Across the world, religious sects and their leaders have their social and political economies, and adopt different strategies to maximise their influence and affluence among people at home or abroad. Most democratic societies and people indulge in educated discourse, and collectively try to decipher challenges that pose substantial threats to their ways of life. Culture of debate and discussion also helps avoid conspiracy theories as people and institutions share a range of diverse perspectives in the public, and endeavour debunking mysteries that have implications for their society. Pakistan is different.
Hardly democratic, and with an acute shortage of social tolerance, discussing sensitive topics is nearly a no-go area. The challenge of establishing a civilized discourse becomes even more intimidating if any aspect of the religion is involved. Deeply conservative and happily high on the haste of electronic and social media headlines, my fellow countrymen — yes, mostly men, find it difficult to think before speaking, updating their or responding to others’ statuses, and tweeting.
Thinking is in shortage, speaking is not. Situation is the same when it comes to discussing extremism and violence in various religious sects in Pakistan. With nearly all Pakistani Muslims aligned with various sects, ignoring theirs and protesting the extremism and violence of the other is common. Historically, Barelvis and their leadership had chosen to denounce any form of sectarian or strategic violence, as opposed to Deobandi and Shiite who busied perpetrating violence against each other, particularly with the killing of Allama Arif Hussain Husseini in 1988. But the classic Brelvi who loved Sufi music and associated himself with social and cultural practices of religion is now changing. And he is alarmingly changing for the worse.
Throughout the history, Jamiat Ulma-e-Pakistan (JUP) represented the Barelvis in Pakistan’s political and social arenas, and Karachi was once their stronghold with late Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani as the figurehead of the sect. Personally, he underwent many phases of tremendous political pressures and constantly refused and resisted the idea of supporting the grossly misinterpreted version of Jihad that was rampant in Pakistan during the 1980s and 1990s. Sadly, during the last years of his life, he became part of the political alliances that endorsed the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Of the five mainstream Brelvi organisations, three have dangerous undertones of sectarian extremism, and have the potential of further deepening the social divides based on religious and sectarian identities intensifying the polarisation of the Pakistani society
Prior to that, the first wave of the Brelvi Jihad had penetrated the sect in the mid-1990s, and there were six mainstream Brelvi militant organisations: Sunni Jihad Council, Tehreek-e-Jihad Jammu Kashmir, Harkate Inqlab-e-Islami, Ababil Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Mustafa and Lashkar-e-Islam. Sunni Jihad Council was the first ever Brelvi militant organisation, and a leading Brelvi cleric Allama Pir Muhammad Saeed Ahmad Mujadadi founded that in 1997. All of these were Kashmir-centric, and fought until 2002, when then President General Pervez Musharraf banned and cracked down against a large number of such outfits.
The ‘returning Mujahideen’ did not sit silent, and joined the ranks of Sunni Tehreek, mostly in Karachi and Hyderabad, Sindh, and thus began the journey of Brelvi extremism that is now much more institutionalised than what it was in the past.
With JUP’s social and political presence nearly diminished for over a decade now, the vacuum of Brelvi representation is being filled in by the fiery and flamboyant speakers who are more noise than sound. You may have disagreed with Noorani on a range of issues, but his soft demeanour and charisma is now replaced by those who seek to fan the conflicts instead of resolving them, and they do it publicly.
Of the five mainstream Brelvi organisations, three have dangerous undertones of sectarian extremism, and have the potential of further deepening the social divides based on religious and sectarian identities intensifying the polarisation of the Pakistani society.
Sunni Ittehad Council, Jamaat Ahle Sunnat and Sunni Tehreek have little inclination toward promoting inter-sectarian harmony, as like any other sectarian organisation, their identity is based on emphasising the sectarian ostentation that galvanises the common and conservative Brelvi Pakistani against the other. Sunni Tehreek has been involved in high pitched battles with Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) to ‘snatch’ the control of mosques and madaris in Karachi and Hyderabad. In the recent Karachi operation, it was found involved in extortion, kidnapping for ransom activities.
The discussion on sectarian and other forms of religious violence in Pakistan generally excludes the Brelvi sect. Their impression is that of the peace and Sufi music loving people, yet the fact is they are as strong headed sectarian as their Deobandi, Shiite and Ahle Hadith counterparts are. Role of the mainstream Brelvi leadership in various recent political and religious crises rather deepened the social schisms, including their stances and sloganeering on Mumtaz Qadri. With implicit but repeated tendencies toward violence in the past, the Brelvi sectarianism could become a violent reality in future.
The writer is a social entrepreneur and a student of Pakistan’s social and political challenges. Twitter: @mkw72
Published in Daily Times, July 31st , 2017.