What was being dreaded has finally surfaced as a reality. The anti-drone strike resolve of Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan, has been put to the test domestically, before he could resettle himself in domestic affairs after concluding his recent visit to the United States (US). On November 1, Hakimullah Mehsud, head of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), along with his accomplices, was killed in a US launched drone attack in North Waziristan. The way the hue and cry is being raised around, it seems that it is the first ever drone strike on any Taliban commander inside the territory of Pakistan. Pakistan has to differentiate whether it is agitating against the vitiating of its latest effort for peace talks with the TTP or on the death of Mehsud. Disparate voices against both points have become one. The question is this: when did the TTP announce to stop attacks on Pakistan that the death of Mehsud be mourned? Pakistan considers that by killing Mehsud the US has scuttled its efforts for peace talks with the TTP. The grievance of the Pakistan government against the US government is that the latter did not take into consideration the interests of the former, despite all diplomatic pains. The precise version of Pakistan’s grievance is that the timing of killing Mehsud was flawed. The Pakistan government claims, as being aired by Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, Interior Minister, that it took months to pave the way for the dialogue for peace with the TTP; however, that one drone strike has crumbled all prospects for bringing peace in Pakistan. As apparent, the Pakistan government was deceived on the assumption that in the aftermath of Sharif’s visit to the US, there would be no more drone strikes on the TTP. The pro-Taliban groups (and sympathisers) in Pakistan were already anti-US. The vociferous anti-US stance of the government on the killing of Mehsud has brought it nearer to those elements. It seems that this drone strike may bring right-wing (religious) Pakistanis near the TTP on the pretext that the US wants disruption in Pakistan. Secondly, the news (bruited about after the capture of Latifullah Mehsud by the US forces in Afghanistan) that India is involved in arranging a dialogue between Afghan Taliban and the Kabul government for the post-2014 arrangement in Afghanistan has spurred anti-India groups in Pakistan into action. The question is this: will the Pakistan government be able to distance itself from the anti-US groups? It is apparent that the drone strike has deceived the Pakistan government, causing it embarrassment. The sense of shame is driving the government closer to pro-Taliban groups and may render it difficult to disassociate itself from the influence of those groups. Secondly, it is also apparent that the drone strike has betrayed the TTP, which might have thought that there would be no drone strike on its leadership during the course of talks with the Pakistan government. The new leadership of the TTP may not believe in Pakistan anymore. By raising its anti-US voice loud, as being done by Nisar, the Pakistan government is trying to convince the TTP (and its sympathisers) that the government was serious in talks and it did not deceive the TTP. The Pakistan government may be apprehensive of retaliatory strikes, which may be launched by the TTP to level the score considering Pakistan in cohort with the US against the TTP clandestinely. The rhetoric to take the matter of drone strikes to an international forum such as the Security Council of United Nations is one thing but it is difficult to prove two points: first, Pakistan was not complaisant in drone strikes; and second, Pakistan did not seek any benefit from drone strikes. The leftover strength of Pakistan can be displayed in the threats of closing the NATO supply line that passes through Pakistan. In this regard, the question is this: will the stoppage of the NATO supply line affect the frequency of drone strikes? The answer is in the negative. Hitherto, Pakistan has failed to comprehend two realities: first, Pakistan cannot halt drone strikes; and second, Pakistan cannot control the TTP. Nevertheless, Pakistan is overlooking another two points: first, the US has shown its resolve to continue drone strikes whenever a high value target is spotted; and second, the TTP has vowed to continue attacks on the military convoys and installations of Pakistan. Interestingly, Nisar has failed to understand that the US is fighting its war (and not of Pakistan’s war) and spending billions of dollars in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Any high value target has the potential to invite a drone strike, which respects no life. Yet, the drone strike, as in this case, has benefitted both Pakistan and the US by taking out the man on which both the governments had announced head money. The next question is this: will the government of Pakistan overlook the economic relief offered through the recent release of $1.6 billion by the US? The answer is in the negative. The post-drone strike scenario depicts that the Pakistan government is feeling embarrassment before both the TTP and Pakistanis (in general). The drone strike has reduced the government’s posture in the sight of pro-Taliban groups (or sympathisers) in Pakistan. These groups may resort to their independent actions (which may be free of government’s restraint) to support the Taliban in Afghanistan. Activities of anti-India elements to peddle anti-US sentiments in Pakistan are a new addition. On the other hand, the TTP has lost confidence in both Pakistan and the US. With that the door of talks between the Pakistan government and the TTP is close now, perhaps, forever. Further, it will be difficult now for the Pakistan government to arrange a dialogue between the Afghan Taliban and the Kabul government. Hence, it can be said that this drone strike will have serious political and strategic implications for both Pakistan and the US in the region. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com