s deputy governor after he said he controlled 10,000 fighters. This shows Kandahari leaders want to eliminate non-Pashtun commanders who could challenge their authority.
Uzbek commander Qari Salahuddin Ayubi was removed from Zabul. Uzbek commander Makhdoom Alam Rabbani was arrested, causing protests in Faryab.
Tajik commander Qari Wakil was arrested after trying to mediate, leading to unrest in Badghis.
Mawlawi Mahdi Mujahid was the only Hazara commander in the Taliban. He rebelled against ethnic discrimination, was captured, and executed. This ended the Hazara presence in the Taliban’s top military leadership.
Even Tajik Army Chief Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat still has his title, but hundreds of officers loyal to him have been removed from the Defence Ministry.
More than 4,000 military personnel have been dismissed. Most came from Badakhshan, Kapisa, Parwan, and Takhar. Badakhshan alone lost over 1,000 officers, many loyal to the Tajik Army Chief.
Other Tajik commanders like Abdul Hamid Khorasani, Ghulam Hussain, and Ajmal Kohi were removed, arrested, or disarmed. Prominent Tajik leader Abdul Hamid Mujahid was killed after criticising the Taliban’s mono-ethnic policies.
When a Tajik or Uzbek commander is arrested, hundreds of his officers and fighters are also dismissed or disarmed. This destroys non-Pashtun command networks step by step.
Even former Deputy Intelligence Chief Salahuddin Salar was dismissed after accusing Taliban leaders of ethnic favouritism, power monopoly, and keeping natural resources in the hands of a small tribal elite.
The fight over Badakhshan’s gold mines shows how Afghanistan’s $1-3 trillion mineral wealth is being used for factional power. Kandahari leaders want full control of mining income while pushing aside local commanders.
This pattern in Badakhshan, Takhar, Panjshir, Balkh, Faryab, and Zabul proves the Taliban now works like a Kandahari tribal network. Loyalty to the tribe matters more than skill, representation, or national unity. Afghanistan’s main internal problem is no longer just ideology. The Taliban’s ethnic discrimination, control of state institutions, and monopoly over resources have made ethnicity a major cause of division. This weakens the regime and creates long-term instability.
The writer is a freelance columnist and contributes regularly on issues concerning national security.