Appeasement never works! Ethnic Germans living in Czechoslovakia provoke violence and, in response, the German Chancellor decides to place the German troops along the Czech border. The UK, the declining regional hegemon, intervenes in the dispute and ultimately cedes the Czech territory to the seemingly offensive Germany in order to avoid another war and obviously capital loss. The German chancellor, after gaining territory with mere efforts, decides to be more offensive; after all, the policeman has already surrendered to his will. Results? Europe witnesses another and probably the most catastrophic war in the history of mankind.
Seven and a half decades (since the Munich Agreement) have indeed changed the world. The second half of the 20th century has witnessed the emergence of militant non-state actors across the world that posed existential threats to nation states. The nation states, in response, have adopted multiple strategies to cope with the burgeoning threat. In fact, numerous states have already adapted their national security strategies in the wake of this threat and give equal heed to non-state actors as they had given to their perceived rival states. Notwithstanding this fundamental change in the states’ response to threats, some states such as Pakistan still seem to hang in between the poles, trying to cope with new challenges with an old methodology.
Pakistan, a post-WWII product, faces two-pronged existential threats from its eastern and western borders. And the threat from the western border comes from non-state actors commonly known as the Taliban. Talibanisation, though a homemade product, has certainly become an existential threat to the sovereignty of the Islamic republic. In fact, recent years have witnessed a large-scale violation of the country’s sovereignty, though by different actors, but the Taliban, more or less, have regularly recorded their presence in the list of the causes that are reasons for violation of the state’s sovereignty. The state, in turn, has adopted a different course, in fact chain, of actions: negotiations, truces, strengthening the armed forces to launch counterterrorist operations, breaking agreements and again, negotiations.
This cycle of actions has worked for almost a decade but it does not seem workable anymore. There are multiple reasons for this state of affairs. The imminent US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the resulting US pressure on Pakistan to deal with this threat and mounting public pressure on a right wing governing party for provision of security are probably the two most important reasons that have constrained the government to resume channels of negotiation with the Taliban no matter if it appears nothing more than appeasement. This appeasement is not likely to work.
The government has recently formed a committee given authority to sign a peace agreement with the Pakistani chapter of the Taliban — the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Surprisingly, the Taliban have also shown interest in signing a peace agreement with the government, though they have also conveyed their conditions to the government through their committee. However, for them, peace talks and practical peace are two different chapters. For instance, they have carried out several terrorist attacks throughout the country amid the peace process. They have also claimed responsibility for killing 23 Frontier Constabulary (FC) persons in retaliation for several operations conducted by the security forces against the terrorist havens in FATA and other cities, particularly Karachi. What does this incident show? What kind of peace will come out as a result of negotiations?
The whole state apparatus seems busy in appeasing the TTP, but still some fundamental questions related to the nature and future of these negotiations and expected peace process remain unanswered. For instance, what does the government do in the long run? What are the priorities of the incumbent premier vis-à-vis the future of these extremists? Will the TTP become a political actor? Is the government likely to cede the TTP-dominated areas to the Taliban? Premier Nawaz Sharif may be thinking to do what Neville Chamberlain (premier of the UK who signed the Munich Agreement) could not do in spite of his best efforts.
As far as signing a peace agreement with the Pakistani Taliban is concerned, the governments in the country have never been misers and there is a long history of peace agreements between the government and the Pakistani Taliban. However, one thing remains common in all these agreements: the then governments surrendered state sovereignty over those areas where the Taliban were powerful. No one has ever tried to think that such agreements would inevitably have a domino-effect impact for the state. Surprisingly, the government is (today) on track to sign another peace agreement while remaining within the constitutional limits with those who do not even consider the constitution of Pakistan as legal and Islamic.
Here comes another question: what is going to happen? Is the government ready to give appeasement another chance? Giving appeasement another chance means that the government is likely to call back all of its troops from the FATA region, especially North Waziristan and South Waziristan. Or the Taliban will be called on to give their version on the ‘un-Islamic constitution’ of Pakistan. We will have to wait for some time in order to witness a historic agreement. What will happen if this peace agreement will be similar to the previous agreements?
If the government does not change the pattern of the agreement, it does not seem unreasonable to argue that such an agreement will only last for a few months. Even after the agreement, the Taliban are unlikely to disarm their fighters, neither will they extradite the foreigners despite the insistence of the government. Above all, the Taliban are likely to get a handsome amount in addition to their fellows freed (currently held by the security forces) as a result of such an agreement. Doing nothing is unlikely to damage their safe havens across the country, nor will it diminish their capability. So what should be done?
The government should first consult its armed forces, especially the army, because the Pakistan army remains the most important actor in this context. Secondly, goals must be clear. If the state is going to sign this agreement, then demilitarisation of the FATA region, strengthening border security on the western border and extradition of the foreigners should remain on the priority list. Instead of appeasing them, the state has to take a firm action otherwise central Punjab is probably the last venue that is outside the battleground, but nevertheless does not seem a hard target for the terrorists. Above all, one thing must remain clear to the decision makers: they cannot use these terrorists in Kashmir after the US’s partial withdrawal from the region.
The writer is a PhD candidate at Area Study Centre, Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at [email protected]