Turkey recently shooting down a Russian SU-24 Bomber over Syria has brought Russian-Turkish relations to their lowest point since the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s. This incident acted as a catalyst but, for quite sometime, Russia-Turkey relations have been strained. Challenges in Turkish-Russian relations commenced with Turkey’s support to the Syrian opposition increasingly continued with Turkey’s decision to host the NATO missile defence system, Turkey’s stance towards the Crimean Tatars following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and, finally, worsened by Russia’s direct military involvement in Syria that targets all opposition groups and its support to the Kurds, particularly the Democratic Union Party (PYD) that has a link to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is banned in Turkey. In locking horns over Syria, Russia and Turkey are playing out the latest chapter in a rivalry that has spanned for centuries. Russia and Turkey emerged as independent powers almost simultaneously in 1380 and 1389. A direct rivalry with the Ottoman Empire began in the 17th century when Russia joined the holy league alliance with Poland and the Habsburg Empire, taking significant territory from the Ottomans although, importantly, not Crimea. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the already significant economic links continued to strengthen, particularly in the new fields of tourism and consumer goods’ exports from Turkey. Both countries became major trading partners for each other. Turkey accounts for around a quarter of Russia’s total food imports and Turkey is Russia’s second most important trading partner after Germany. Russia’s largest customers are the Turks when it comes to energy. Turkey imports 55 percent of its natural gas from Russia and 30 percent of its oil. Moscow, after the downing of its fighter jet, has banned the import of some Turkish goods, imposed restrictions on travel and plans to stop some Turkish companies from doing business in Russia. The Turkish economy will take a direct hit because of worsening economic ties with Russia. Analysts estimate Moscow’s sanctions could cut 0.5 percent off the annual growth, which is already slowing sharply. The Turkish lira has lost nearly 20 percent of its value against the dollar this year. On the other side, Russia will also feel pain. Inflation in Russia has soared this year, piling on the pain for an economy deep in recession. Unfortunately, these two trading partners have conflicting interests in Syria. Ankara’s objective is to protect the rebel groups it is supporting in Syria, particularly the Turkmen but also Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups fighting Assad. Shooting down the Russian warplane can be interpreted as a way to impose a no-fly zone along the Turkish-Syrian border. That protects Turkey’s protégés and forces other powers to recognise Turkey’s special status in the region. On the other side, Russia’s approach to the Syrian civil war is in no small part based on Moscow’s belief that secular authoritarian rulers are the only effective bulwark against radical Islam in the Middle East. The Kremlin sees radical Islam as a threat to its domestic security and the international order. It supports Assad to stress the illegitimacy of regime change through popular revolt or external pressure. In Moscow’s view, such movements potentially endanger its own legitimacy and create chaos in international relations as witnessed in Iraq, Libya and, from its point of view, Ukraine. Moreover, the Middle East is the only area where Russia can try to prove that it is not just a regional post-Soviet power with a revisionist agenda but a global actor able to make a difference in managing crucial conflicts. However, this tension between Russia and Turkey, a NATO member, cannot be allowed to escalate into a larger confrontation. US and NATO’s other member countries should do what they can to calm tensions between the two important nations. An independent investigation of the shooting down of the plane perhaps by the UN might help to defuse a diplomatic tussle over whether the Russian plane was in fact in Turkish airspace, a claim that Russia denies. Much depends on Russia’s reaction in the coming days and weeks. If Russia views the downing of its jets as a sign that helping Assad win this war could prove far too costly, then Russia might be willing to get on board with a managed transition away from Assad’s leadership, which the US and other allies have advocated. But there is also a chance that the downing of the Russian jet and a subsequent reported attack on a Russian helicopter by rebels could strengthen Russian President Vladimir Putin’s resolve to vanquish the rebels in Syria and the regional powers who back them. The world cannot afford World War III. The UN and west must do all they can to keep the international community, including Russia and Turkey, focused on the most important matter at hand: an agreement that brings the bloodshed in Syria to an end and wipes out the extremist elements from there. The author is a columnist for the Middle-East and Af-Pak region and editor of geo-political news agency ViewsAround. He can be reached at manishraiva@gmail.com