Based on an article written by Former Air Commodore Sajjad Hyder. Former Air Commodore Sajjad Hyder, “Straight Shooting on the 1965 War,” Dawn, September 6, 2016 (concluded) Prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, President Ayub Khan had been advised by the Foreign Office that India would not react to the incursion by the Pakistan Army in the Akhnur sector of Indian-held Kashmir in August 1965. The action by India of crossing the international border in the early hours of September 6, therefore, came to him as a surprise, and even before Pakistan’s armour thrust in the Khem-Karan area got bogged down on the third day of the war, he began to think of a ceasefire. On the fourth day of the war, I was sent to Beijing with a letter from President Ayub Khan for Premier Zhou En-lai to seek Chinese assistance in our war against India. President Ayub Khan had agreed that I should ask for fighter aircraft for the Pakistan Air Force but that these should not be sent directly to Pakistan. He had suggested that Chinese fighter aircraft should be sent to Pakistan via Indonesia from where I should ask President Soekarno to send these by sea to Karachi. I had explained to President Ayub Khan the absurdity of the suggestion, but he felt that politically it was not desirable for China to supply these aircraft to us directly. This was obviously meant not to upset the United States which distrusted China and whose goodwill we did not wish to lose. Zhou En- lai was taken aback when I suggested that the aircraft should be routed to us via Indonesia. He said that he did not understand this. If we really intended to use these aircraft in the war, he could, he said, have these flown to Peshawar or Sargodha within 24 hours. He congratulated me on the performance of the Pakistan Air Force but expressed his confusion about Pakistan’s determination to continue the war. He said that according to his information we had already started moves for a ceasefire. He said that he was willing to fly to Rawalpindi, Peshawar or to any other place to meet Ayub Khan and discuss all these matters. Alternatively, he suggested that Ayub Khan could come to Beijing or Kashgar. On my return to Rawalpindi, I conveyed Premier Zhou’s message to President Ayub Khan. He was not willing to meet the Chinese Premier and did not, for one reason or the other, agree to meet the Chinese leaders till after the war, before his departure for Tashkent. In spite of our odd attitude, the Chinese provided the equipment we desired. Aircraft were sent via Indonesia and China moved their forces on India’s northern borders. When we went to Tashkent in January 1966, we had no choice but to formalise an end to the war on India’s terms. Come September, Pakistanis are told how the gallant Pakistan Armed forces fought and thwarted the Indian Juggernaut which invaded Pakistan in a surprise move on September 6 ‘without any provocation’. For 49 years, the nation has been regaled by the stories of valour and ‘victory over the evil enemy’. These stories are true, but the whole truth has not been told. Seldom has any attempt been made to tell the nation that the fighting elements of the armed forces achieved this spectacular success not because, but in spite of the visionless leadership which had perpetrated this senseless war on a flimsy, unprofessional and immature hypothesis. Having been in a key operational command in both 1965 and 1971, I say with full confidence that irrespective of which branch of the armed forces they served in, the fearless spirit and valor of our fighting men was exemplary. Sadly, the laurels of victory in Pakistan were placed largely on undeserving heads, while the real achievers and heroes still remain deprived of their due accolades. This was done due to the efforts and the pervasive propaganda unleashed by those at the highest echelons of the army and all the ‘King’s Men’ who, immediately after the ceasefire, set out to successfully create a massive cover-up to bury deep the blunders that cost thousands of lives even before September 6. This may come as a surprise to many because the secret of those martyrs sent on Operation: Gibraltar, a one way mission to capture Kashmir, does not find mention during the celebration ceremonies. Who was it who thought that an operation to capture Kashmir would not invite ferocious Indian action? It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who, with Aziz Ahmed in tow, propounded “The plan to create an Algerian type revolution in the vale”, a plan that field marshal-turned-president Ayub Khan and his selected Commander in Chief (C-in-C) Musa Khan swallowed hook, line and sinker. Thus, 8,000 or so men (mostly non-soldiers) were thrown into the fray without a bthought as to the consequences of this action. The C-in-C at the time writes in his memoirs that the Azad Kashmiri irregulars were trained for six to eight weeks at Rawalpindi in the art of guerilla warfare. And so it was that, without a modicum of strategic vision or proper contingency planning or preparation; without any known networking with local elements or even their sympathy, Op Gibraltar was launched. In the last brief at Kharian, the President had asked for a brief on Op Gibraltar. Two most significant things happened in this briefing, as I learnt from Gen Gul Hassan as well as Gen Akhtar Malik separately much after the war. The President asked Gen Akhtar Malik why he does not go for Akhnur (the sole entry point and the jugular vein of the valley known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’) and block off India from the Vale. Akhtar Malik replied that he could take Akhnur, provided he is given a task force. According to history, the 12 Div was then allocated additional forces for Operation: Grand Slam. As a result, the capture of Akhnur through Op Grand Slam came on the menu only at that time. The panic which prevailed amongst the Indian troops while fleeing from Chhamb can be seen from a picture below. It shows an Indian Army Truck, a jeep with a trailer and AMX tank abandoned in the middle of the river Ravi. The gun of the tank is facing the Pakistan side, ready to fight. But the tank crew along with other occupants of the truck and the jeep would rather choose to run for their life than fire their guns. Gen Gul Hassan told me years later at my home that he had instructions from the C-in-C that every signal to operational units must end with ‘Do Not Provoke, Do Not Escalate’. Thus, a disaster foretold ominously was made reality by the national leadership and army high command. They thought in their limited ‘barrack to battalion’ knowledge of military strategy that India will lose Kashmir without a whimper, and will not dare to escalate the war. They believed that this resulting victory would then cement the insecure president’s position and ensure a bright future for all his courtiers. It is ironic that despite all the blunders and the lives lost to their callous incompetence and utter stupidity, these men flourished and remained unaccountable. In shameful contrast, the martyrs of Op Gibraltar who were sent on a one way mission were removed from the radar in perpetuity. What about their kith and kin? Should they not deserve the acknowledgement of their martyrdom? To be continued The writer is a defence analyst and economist. He has authored “Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan” (Ashgate Publishing, 2003)