The month of May remains very important in Pakistan’s history from the point of view of national defence. On May 28, 1998, the defence of Pakistan was made invincible as Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests in response to five tests conducted by India. It is important to note that India had conducted nuclear tests for the second time in 1998 – the first was the so-called Smiling Buddha in May 1974. Soon after nuclear tests, sanctions were imposed by the UNSC on both India and Pakistan. Pakistan had adopted a logical position that it was not the first to conduct nuclear test. Despite having developed the capability for over a decade, Pakistan avoided testing its nuclear devices. But Pakistan was left with no option but to proceed with the tests as the regional bully, India, was sending highly threatening and destabilising signals to it. After India test fired its nuclear weapons, its political and military leadership adopted an aggressive posture towards Pakistan. They were expecting Pakistan to surrender and accept a subservient role in South Asia. Under these circumstances, Pakistan was justified to conduct nuclear tests of its own. The conventional military imbalance that India had with Pakistan and its reflection in Indian policy also contributed to the decision of Pakistani policy makers, both military and civilian, to consider the nuclear weapons option. Critics of military’s representation in the National Command Authority are oblivious to the fact that civil-military leadership works in tandem for national security The rationale of Pakistan’s military nuclear programme remains the same: to counter the conventional military superiority of India. In the past, under different pretexts India had mobilised its military to exert pressure on Pakistan. It was Indian short-sighted behaviour that made Indian conventional military superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan irrelevant after Pakistan became an overt nuclear power. In the decade following the nuclear tests, Pakistan developed different delivery systems and a nuclear doctrine defining the role of nuclear weapons in external security. All weapons are means of extending the national interest of the country. The role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan is making unbearable the cost of any military option that India may consider against Pakistan. Hence the concept of strategic stability comes into play. Pakistan has degraded the military options for India to the point where they become irrational. Since the rationale of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is countering Indian conventional military force, adopting a first use doctrine is logical. It’s the balance of terror between India and Pakistan that discourages India from using conventional military force in any misadventure against Pakistan. If Pakistan were to adopt ‘no first use’ policy, India would be encouraged to believe that it can utilise its conventional military force against Pakistan in short war before nuclear weapons become relevant. Indian Cold Start doctrine was specifically structured under this false assumption that shift, swift and decisive victory over Pakistan was possible by rapid deployment of conventional military force in a theatre of its own choice. Though India initially denied the existence of any such doctrine, later statements from the security elite of India have revealed that such a doctrine does exist for all practical purposes. An Indian security elite mind-set that conventional war with Pakistan is possible under nuclear overhang is highly destabilising. By adopting the first use nuclear doctrinal posture, Pakistan has made it explicit that any conventional military attack on Pakistan will not remain restricted to this domain only. In such a scenario, the responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan will rest with India. There is a lot of negative propaganda associated with the development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) by Pakistan. However, it was aggressive behaviour of India manifested in Cold Start doctrine that forced Pakistan to develop TNWs. As theatre level nuclear weapons, TNWs are for self-defence. The stability effect that TNWs have in South Asia is highly under-recognised. Pakistan has developed robust command and control system for nuclear weapons. This structure is formalised in the form of National Command Authority (NCA) with the Prime Minister as its head. Like all other states with nuclear weapons, the composition of NCA in Pakistan is also reflective of a consensus between civil and military leadership. Critics of military’s representation in the NCA are oblivious to the fact that civil-military leadership work in tandem with the purpose of securing the country. The control over nuclear devices remains with the civilian leadership. The utility of nuclear weapons can be checked from the fact that despite multiple escalations after overt nuclearisation of South Asia, India has not dared to attack Pakistan from the eastern border. Pakistan achieved another major milestone in January 2017 when it gained credible second strike capability, which will ensured durable peace and protection from any attack from India. The writer is a Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute, a think-tank based in Islamabad. asmaakhalid_90@hotmail.com