The recent release of Malik Ishaq, the prime accused in over 40 cases of terrorism, would have been a shock had one not been aware of the legal mess and half-hearted political will to counter terrorism in Pakistan. Acquittals of the militants accused of various terrorist acts of 2008’s attacks on Mumbai as well as hundreds of attacks against Pakistan itself raises eyebrows internally and internationally. It needs serious analysis. For effective anti-terror legislation, criminalising the offence is important and is possible only after resolving conceptual issues like defining the offence and branding it as unambiguous and undisputed terrorist act. In case of Pakistan, even after a long history of terrorism, this conceptual problem still remains unresolved and is posed with very real questions such as, if guerrilla movements (or freedom fights, so to speak) should be branded as terrorism, why to exonerate the state when it acts violently to curb internal dissent? In Pakistan’s context, the question carries weight in the backdrop of the state’s behaviour in curbing ‘insurgency’ in Balochistan. Quoting Grant Wardlaw, an act becomes a terrorist act if violence or threat of violence is used against a group to make it concede to specific political demands of the perpetrator. If so, we would end up calling freedom fighters as terrorists who fought imperialism in pre-partition united India. This conceptual ambiguity, however, is global, not specific to Pakistan. But the handicap is severe as it reflects on effective measures in combating terrorism as well as coordinating operable anti-terror legislation. While the US, Australia, the UK, and other western countries take drastic legislative measures to counter terrorism, Pakistan severely lags behind despite frequent attacks and a long evolutionary history of anti-terrorism laws. While Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was first to introduce the word ‘terrorist act’ in legislation, the first Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) was promulgated under Mian Nawaz Sharif in 1997. Apparently, the ATA of 1997 was written in response to sectarian threat, especially the January 1997 bombing in district courts Lahore by Shia militant organisation Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqha Ja’afria (TNFJ). Not only was the ATA misused to settle political scores, but some Sunni sectarian organisations like Sipaah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) were selectively patronised despite this piece of legislation. The political patronage of terrorists by some political parties for their petty electoral interests, as well as by the military establishment, has been responsible for impotency of anti-terror laws in Pakistan. The list of proscribed organisations has neither been made public officially, nor is it being implemented. Despite a public perception (quoted in many op-eds and writings) that LeT has been proscribed along with many others, Pakistan government has never come up with the assertion that it has not been banned to date. Many proscribed organisations are allowed to operate and collect funds under changed names and their original identity is no secret. What is most perplexing is that despite being amply covered by the ATA 1997 and amendments of 2000, 2002 and 2005, the glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations by the media remains unchecked. Undeterred media space is still available to the representatives of proscribed organisations under the garb of a highly confused interpretation of ‘freedom of expression’. Those using violence against the state and the people, e.g. the Lal Masjid brigade including Abdul Aziz and his brother Rasheed Ghazi who was killed in a military operation against the Lal Masjid, are shamelessly glorified as ‘martyrs’ and ‘innocents’ by the media and some political parties. Moreover, no action has ever been taken against those using hate speech to radicalise people. Not only are the militants acquitted from courts on regular basis, these terrorists have unchallenged freedom to organise public rallies, amass funds and weapons (which they display unabashedly). Media has, in the past, reported on front pages extreme hate expressions by these militants in public rallies, like desecrating and burning the flags of the US, Israel and India. It seems like a joke to even think about any legal action on such incidents by the state institutions. That points to a serious problem of the state’s will to counter the militant organisations’ influence on larger public, which ultimately is responsible for public confusions on terrorism. Democratic governments cannot be expected to take stringent steps against militants if these militants enjoy public support. Religious political parties like Jamat-e-Islami have openly manipulated this public support, especially among youth through its students’ organisation Islami Jamiat Talaba that radicalises urban middle class youth using anti-imperialist slogans against the US. In addition to these larger problems of state’s patronage and absence of its will to counter militancy, a big problem exists in terms of implementing the laws as well as weak prosecution in cases of terrorism. Limited human and technical resources available to police are the main hampering factor responsible for extremely weak investigation. Civilian intelligence agencies, e.g. Intelligence Bureau, remain resource starved and incapable of gathering actionable intelligence using modern technological means. If the US wants a stable and terror-free Pakistan, it has to invest in civilian set-up rather than filling the military coffers non-stop. Many problems that Pakistan has been facing in countering terrorism are the direct result of unquestioned monopolisation of terrorism handling by the army. Conceptually, the army should have no business in a turf that should be exclusively handled by the Interior Division, unless the latter invites army’s support. What further fans the terrorism ambers are the alleged deals between the military and the militants, for reasons described as ‘national interest’. One would, however, keep chewing nails while trying to make out how and why a nation would describe patronage of terrorism as its national interest. Things cannot be expected to change unless some difficult decisions are taken, however unpopular they might be with a radicalised Islamist population and an unbridled army. One most benign decision could be activation of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and formation of a high-powered parliamentary committee that reviews the legislation and associated implementation problems for taking specific actions to empower prosecution, judiciary, police etc. This committee representing all parliamentary parties, with chairs of standing committees on Defence, Interior and Law and Justice as ex-officio members, might be chaired by a strong parliamentarian. Rigorous measures should also be taken for providing foolproof security to witnesses, counsels and judges (over eight people were killed associated with the cases on the recently acquitted terrorist Malik Ishaq). If Pakistan wants to come clean out of what its establishment calls a ‘negative international propaganda’, it has to act. Our insistence on not going in North Waziristan can be taken as an evidence of our possible complicity, but is also an open announcement that we have willingly withdrawn our sovereignty from the area in favour of militants capturing that area since long. Saving Pakistan’s integrity is a challenging project ahead for not only the government, but also the armed forces of Pakistan. The writer is a student of counter terrorism based in Islamabad. She can be reached at marvisirmed@me.com