If the Taliban affect Kabul, will they also affect Islamabad? This is the question the answer to which most Pakistanis are looking for. The past few weeks have revealed that the Pakistani version of the Taliban is a replica of the Afghan version. Hence, there exists a correlation between the future of Kabul and that of Islamabad. In the Paris moot (projected as intra-Afghan talks) that took place from December 19 to 21, a delegation representing the Afghan version of the Taliban (led by Shahabuddin Dilawar and Naeem Wardak) expressed its resolve to abide by the terms of a (new) constitution embodying the ‘principles of the holy religion of Islam’. On December 28, 2012, through a video message, the chief of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hakeemullah Mehsud, offered peace talks to Pakistan but only if certain pre-conditions were met. One condition was to convert the existing constitution into an Islamic one. This point is an interesting development because in the past, the Taliban in Afghanistan declared time and again that they did not recognise any constitution. The same was the version of their counterpart in Pakistan, owing to which Pakistan had to launch an army operation in Swat in May 2009. Taken together, it seems that both versions of the Taliban have finally realised the importance of a constitution. The next question is, what type of constitution is relevant? There are two problems with the phenomenon of Talibanisation: first, the Taliban strive for the revival of the medieval age’s Islamic traditions and norms, and secondly, the Taliban are averse to anything connected even remotely to the west. Their abhorrence for the constitution and the resultant democracy is owing to the blend of these two factors. In his video message, the chief of the TTP also asked the Pakistan government to reorient its foreign policy and dissociate itself from the US. Similarly, on January 5, 2013, the Afghan version of the Taliban has said (through a statement) that its fight against the foreign forces will continue if a single foreigner stays back in Afghanistan after 2014. The Afghan version of the Taliban was shrewd enough not to mention this point at the Paris moot. There they tried to show the world their soft posture. The message of talks from the chief of the TTP came immediately after two horrendous events: first, the assassination of Bashir Ahmed Bilour of the ANP, and secondly, the kidnapping and assassination of 22 paramilitary Levies personnel. Against this backdrop, through the offer of peace talks, the TTP is saying that the militancy and terrorism in Pakistan may wane if the latter forsakes the US. This is a psychological attempt to make Pakistanis think that not the Taliban but India is their enemy number one. The TTP may be considering that by undertaking violent means it has rendered the state amenable to its demands. Rehman Malik’s frequent requests and show of gratitude to the TTP validate that reckoning. This is a dangerous trend. The question is this: has the menace of militancy outgrown Pakistan’s strength to overcome it? There is a second dimension of the offer from the chief of the TTP to hold peace talks. At the Paris moot, the Taliban delegation successfully made its voice heard by the international players. Having seen the success of that tactic, the TTP is also bent on making its voice heard at the national level through the offer of peace talks. This is another dangerous trend. The question is, will the TTP be recognised as a legitimate voice of those who are against Pakistan’s entry into the war on terror? One problem with the Afghan Taliban is that they are inconsiderate to the fact that in their victory over the former USSR, American technology played a decisive role in undercutting the strength of the Soviet Army. In the post-2001 phase, there is no such counter-force available to help them technologically. Perhaps they do not appreciate the importance of technological prowess in fighting modern day wars. The same is the problem with the TTP, which by its actions (of militancy and terrorism) is inviting air and drone strikes on its abode. The second problem with the Afghan Taliban is that they do not realise that the international forces are in their country under a UN mandate. When the Afghan Taliban do not recognise democracy and the constitution, they perceivably cannot recognise the UN and its resolutions, besides the international obligations of Afghanistan. Perpetual wars have made them lose the sense of the age they are living in. This sense of aloofness is common in both the Afghan and Pakistani version of the Taliban. The Pakistan army’s new doctrine described by Major-General Asim Saleem Bajwa, Director General of the Inter-Services Public Relations, has one positive and one negative point. The positive is that the doctrine has made the army include sub-conventional war as a new chapter in its Green Book of warfare. The negative is that the doctrine offers a provision for ‘foreign proxies’ as instigators of war. In this way, an excuse for the existence of a sub-conventional war is sought in the existence of foreign agents. The army’s new doctrine cannot help resolve the situation that has become grave. The civilian government should launch a comprehensive rehabilitation programme to reorient those who have become Talibanised. Secondly, the constitutional status of FATA should be reconsidered in the context of the federation and a FATA Council should be constituted. A separate province by the name of Qabailistan comprising seven Agencies and six Frontier Regions is also a good option. If Pakistan wants to put its own house in order, it should think locally. Why is the phenomenon of Talibanisation engulfing its Pashtun and southern Punjab population? What role is deprivation of education playing to make them Taliban? And what role can local bodies play in introducing democracy to their lives? In fact, there is an urgent need of formulation of Pakistan’s new doctrine to reverse the phenomenon of Talibanisation in Pakistan. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com