Of course New Delhi had calculated the aftermath of test-firing the Agni-IV intercontinental ballistic missile well ahead of time. Pakistan would object — naturally to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which Islamabad promptly did — and there’d be talk of an arms race in the continent all over again. India’s policy doesn’t only focus on and respond to Pakistan, of course, even though Islamabad has become the centre of Delhi’s planning like rarely before. That is why first Modi upset long standing diplomatic understanding by invoking the ghosts of the fall of Dhaka in Dhaka itself shortly after assuming the premiership. And then he risked outright military confrontation at the LoC as well as Working Boundary not too long ago. The Nawaz government took its sweet time seeing past Modi’s occasional, though well timed, sweeteners like the unannounced stopover at Lahore in December 2015 for Nawaz’s grand-daughter’s wedding. Of late, Islamabad has finally factored in that a thaw with India, which Nawaz placed quite high on his priority list this time around, is not going to happen at least in the present electoral cycle over here or across the border. That, in part, explains the changing of gears at the foreign office. Finally we have accused India of state sponsored terrorism in Pakistan. And even though we’ve handed the UN a dossier or two about Indian involvement here before also, this time around seems to be a different story. But just exposing Indian excesses, especially those related to CEPC, is only going to go so far. Delhi is the bedrock of Washington’s Pivot to Asia, and its most relied upon counterweight to China. Also, unlike other alliances put in potential trouble with the ascent of Donald Trump, India is unlikely to feel the heat as far as the Pivot situation is concerned. Trump and Tillerson (his designated secretary of state) have already come down hard on China. There’s not just the prospect of trade and currency wars — especially since Trump has made no secret of dubbing China a currency manipulator; a big, big charge in the world of international business — but also military confrontation as warnings do the rounds about China’s activities in the South China Sea. Delhi, therefore, will remain important for the Americans, at least for the foreseeable future. Islamabad, on the other hand, should expect to feel the heat sooner rather than later, despite the cordial phone call between Nawaz Sharif and Donald Trump. It’s the Republicans, after all, who’ve tightened the screws on Pakistan over the last year. The Republican Congress bulldozed the F16 deal, debated whether Pakistan was a friend or foe, and froze the Coalition Support Fund (CSF). It has also recommended tying further aid, which Pakistan always needs a lot of, on measurable action against Haqqanis, movement on the Shakeel Afridi case, etc. If anything, Islamabad should expect the Trump administration to be a lot more direct. The new president clearly brings a no-nonsense approach with him. Years in the financial industry have honed his skills towards quantifiable measures of success. There will be little vagueness about his policies. And since Pakistan, and how it acts, continues to impact Afghanistan and the situation around it, it should expect a phone call sooner than most others as the new administration takes hold in Washington. That is all the more reason Pakistan should be better prepared this time than it has been in the past. It is still without a credible argument, for example, on the Haqqani Network, despite a good two-and-something years of Zarb-e-Azb. And its position regarding the Afghan Taliban has rubbed all the principal players of the war in the wrong way so far. First, we denied hosting or helping them for the longest time. Then, in a surprise about turn at the time of the Quadrilateral, we admitting to hosting some of their families so we could pressure them at the right time. Then, of course, we could not pressure them when needed and first we were pushed out of the QCG then the initiative was abandoned altogether. Regrettably, we still remain without a credible narrative regarding the longest war of our times. The responsible position vis-à-vis the Agni-IV launch can put Pakistan in good light again. But there’s a paradox there too. First Pakistan will be forced to act like the more anchored party and express concern at the arms race in the region. Then, owing to the long-held position, it will also be forced to repay in kind. It will, in other words, be forced to advance its own arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles. And that will make Pakistan become an unwilling part of the arms race while denouncing it at the same time. This has been India’s Pakistan programme in a nutshell. From reigniting a cold war just when Islamabad was posturing for peace and negotiations, to an unprecedented flare up at the LoC and the Working Boundary, to now an arms race. Remember, India’s economy has been constrained for a while, but it has far greater military spending room, and far greater military alliances. Pakistan’s ability to spend, especially when Zarb-e-Azb draws a fair sum from the kitty and CSF flows after much trouble, is much more restricted. The arms race comes when political moves on the chess board have already succeeded in isolating Pakistan in the region. Now, it seems the Modi government aims at squeezing Pakistan through unsustainable, and nonsensical, military expenditure. Pakistan’s foreign policy has been in limbo for almost the entire length of this government. There is an urgent need to turn things around. It may still not be too late to appoint a full time foreign minister with an overhauled position on India. We must immediately grasp the enormity of the confrontation in a rapidly evolving international environment, which India seems playing to its advantage for the moment. We must immediately begin acting instead of reacting. The writer is the Resident Editor, Daily Times, Lahore and can be reached at yourafiq@gmail.com