Pakistan’s upcoming GSP+ review arrives at a moment when the politics of human rights, the pressures of regional geopolitics and the influence of narrative networks have converged to reshape how states like Pakistan are evaluated.
The EU Ambassador’s recent reminder that Pakistan must “do more” ahead of the assessment offers a starting point, but the reality is far more complex than recurring diplomatic soundbites suggest. Pakistan’s trajectory over the past decade reflects steady-though rarely acknowledged-progress. Since 2012, the country has enacted multiple rights-aligned reforms that foreign commentators often overlook.
The Protection of Journalists and Media Professionals Act (2021) established special prosecutors and mandatory safety mechanisms for a media sector that has historically faced threats. The Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act (2021) introduced special courts, forensic protocols and tougher penalties, reflecting a shift toward evidence-based justice. Between 2020 and 2022, federal and provincial governments criminalized domestic violence and implemented protection orders and shelter systems.
The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act (2018) remains one of the region’s most progressive identity-rights laws, while the Zainab Alert Act (2020) created Pakistan’s first rapid response system for abducted children. These reforms are supported institutionally by the National Commission on Human Rights, which holds statutory authority to investigate complaints, monitor treaty compliance and advise the government-an architecture aligned with EU conditionalities.
Pakistan’s reform record operates within an international environment where human rights discourse has been increasingly instrumentalized.
Yet Pakistan’s reform record operates within an international environment where human rights discourse has been increasingly instrumentalized. Dissident networks abroad, many living as asylum seekers in Europe, leverage global platforms to project narratives that often omit critical context.
Some of these figures engage selectively: for example, Mahrang Baloch’s activism regularly denounces Pakistani institutions but remains silent on atrocities committed by US-designated terrorist groups such as the BLA and BLF-groups responsible for dozens of targeted killings and attacks on civilians over recent years. Their silence on non-state violence creates an asymmetry in the global conversation, one that Western audiences often take at face value.
Narrative manufacturing extends beyond individual activists. Media outlets and lobbying platforms replicate these framings, sometimes with striking intensity. Between March and May 2025, The Diplomat published over 25 articles focused on Balochistan, an output that does not correspond to the volume of verified developments on the ground. Meanwhile, platforms like MEMRI routinely amplify voices such as Mir Yar Baloch, producing content that is then cited back into policy discussions-creating a feedback loop where selective stories shape perceptions more strongly than official data or on-ground realities.
The double standards embedded in this discourse become clearer when compared to global patterns. Reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and UN agencies between 2019 and 2023 have documented recurring rights violations in Western countries themselves: Islamophobic hate crimes in Europe; racially motivated police violence in the United States; restrictions on protest movements in several EU member states. These systemic issues rarely receive the same scrutiny or conditional trade implications that Pakistan faces.
The contrast becomes sharper with India, whose human rights profile has deteriorated across multiple empirical indicators. According to the US Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2025, India intensified repression of journalists and activists through politically motivated cases, blocking over 175 social media accounts and targeting more than 34 journalists in 2024 alone.
The Indian Human Rights Commission recorded 107 police custodial deaths and 1,372 judicial custodial deaths between January and August 2024, signalling structural impunity. Reporters Without Borders ranked India among the world’s most dangerous countries for journalists in 2024, citing widespread censorship, intimidation and violent reprisals. These trends exist alongside the documented persecution of minorities, from the vehicular killing of a Sikh farmer during protests in 2021 to open calls for genocide against Muslims and Christians by extremist groups without state accountability. Yet India faces no threat of losing trade preferences, no intensified conditionality and no public admonitions from European officials.
This asymmetry reflects a structural reality: human rights have increasingly become a geopolitical tool rather than a universal moral framework. States with strategic value-whether in trade, defense or technology-receive leniency, while developing countries with weaker leverage are subjected to amplified conditionality cycles.
In such an environment, the GSP+ mechanism risks drifting away from its intended purpose as a development incentive and transforming into an instrument shaped by political alignments and narrative pressures. For Pakistan, the stakes are high; GSP+ contributes significantly to export competitiveness, especially in textiles, and supports millions of jobs.
Whether the EU chooses to evaluate Pakistan through measurable reforms or through politicized narratives will determine not only the credibility of the upcoming review but the future of its partnership with Pakistan. If assessments continue to be influenced by selective activism, unbalanced media cycles and geopolitical signaling, the EU risks undermining the very principles it claims to uphold.
But if the process recognizes Pakistan’s substantive progress-judged against realistic benchmarks and compared consistently across states-it could strengthen genuine reform incentives and restore confidence in an increasingly fragile global human rights architecture.
The writer is a freelance columnist.