Finally, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has issued its verdict on the writ petition of Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan filed almost 16 years ago. With that, the ‘role’ of the army and the ISI to assemble one type of politicians and construct one type of parliament has ended. Secondly, with that the civil-military balance is restored. Thirdly, with that the boundaries of a free and fair election have been redefined. In the past, the role was considered a prerogative resting with the army (which sought the help of the intelligence agencies) to introduce one type of democracy. The role also served as a blackmailing tactic to write off certain politicians and eventually, political parties from the national political mainstream. In this way, the politicians who did not follow the dictates of the army would not secure a chance to be elected or, if elected, to be allowed to form the government. The underlying objective was to control the process of (civilian) policymaking. One can argue that the positive effects perceived from the decision of the Asghar Khan case are merely wishful thinking. The army (and its intelligence agencies) will not retreat an inch from the political land it conquered years ago; the civil-military balance cannot be restored in Pakistan unless Pakistan foregoes its ambition of being a national security state, and not old but new modes of manipulation of elections will be resorted to. Nevertheless, the decision in the Asghar Khan case is indicative of a change in the approach of the judiciary. Had the Asghar Khan case been taken up in the same manner, for instance, ten years ago, firstly, it would not have been decided in the way it has been decided now, and secondly, there would have been a severe reaction from the army and the ISI. Or at least the beneficiaries of the manipulative system (supported by the army) would have launched a vicious diatribe against the judiciary. Generally speaking, the doling out of public money to buy loyalties has also become a trend. Two journalists, Hamid Mir and Absar Alam, are contesting a case in the Supreme Court by levelling allegations at certain departments and organisations for distributing funds to buy the loyalties of media people (including anchorpersons and journalists) to achieve a certain result: influence public opinion. The question is why the army and the ISI wanted to bring one kind of political representatives to form one kind of government by distributing Rs 60 million among politicians. To this question, one can find the answer buried in the dynamics of the Cold War. The spell of the Cold War continued from the 1950s to the 1980s. The Cold War left deep scars on the national psyche of Pakistanis. It was an era when the army harboured political aspirations to meet the needs of bloc politics at the international level. It was an era when harbouring political ambitions by the army was considered legitimate and thorough nationalism. The concept of nationalism at that time also got skewed a little bit. In fact, a virulent nationalism thrived and wore the glasses of parochialism and chauvinism. The army arrogated to itself the declaration of ‘who is a patriot and who is not’. Any politician or political party could be declared a fifth column. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) fell victim to that kind of thinking in the 1990 elections and became a runner up to the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). An improved version of the same thinking, bequeathed by the Cold War, was displayed by General Pervez Musharraf. Under his command, a replica of the IJI called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal was manufactured in 2001. General Musharraf also manipulated the political scene in 2002 through the NAB to establish and perpetuate his rule. Consequently, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid and a forward bloc in the PPP were formed. In this way, both pre- and post-electoral manipulations were carried out to keep the PPP under the thumb and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz out of the political equation. Against this background, the Asghar Khan case deals primarily with the pre-electoral arrangement meant to affect the results of the elections. An investigation is also required into the allegations of using the NAB to create a post-electoral alliance to form the kind of parliament that could dance to the tune of General Musharraf. The rigging (including pre and post-electoral manipulations) under the auspices of the army has led to the emergence of religious groups as religio-political parties, which are now a force to reckon with. The eras of army rule over Pakistan deliberately pampered the religious parties to share power. Once introduced to the power corridors, these groups keep on yearning for another spell and to achieve that end they are ready to do the army’s bidding. This imbalance is still to be addressed and the link to be severed. In Pakistan recently, the judiciary has matured to meet the democratic needs of the country. The institution of the army is also getting mature, so are civil society, politicians and the media. The problem is with their speed of maturation against one another. In this regard, the era of General Musharraf (from 2000 to 2008) was a blessing in disguise, as it helped make the evolution possible. A question still irks many minds: why was the Tamgha-e-Jamhooriat (Medal of Democracy) bestowed on General Aslam Beg, the former Chief of Army Staff? Was the restoration of democracy after the death of General Ziaul Haq his gift to the PPP? In fact, by awarding the medal to General Beg, the PPP showed its weakness. One reason may be that the PPP thought of keeping the institution of the army appeased to obviate another army coup. One can also conclude that the primordial fear of an (unlawful) ouster also preyed on the minds of politicians and convinced them to resort to corruption — to gather wealth for the rainy days abroad or to reinvest in the next elections whenever scheduled. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com