Life is a conflict between one’s intent and one’s fate. No one knows this truth better than Pakistanis. Interestingly, Pakistan has also been trying to synchronise its intent with its fate. Regarding its western border, the prevalent intent of Pakistan is based on three main presumptions. First, the military operation in North Waziristan has not taken place in the past (since 2009) and hence it will not take place in the future. Second, the US-NATO forces will not dare pick a fight with the Haqqani network in North Waziristan because the former are disinterested in opening a new war front, especially before the forthcoming elections in the US due this year. Third, Osama bin Laden is dead and hence the world is losing sight of Afghanistan; consequently, the situation in Afghanistan will soon recede to the pre-9/11 scenario. Nevertheless, Pakistan seems to be failing in viewing the obverse side of the coin. One of the reasons is that Pakistan is wary of adopting the policy of self-reliance in the domain of security. Instead of relying on its own geography and terrain to vouch for an honourable survival, Pakistan banks on the geography and terrain of Afghanistan to hedge against any attack from India — the format of the strategic depth policy. In principle, Pakistan’s security policy should be independent of Afghanistan. If adopted, this approach may diminish the chances of blackmailing at the hands of jihadists and the Taliban. The second reason is that if US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recommends (by September 9, 2012) that the Haqqani network be declared a terrorist outfit, the US lawmakers in Congress may impose sanctions on Pakistan. Afterwards, if an offensive is launched by the Pakistan army, there may be left little space to argue that the operation was conducted on the choice and timing of the army. Is the policy of promoting ethnic hegemony (which brews ethnic discontent) in Afghanistan in the interests of Pakistan? In other words, is it a reasonable strategy to alienate the Northern Alliance and let it fall into the lap of India? Why can Pakistan make no effort to reconcile the Taliban with the Northern Alliance? In order to reduce hostility and tension in the region, Pakistan needs to advocate the policy of reconciliation. Pakistan needs to rethink whether the strategic depth policy is congruent with the modern warfare paradigm, especially when Pakistan is possessing nuclear weapons as deterrence. In this age of economics, will India consider it feasible to confront a nuclear-capable Pakistan? The ‘India-centric’ approach of General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani must answer this question. Pakistan seems to be still entangled in the debate whether this is ‘our war’ or ‘their war’ and whether this is ‘my enemy’ or ‘your enemy’. After one decade of the onset of the war, Pakistanis are generally still indecisive. Despite the pleading of General Kayani (on Independence Day), most Pakistanis are not clear if the efforts of Pakistan pertaining to the war on terror are in their favour. The policy of militarisation of Pakistan and raising jihadist slogans was adopted in the past brainwashed generations and few are ready to banish those obsessions. That is how it seems that the concept of Muslim trans-nationalism has taken root deeper than the will to fight the war on terror. Pakistan intends to participate in the war on terror but by defending its borders and safeguarding its sovereignty. Unfortunately, the war on terror is diffused across the Pak-Afghan border. It respects none and follows no principle. Pakistan has been struggling to cope with this reality. The government in Kabul seems to distance itself from the influence of Pakistan. There are two major signs of that. First, the number of border skirmishes between Pakistani and Afghan security forces is increasing rapidly. It seems that, before the year 2014 visits Afghanistan, the government in Kabul may try to make Afghanistan as hostile as possible for Pakistan. The wider the gulf between Kabul and Islamabad, the more are the chances of an Afghanistan independent of the sway of Pakistan and the more is the probability for the (Afghan) Taliban adopting an inward looking approach. Second, there has appeared a sudden escalation in the number of drone strikes that are claiming high-profile Taliban casualties on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. In this way, the preamble of the war on North Waziristan has been introduced. Still much more to come in the future: for instance, more number of drone strikes to provoke the Haqqani network (and the associated Taliban) to revolt against the state of Pakistan to actuate a clash that may break the bond of allegiance between them. Consequently, the enhanced number of drone strikes holds the potential to escalate into a full-fledged confrontation. Nevertheless, unless the Haqqanis turn insurgents (that will change the public opinion against them, an excuse General Kayani has been waiting for), the Pakistan army may remain hesitant in launching the offensive on North Waziristan. Given the potential of al Qaeda to translate the anti-US sentiment into militancy, it means that al Qaeda is a perpetual predicament for the US. If the members of al Qaeda are hiding in North Waziristan (to cash in on the constraints of Pakistan to launch an offensive there), an attack on North Waziristan, led by the US, cannot be ruled out. Pakistan has to make a choice: whether it has to live with the glamour of Pashtun gallantry and keep on fomenting destabilisation in Afghanistan or put its own house in order and stamp out the menace of militancy. Second, Pakistan has to weigh cautiously that, after 2014, what kind of effects the militants (both local and foreign) hiding in North Waziristan may have on Kabul vis-à-vis Islamabad? The reason is, two things cannot go hand in hand: Pakistan supporting (or promoting) militancy abroad but keeping homegrown militancy in check. If the Taliban affect Kabul, they cannot spare Islamabad. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com