The latest exchange between the US and Iran has left the ceasefire alive in name, but badly wounded in substance. What began with Iran bringing down a US Apache helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz has quickly turned into American strikes on Iranian air-defence, radar and ground-control sites, followed by Iranian missile and drone attacks on US-linked facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan.
President Donald Trump’s warning that Iran has taken too long to negotiate and will now “pay the price” has made matters worse. Threats to hit bridges, power plants and other infrastructure cannot be treated as routine pressure tactics. Even when such targets are described as dual-use, they sit dangerously close to civilian life.
Tehran’s language is no less combustible. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s warning that Iran will “leave no attack or threat unanswered” may be intended to restore deterrence, but deterrence built on automatic retaliation can become a trap of its own. The more each side publicly commits itself to answering every blow, the less room remains for quiet repair.
That is why the limited nature of the latest strikes should not be ignored. Some military assessments suggest that both sides may still be calibrating their actions rather than rushing into all-out escalation. But playing with missiles is a dangerous game. One interception failure, one death toll, one misread order can turn the theatre into a catastrophe.
The Gulf states are already feeling the heat. Kuwait’s activation of air defences and warning citizens to rely on official instructions is a reminder that this is no bilateral argument between Washington and Tehran. Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Fleet. Kuwait and Jordan host American military assets. Meanwhile, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have their own security and economic stakes. These capitals do not want to become collateral damage in someone else’s war, and ergo, their concerns should matter in Washington as much as their facilities do.
This is where Pakistan’s role matters. Islamabad cannot dictate terms to Washington, Tehran or Tel Aviv. It cannot guarantee peace alone. But Pakistan has what many actors do not: working channels with Iran, a security relationship with the US, stakes in Gulf stability, and credibility built through earlier de-escalation efforts. Its role is stronger than it was at the start of the crisis precisely because both sides now need channels that allow them to climb down without declaring defeat. Pakistan should use that space carefully. The task, far more significant than before, is not to claim ownership of mediation, but to keep messages moving when public rhetoric has become too expensive for leaders to soften.
There is still time to stop the fire, but not much. The last 24 hours have shown that both Washington and Tehran will take no time in running towards the cliff. However, what this ongoing game of chicken has yet to explain is whether they can restrain themselves after proving their point. That is now the real test. *