On June 8, 2013, the incumbent government finally lodged its first formal protest with the United States by handing over a demarche to Richard Hoagland, US Charge d’Affaires, over the drone strike, which killed seven people in North Waziristan on June 7. Hoagland was summoned to the Foreign Office on the instructions of Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister (PM) of Pakistan. With that the protest history of the incumbent government over drone strikes began. There are two instances of drone strikes. First, when a suspected activity (which may be a movement or a congregation) is discerned by satellites in the border area connecting Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is now a sophisticated US satellite surveillance system stationed over the Pak-Afghan border area. This system has its own parameters of spotting day or nighttime physical activity or gathering. The parameters of the spotting mechanism have proven less accurate, caused more collateral damage and are prone to judgmental mistakes when followed by drone strikes. Huge humanitarian cost has brought the parameters of this system under scrutiny. The second instance is when a chip is activated and lodged at a place in the Pak-Afghan border region. There is now an established network of local Pashtun spies in the tribal belt of Pakistan. These spies have been hired by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US to activate and drop chips where any suspect belonging either to al Qaeda or the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is located or expected. An activated chip sends signals to the satellite surveillance system and a targeted drone (missile) strike ensues. This method, no doubt, is more accurate and causes less collateral damage but it is prone to intrigues hatched by informants. However, this method has brought the volume of humanitarian cost down to a minimum. Both these methods have engendered variable results no doubt but, consequently, several al Qaeda and TTP leaders have lost their lives. Nevertheless, the second method is considered an improved version of the first one and is more relied on currently. There are reports that the al Qaeda is on the run and has relocated to Yemen and Somalia. Similarly, the TTP leaders are also under perpetual threat of elimination, and they have to be in small groups and keep on changing their positions to circumvent any targeted drone strike. The incident of drone strike that occurred on June 7 was the product of a suspicious movement at night captured by the surveillance satellite system; it consumed the life of a Pakistani Taliban commander, Mutaqi alias Bahadar Khan, along with his six accomplices in North Waziristan. However, the incident of drone strike that took place on May 29 was a product of the activation and lodging of a chip; it killed the second-in-command of the TTP, Waliur Rehman Mehsud, and four others in North Waziristan. Hitherto, on drone strikes, there are three narratives of Pakistan: first, drone strikes are a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; second, drone strikes are counter-productive as these produce more militants who carry out suicide bomb attacks in the territory of Pakistan and also in Afghanistan; and third, drone strikes devours innocent civilian lives. Hence, Pakistan condemns drone strikes and these should be ended immediately. Pakistan seems ignorant of the fact that there are not just drones hovering over Pakistani air space; there are Pashtun spies who are dogging the targets given by the CIA to earn head money in millions of US dollars. The killing of Waliur Rehman is an interesting case study in this regard. His killing coincided with the oath-taking ceremony of the provincial assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (The drone strike was the first one after May 11 elections.) There are two possibilities of Rehman’s killing: first, he was incidentally spotted by the Pashtun spies handled by the CIA; and second, a TTP-insider tipped off the CIA handlers about his presence that led to his killing. Rehman was considered moderate in the sense that he was a proponent of talks to be held between the government of Pakistan and the TTP to reach a peace accord. Within the context of the help of a TTP insider, one possibility is that he was killed with the help of the TTP sub-group, which was against the talks while the second possibility is that he was killed with the help of those who wanted to replace him and hold the talks themselves to earn popularity. In both cases, intrigue is the common factor and the informer will get the head money amounting to five million dollars from the US. It is not that what US Secretary of State John Kerry or President Barack Obama can do to end drone strikes, it is whether another attack like 9/11 can be averted or not. If Pakistan has failed to rout out al Qaeda and its supportive network, such as the TTP, from its tribal (lawless) region, can Pakistan press on the US or the world to end drone strikes in the same region? Secondly, can Pakistan assure the US or the world if another 9/11 or Times Square bombing attempt take place, these would not be having any roots in the (lawless) tribal region of Pakistan? Nevertheless, for Pakistan, the bigger question will be this: will Pakistan be ready to face the consequences of another 9/11-like attack happening anywhere in the world or a successful Times Square bombing attempt tracked to its land? Pakistan has failed to realise that the existence of Osama bin Laden miles inside the territory of Pakistan weakened Pakistan’s case at the international level. It is yet to be seen how Tariq Fatemi, Foreign Policy Advisor to the PM of Pakistan, will convince the US why it should wrap up its satellite surveillance system and the Pashtun spy network considering them an exercise in futility and why the second-in-command of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, cannot be found in Pakistan or its tribal belt. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com