On November 5, speaking to a group of officers at the General Headquarters, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani said, “No individual or institution has the monopoly to decide what is right or wrong in defining the ultimate national interest.” This part of his statement is a realisation of the fact that defining the ultimate national interest is not the job of the army alone. In fact, such an avowal was long overdue because so far, scores of people have lost their lives and several political governments have lost their legitimacy to rule the country at the altar of the ultimate national interest. General Kayani has finally confirmed that to determine the contours of the ultimate national interest the input (or opinion) of several individuals and state institutions (including the army) is imperative. The next question is, what mechanism should be put in place to achieve the given goals of the national interest? Should abduction, torture and killing be part of the mechanism? How will the state or its institutions deal with the people (for instance, of Balochistan) who have got disillusioned with the country for obvious reasons of intervention, discrimination, underdevelopment and repression? One should not overlook the fact that the present age of internationalisation is not only influencing the concept of national interest but also the mechanism to achieve it. Secondly, this age is also bringing both the definition and the mechanism under more and more public scrutiny. Thirdly, the factors of rigidity, narcissism and introversion are considered incongruous and illegitimate if they sway the concept or the mechanism. Fourthly, in the present age, the targets of national interest cannot be achieved by oppression but by employing democratic means. General Kayani also said, “As a nation, we are passing through a defining phase. We are critically looking at the mistakes made in the past and trying to set the course for a better future. An intense discussion and debate is natural in this process. It should emerge only through a consensus, and all Pakistanis have a right to express their opinions. The constitution provides a clear mechanism for it.” This part of the general’s statement indicates that the army has come under unprecedented pressure on the disclosure of its mistakes committed in the past. No doubt, the political cell in the ISI was formed by the late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in May 1975 (which he should not have constituted) but the late General Ziaul Haq also did not close the cell considering it illegal. The reason was obvious: the ISI (or the army) was happy with the new assigned role and was not ready to forsake it. The new role offered the ISI (or the army) ample opportunities to dictate its terms to the succeeding political governments. That was how the fulcrum of power shifted from the civilians to the army. The question is, did the ISI (or the army) not know it was being asked to do a job of manoeuvring the political scene not protected under the constitution? Why did the ISI (or the army) make the political cell an integral part of its organisation and the assigned political role a compulsory part of its duty? Why did the ISI (or the army) consider it legitimate to engage in electoral rigging of all sorts? Did the ISI (or the army) not foresee what would happen when its malfeasance (activities in the political sphere) was exposed, as has happened now? Nevertheless, one can conclude that had the Supreme Court not delivered this kind of judgement on the Asghar Khan case, General Kayani would not have confessed the past mistakes. General Kayani also said, “Weakening of the institutions and trying to assume more than one’s due role will set us back. We owe it to the future of Pakistan to lay correct foundations today. We should not be carried away by short-term considerations, which may have greater negative consequences in the future.” This part of his statement carries the threat that has alerted all. Even the incumbent political government has not dared ask the general his legal standing on issuing such a public statement. Anyway, the answer to this part of the statement is two-pronged: first, if the army (or the ISI) does not like criticism, it should stay away from politics, and secondly, if generals are so scared of public scrutiny or what is called a media trial, they should not opt for private jobs once they are retired. Face saving should not be done by threatening the judiciary and the media of the consequences. General Kayani also said, “The armed forces draw their strength from the bedrock of public support. National security is meaningless without it. Therefore, any effort that wittingly or unwittingly drives a wedge between the people and the armed forces undermines the larger national interest.” This part of his statement also needs to be addressed. The source of strength of the army is parliament, which is elected by the people. Parliament cannot be bypassed. That is, the trust of the people of Pakistan reposed in the army flows through parliament. Secondly, parliament is a measure of the people’s will while the army has no gadget to fathom that will. The practice of populism has hurt this country a lot, such as the army toppling an elected government by declaring that the government has become unpopular and that people have incited the army to stage a coup. Does the ISI (or the army) have any idea how badly it has damaged the political and social fabric of Pakistan by promoting the religious parties through rigged elections? The extent of this damage cannot be felt by living in secured surroundings of a military cantonment having all facilities of health, education, recreation, sports and shopping. Live in a civil area, interact with a common man and discover rampant radicalisation. The mistakes committed by the ISI (or the army) in this regard do not necessitate just a confession but a due apology to the nation. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com