Pakistan is in crisis. There is trouble brewing on both the western and eastern borders. The menace of terrorism hangs in the air. There is increasing anger and alienation among the marginalised minorities. The world’s worries continue about Pakistan’s role in financing terrorism. The rupee has fallen by ten percent against the dollar in the past 100 days. Electricity shortages simply refuse to go away. And the quibbling among the provinces continues on the sharing of water resources and the building of dams. The Supreme Court has fired and politically neutered the thrice-elected prime minister. It is exercising judicial activism. Infighting has begun among the political elites, the judiciary, and the media. It may be tempting to conclude that the nation would be much better off if put under military rule for two decades. Wasn’t that the path to success taken by the Asian Tigers? At birth, Pakistan’s per capita GDP was much higher than that of several East Asian countries. In the early sixties, Pakistan was viewed by the US development economist, WW Rostow, as having arrived at the ‘take off’ stage on the ladder of development. Yet, in the coming decades, the East Asian countries took off on the road to prosperity while Pakistan remained stuck in neutral and began to regress. What happened and why? Four of the East Asian economies industrialised rapidly and transformed their economies and ultimately their society. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan became known as the Asian Tigers. Of these, the last three were ruled by strongmen for two decades or more. That led more than one analyst to conclude that dictatorship was synonymous with economic development. It is true that two dictators governed South Korea for 29 years: Syngman Rhee for 12 years and General Park Chung Hee for 17 years. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew ruled Singapore for 31 years. And Taiwan was ruled by General Chiang Kai-shek for 30 years. But a cross-continental analysis shows that dictatorship per se has never guaranteed economic growth and development. In East Asia, Philippines did not become an Asian Tiger, nor did Indonesia, even though dictators ruled the roost in both countries. Neither did dictatorships in South America turn Argentina, Brazil and Chile into Latin Tigers. Nor did dictatorships in Eastern Europe turn East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia into European Tigers. And dictators failed miserably in Sub-Saharan Africa. Globally speaking, dictatorship did not promote economic or social development. Why? Dictatorship has nothing to do with economic growth or development. If it did, China should have grown by leaps and bounds under Chairman Mao, the Great Helmsman. China’s transformation began when Deng, who was dubbed the capitalist roader during the Cultural Revolution, found a subtle way to inject capitalism into a communist polity. What matters then? It all begins with visionary leadership that can design sound economic policies. The next factor is the training of a cadre of disciplined followers that can execute the policies. But even then progress is not guaranteed. If political leaders are performing poorly, let them be replaced through the electoral process, not a coup There should be no distractions to economic growth, like wars with neighbours. South Korea put its conflict with North Korea on hold in the 1960s, Taiwan did the same with its conflict with China, and Singapore put aside its differences with Malaysia. Had these countries allowed themselves to be drawn into an arms race with their neighbours, the results would have been devastating, and not just economically. Singapore’s Lee put it well when he said, “The Pakistanis are a hardy people with enough of the talented and well-educated to build a modern nation. But unending strife with India has drained Pakistan’s resources and stunted its potential.” Some thought that Confucianism was the reason behind the success of the Asian Tigers. But the philosopher’s writings had been around for two and a half millennia. Some argued it was capitalism,but that was being pursued in Latin America with limited success. The secret sauce in the economic triumph of the four Asian tigers was the adoption of export-oriented policies, which they copied from Japan. By contrast, the Latin American economies failed because they adopted inward-looking import substitution policies. So success came not from having dictatorships but in having the right dictators. Unfortunately, one does not get to choose one’s dictator. Pakistan had not one but four opportunities to choose the right dictator. But it always chose the wrong ones. The rule of the generals did not yield dividends, only broken promises. In the end, they fell on their own swords. The first few years of the first dictator were quite good. The economy grew. But he said publically that democracy was not suited to the genius of the people. In his private diaries, he wrote that Pakistan would not be ready for democracy for another four decades. The rigged elections of 1964 caused irreparable racial schisms to develop in Karachi. In his era, economic power was concentrated in 22 families. His chief economist, the Cambridge-and-Yale educated Mahbubul Haq, justified them: ‘There exists, therefore, a functional justification for inequality of income if this raises production for all and not consumption for a few. The road to eventual equalities may inevitably lie through initial inequalities.’ Flush with electoral victory, the dictator decided to seize Kashmir by force, which plunged the country into a full-scale war with India. The war failed to yield Kashmir. It was followed by an economic slowdown, which led to discontentment and his overthrow. The second dictator promised fair elections and hoped they would lead to a hung parliament so he could continue ruling. When that did not happen, he plunged the country into a civil war, which led to a disastrous full-scale war with India and the loss of East Pakistan. The third dictator brought high economic growth but at great cost. He left behind a terrible legacy of jihadi terrorism and the Kalashnikov culture. The last member of the pantheon of dictators delivered a few years of good economic growth in the middle of his tenure, but then the economy began to slow down. He mishandled domestic political issues and was forced out of office. In sum, since 1958, Pakistan has been ruled directly or indirectly by the military. Antagonism with India has become interwoven in its strategic culture. Wars with India have yielded nothing positive. Despite having fared poorly under military rule, the illusion military persists that military rule is better than ‘corrupt and feeble’ civilian rule. As if in a dream, some people continue to hope that a new man on horseback will transform Pakistan into an Asian Tiger. The cure for bad political performance is not the more military rule. If political leaders are performing poorly, let them be replaced through the electoral process, not by a coup. A military dictatorship is not the answer to Pakistan’s myriad ills. The military should stay focused on its core competency, not on governing the nation. Freed of the fear of being overthrown, Pakistan will then develop strong and robust political institutions. That would be the best way for General Bajwa to ‘save’ democracy. The writer is author of Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan. He can be reached at Ahmadfaruqui@gmail.com Published in Daily Times, April 1st 2018.