Finally, Pakistan has conceded the fact that its national security is under threat and it needs a policy to brave the threat. With that two vistas are opened: first, Pakistan needs to do introspection on the causes that have brought Pakistan to such a pass; and second, Pakistan needs to formulate a policy that encompasses all ingredients to have effect. This is how a plausible cause-and-effect relationship can be fostered as a recipe for salvation. The first vista called introspection takes Pakistan to the days of the 1960s when the military hogged the defence and foreign policies. The events in the wake of 2001 made the military comprehend the morass it was in. Especially after 2008, as it seems, the military realised that its engagement in the war on terror, and subsequently, in the asymmetric war was sapping its energies and morale. The asymmetric war can be considered one branch of the war on terror while the sectarian strife is another one. The actors of both the asymmetric and sectarian wars surface from society, do their atrocious acts, and then wane into society again. Each time, they appear with more vigour and new zeal and, perhaps, with new techniques. The India-centrism of the military is one thing while reality-centrism is a different thing. Reality-centrism tells that while formulating the defence and foreign policies, especially in the 1980s, the military failed to foresee their consequences. Perhaps the military failed to forecast (and obviate) the gory incident of 9/11 that changed the world. One can say that the gruesome event of 9/11 turned the tables on the military that resisted the ensuing changes till 2008 or 2013. The speeches of General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani delivered on both March 23 and August 14 this year are testament to the change in the perception of the military towards the security challenges the country is beset with. In 2013, the military has realised that it is in deep trouble, which cannot be weathered unless the help of the civilian leadership is sought. In short, it has taken the military at least five decades to cognize that it needs the help of the civilian leadership. The second vista called policy formulation is now easier said than done. On paper, a policy can be formulated based on the input from all stakeholders, both political parties and the military, but its implementation is an uphill task. The reason is that not only the fringes of society are in revolt but the core is also adulterated with extremism (or extremist ideology). Secondly, the divide (which actually spans five decades) in civil-military relations is too deep and wide to be bridged immediately through any politico-military consensus. Third, the militants are in a constant process of evolving new practices to attack and disturb the normal tenor of life. In a country with a rancorous history of civil-military distrust, if not conflict, the thought of having a central command and control of the (supposed) central intelligence body (to coordinate between different intelligence agencies) is a madman’s idea. It is still not known what the boundaries and limits of the cooperation are that the military has been trying to extend to the civilian leadership. Briefing politicians over the state of the national security threat to Pakistan is one thing while showing subordination to the civilian leadership is a different proposition. The conflict the military is enmeshed in has coerced it to extend the hand of cooperation towards the civilians. This is a first step towards civil-military rapprochement. It is obvious that the civilian leadership must be demanding the subordination of the institution of the military (including its intelligence agencies) to its institution called parliament, as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan. The point is simple: if the Taliban have to embrace the Constitution of Pakistan, the military should also do the same. To elaborate the point, if General Kayani is demanding from the Taliban respect for the constitution, his institution should lead the Taliban by setting an example. A dialogue with the Taliban is an option; the point is whether the dialogue is done from an advantageous or frail position. In the past, the military used to do a dialogue on its own volition; now, it is asking the civilian leadership to do the same and, perhaps, on its behalf. The civilian leadership, on the other hand, understands fully the repercussions of the failure of any such dialogue. Secondly, the civilian leadership fathoms the consequences of its engagement in the war on terror and all its offshoots including asymmetric war and sectarian strife. Thirdly, the civilian leadership knows that it is being revered by the military circles only because its help is required. Fourthly, the civilian leadership recognises that fighting the menace of terrorism is now its problem (and not of the military, as the military is not trained for launching counterterrorism operations). Fifthly, the civilian leadership apprehends that curbing the sectarian conflict is its headache, as the asymmetric war is being fought in the military domain while the sectarian war is being fought in the civil domain. The last two points have stretched the budget allocation on maintaining law and order to its limits. The military of today is left with taking pride only in apt handling of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or in the rescue of flood-hit victims. These two jobs can be done by establishing new bodies specialised in the tasks, as happens in all developed countries. The military should be assigned the task of only border duties and looking outward. No national security policy can be successful if the military does not cede the space (it occupied in the defence and foreign policy matters) to civilian policy-makers. Secondly, no national security policy can be fruitful if the military does not accept its position as subsidiary to the civilian leadership, as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com