The sudden rise in drone strikes by the US-operated drones has caused wide scale uproar throughout the country. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly on August 28 passed a unanimous resolution against Predator strikes and called upon the government to take strong measures. However, do the lawmakers and the common man understand the complexity of the issue, coupled with the demographics of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region? Apparently, it seems they do not. The analysis below provides a detailed picture as why drones and operation in Waziristan cannot be treated as just another issue. The latest rain of Hellfire missiles fired off CIA-operated drones on targets in Waziristan in FATA offer Pakistan another excuse to protest the series of attacks that have killed some three dozen people from August 19 to August 24. The latest string of these multiple strikes on Friday, August 24, left at least 18 people dead, reportedly including either Badruddin Haqqani, the younger brother of the head of the Haqqani network, Sirajuddin, or a younger member of the family. Only 24 hours earlier, on August 23, Pakistani officials had lodged a formal protest to the US on North Waziristan drone attacks. Pakistan maintains that such strikes not only violate international laws but also its territorial sovereignty. During the current year so far, the CIA has operated as many as 32 lethal drone strikes. A cursory breakdown of these strikes suggests that 14 were directed against the Haqqani network, nine against Hafiz Gul Bahadur (a North Waziristan-based warlord considered the mainstay support for the Haqqani network-and al Qaeda fighters), three against Maulvi Nazir (Wana, SouthWaziristan), about six aimed at the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) warlord Hakeemullah Mehsud and five for other splinters of Taliban, largely known as the Punjabi Taliban. On the face of it, the intensification underlines a revival of intelligence sharing between the US and Pakistani institutions. One indicator for that is a drone strike in the region between Bajaur Agency and the eastern Afghan Kunar province, which the anti-Pakistan TTP is reportedly using for attacks on Pakistani security posts. The death in a US-Afghan attack on the Afghan soil of Mullah Dadullah, the head of the Bajaur Agency TTP, and raging border region skirmishes between the TTP and Pakistani military also point to the possible resumption of tactical contacts between forces on both sides of the Durand Line. The TTP has vowed revenge for Dadullah’s killing but signs continue emerging of an imminent multi-pronged crackdown on militants holed up in the Waziristan region, i.e. not only against the Haqqani network but also against others who seem united by al Qaeda’s anti-American narrative. A cursory look at this constellation of militant groups explains the formidable challenge that they pose to Pakistan and the US-led coalition across the border. Al Qaeda, led by the Egyptian Dr Ayman al Zawahiri, stands out as the ideological leader of the shades of Islamist militant groups in the Afghan-Pakistan region. The Haqqani network serves as a protective shield for these groups’ activities in support of al Qaeda’s regional and global anti-US agenda. Prominent groups such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s (North Waziristan), the TTP (uprooted from the region of its origin, i.e. South Waziristan in October 2009) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban of Mullah Nazir Ahmed (South Waziristan) host and protect non-indigenous militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar al Alam Al-Islami, and the vicious Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a radical militant group comprising anti-government Islamists from the Central Asian state of Uzbekistan. More alarmingly, militants also use Tableeghi Jamaat, a massive organisation built on principles of peaceful preaching across the globe, for social security and refuge from law. Sections within this organisation also concur with the narrative that often comes from al Qaeda and is parroted by most militant organisations. Many militants consider participation in the Tableeghi Jamaat’s congregations outside Lahore as a semi-pilgrimage before heading off to Afghanistan for jihad via the border regions. Analysing this complex constellation, it is quite likely that in case of a big military action these groups will position themselves for action against the government, military installations and public places such as markets. Most people in North Waziristan are already scared and many have left for safer places in anticipation of a military operation. This means more internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, viewed against the looming US presidential election, as well as the mounting networking of militant outfits in North Waziristan, action against them seems imminent. Also, it is obvious that the CIA will continue sending drones to Waziristan to hunt down the militant community that is inspired by al Qaeda, protected by the Haqqani network and facilitated by others. By forcing the Pakistan army into action against these groups, the US administration needs to convey to the domestic opposition and common Americans that it has prevailed upon Pakistan and has made it move against those “who take and threaten our soldiers’ lives”. But the relentless drone campaign remains at the centre of a global human rights controversy. Although precise and accurate in data collection, unmanned predators continue to draw heavy criticism by activists who argue that often targeting a single militant leads to the death of several innocent people, including women and children in the vicinity. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Ben Emerson, has asked the US to allow internal investigation on its drone programme for the sake of internal security. This demand sends a positive message to Pakistan that if it takes substantive measures against militancy, it could plead a strong case against drone attacks in the UN. Philip Alsten, Emerson’s predecessor, had made more or less similar demands in 2010, demanding that the lead of drones be given to the US military for accountability of the consequences. Nevertheless, viewed against the stated objectives of the Obama administration, the debate over the use of drone technology — both in and outside the US — is not likely to bear much influence on the drone operations for a simple reason. As long as the unwanted people considered as terrorists and a threat to the US-NATO and Afghan forces shelter in or operate out of North Waziristan, the CIA will keep sending drones. In addition, officially, Pakistan will keep protesting every strike, as it has in the past, without any military action against drones. Many within Pakistan, including the religio-political leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman, have even urged deployment of air force aircraft against drones. But meanwhile there seems to be an unwritten, tacit understanding on this issue between the two countries, and the drone strikes hence are likely to continue. Critics have often pleaded for a transparent and publicly acceptable mechanism for drone strikes, rather than ducking under opposition to these operations by a certain segment of politicians. Apparently, if more TTP militants came under attack in the greater Paktia region of Afghanistan in the coming days, including drone strikes, this would mean both allies have agreed to expand the scope of cooperation in North Waziristan. This will likely see a more coordinated Pak-US movement in the region, i.e. Pakistan tightening screws on the Haqqanis and affiliates. Meanwhile, the US-ISAF would try to neutralise the TTP and other anti-Pakistan groups currently using Afghan soil for cross-border attacks. But it is questionable whether a big military operation and more drone strikes will entail something substantial for both Pakistan and the US after the big publicity on an impending operation in North Waziristan. Most of them will fan out to safer places rather than waiting for the Pakistani or American-Afghan forces to get them. This may be good to sell to the American public and legislators but will not mean much as far as neutralising and eliminating the al Qaeda-inspired militant networks from the region. Only a quiet, well-coordinated and sincere multilateral crackdown may provide us all the much-needed relief. The writer is working as a research analyst, programme consultant and content editor at the Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad along with pursuing his Research Studies in Public Policy from Germany. He can be reached at farooq@crss.pk