After winning majority number of seats in the 2014 general elections of India, the then Prime Minister designate, Narendra Modi, sent an invitation to the heads of states from member countries of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as well as Mauritius to attend his swearing-in ceremony in New Delhi. The invitation was accepted by all, except Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh, who could not attend the ceremony due to prior commitments. On the day following the ceremony, the Indian Prime Minister held brief one-on-one talks with the guests. Speaking at various occasions, the Indian Prime Minister stressed on ‘neighbours first’ as his foreign policy priority. Modi chose Bhutan as the first country to pay an official visit at bilateral level. Soon after taking over power, Modi’s first challenge on foreign policy front was ratification of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) with Bangladesh. The LBA protocol had been signed by Dr Manmohan Singh’s government in 2011. During his election speeches, particularly in constituencies bordering Bangladesh, Narendra Modi had repeatedly stated that his government would not compromise with Indian territorial sovereignty. Perhaps, realising the significance of continuity of policies in a democratic set up, after becoming the Prime Minister, Modi announced at a public meeting with BJP workers in Guwahati that his government would ratify the LBA. Later, he himself went to Dhaka in June 2015 to exchange the ratified documents with his Bangladeshi counterpart — Sheikh Hasina. In a land swapping exercise, India has received 2,777.038 acres of adverse possession areas of land and transferred 2,267.682 acres of the same form of land to Bangladesh. India received 51 of the 71 Bangladeshi enclaves that were inside India proper; while Bangladesh received 95 of the 103 Indian enclaves that were inside Bangladesh proper. In this land swap exercise India gave around 40 km² (10,000 acres) to Bangladesh. In April 2017, Hasina made her most awaited visit to India, during which the two countries signed 35 agreements and Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs). Meanwhile, tensions were already rife in Nepal between ethnic and tribal groups like Madhes and Tharus over some provisions inserted in its new constitution. These provisions were seen as an attack on the age-old custom of roti-beti (bread-daughter). The problem intensified further after the election of K.P. Sharma Oli as the Prime Minister of Nepal, and promulgation of the constitution of 2015. India was not happy with either of these developments. Nepal accused India’s High Commissioner to Nepal for his role in fomenting trouble by making statements in support of the protesters. Blockade of goods passing through India into Nepal was seen by the non-protesting Nepalese as an example of India’s ‘big brother’ attitude. The political tensions between India and Nepal took months to be resolved. Modi started with a goodwill message to Pakistan but the tone changed very soon because of the nature of the relationship between the two countries In March 2015, Modi visited Seychelles and Mauritius. The two strategically important island countries were waiting for an Indian Prime Minister’s visit for a long time. On the same tour, Modi also landed in Sri Lanka. Taking up the Tamil issue, Modi said India stood for a “united Sri Lanka”, but also wanted an “early and full implementation of the 13th Amendment” that provided for devolution of power in Tamil majority provinces. He also visited Jaffna and Talaimannar, in war affected northern Sri Lanka. In May 2017,Modi again visited to Sri Lanka after Sri Lanka Prime Minister Ranil Wickremsing he’s visit to New Delhi. With Pakistan, Modi started with a goodwill message but the plot was lost very soon because of the nature of structural relationship between the two countries. The high point of tensions was Modi’s reference to a liberated Balochistan, made on the occasion of the Independence Day in 2016, mainly to attract his political constituency. Later, in a bid to ‘isolate’ Pakistan after a militant attack on the Uri brigade headquarters in Jammu and Kashmir on September 18, 2016, the Indian government boycotted the 19th summit of the SAARC which was scheduled to be held in Islamabad on November 9 and 10, 2016. After India’s decision, other members also decided against participating in the summit. Subsequently, Modi also threatened Pakistan with scraping the Indus Water Treaty. However, months later, Indian government toned down its rhetoric and accepted an invitation from Pakistan to participate in the meeting of Permanent Indus Commissioners at Islamabad in March 2017. At present, the two countries are at loggerheads at the International Court of Justice over the status of Kulbhushan Jadhav. For India, he is an Indian citizen who was engaged in business in Iran after ‘premature retirement’ from Indian navy, and was kidnapped by Pakistani security officials. Pakistan considers him to be a spy engaged in subversive activities in Karachi and Balochistan. In his three years in power, Modi has visited Afghanistan twice; both visits were reciprocated by the Afghan President. The 6th Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia — Istanbul Process on Afghanistan was held at Amritsar in December 2016. Inaugurating the conference, Modi said, “The Parliament Building in Kabul represents our strong commitment to Afghanistan’s democratic future. Zeranj-Deleram highway and India-Afghanistan-Iran cooperation on Chabahar would enable Afghanistan to link its economy with centres of strong economic growth in South Asia and beyond”. He added, “We also plan to connect Afghanistan with India through an air transport corridor. President Ghani and I have discussed additional measures for deepening our bilateral cooperation. We are making progress in developing plans for utilisation of the additional $1 billion earmarked by India for capacity building in Afghanistan.” In May 2017, the Indian ambassador to Afghanistan, Manpreet Vohra, met the former warlord and a minister in Ghani’s government, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. To conclude, in these three years, Modi’s foreign policy can be seen as a mix of realism and idealism — assertive and accommodative to the demands of neighbours. His tactic or method may appear to be ‘new’ or ‘different’ to some commentators but as such there is no marked shift in India’s regional policy. Hence, Modi’s foreign policy is an instance of continuity, rather than change, with his predecessor’s policy. The writer has a PhD degree and he is a Visiting Research Scholar at Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. The views expressed in this essay are personal and do not reflect the views of the institution