Sure, the news about the arrest of Altaf Hussain, the founding leader of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), in London cannot be ignored as a little hiccup. It is, by every means, a striking development, a step confirming the rule of law in the west and a fact reflecting the gravity of the situation for Altaf Hussain in the UK. However, we cannot get consumed by the news — we have bigger fish to fry in Pakistan. Our focus of debate, therefore, cannot be minimised to the nature of the investigation against him, his bail or jail time, the evidence in the hands of the prosecution, his trial, its verdict, and his return to active politics. Rather, our concern should be directed towards ensuring permanent peace in the largest city of Pakistan with a population of 20 million people, preventing a violent turf war within the party, tackling the ethnic divisions in the city, fighting the drug cartels, handling its land mafia and quelling its sectarian outfits, all of which have played a role in making Karachi one of the most lawless cosmopolitan cities in the world. How could it be a surprise? We have known from the day Dr Imran Farooq was murdered and the London police launched a broad based investigation that the political career of Altaf Hussain was in question. Even if their suspicion had been less initially about his involvement, they had to get information about his sources of income, his ‘charitable’ collections, his leadership style and his party’s activities in Pakistan. The problem was that once they had gathered all the details, how could they ignore them and not file criminal charges against him? They had no choice except to proceed further and dig deeper to protect their own reputation and maintain the supremacy of the rule of law in their homeland. Had they disregarded all the data, it would have not only been unprofessional on their part but also unreliable and incompetent in the eyes of the public, a blemish that they could not afford to have on their collar. That is where we stand right now. Even after his bail, I am not sure what lies in future for Mr Hussain. Nonetheless, as a British citizen, I believe it is a local matter to be decided between him and his government. What sparks my interest though are the political and economic consequences of those actions in Pakistan. To Mr Hussain’s credit, as long as he was active, he had kept a significant number of immigrant Pakistanis (Mohajirs) loyal to him and the MQM. Yes, they were unhappy at times with the parts policies and even frustrated with the behaviour of the local unit leaders, yet he knew how to play the ethnicity card and win back their sympathies. Once prompted about their insecurities, Mohajirs were ready to forgive all his policy mistakes and vote for him again, making him the only politician across the Urdu-speaking community who represented their interests and guarded their rights, a status that could not be challenged by anyone for decades. This absence of competition, while good for Mr Hussein as he kept the party on a tight leash, was a dangerous undertaking as it failed to provide any replacement in times of crisis like today. In addition, all the prominent leaders from Azeem Ahmed Tariq to Imran Farooq and from Saleem Shahzad to Mustafa Kamal, people with grassroots support who could unite the Mohajirs in his absence and provide a reasonable alternative, either have been asked to leave the party or have been killed under mysterious circumstances, a question that intrigues yet scares many analysts from dwelling upon it further. The incompetent and ineffective leadership that stayed loyal to the party and/or Altaf Hussain has big problems of its own: the members disagree with each other much more than they agree, causing fragmentation and further divisions within the MQM, leaving it more vulnerable than it has ever been. Dealing with this crisis is going to be a difficult task for them and they will fail. However, irrespective of the cause, whether it happens because a strong, unifying figure is missing or as a result of internal conflicts, or both, one thing that they must keep in mind is this: as the party gets weaker from within, the risk of attack by the paratroopers becomes more imminent. The paratroopers are prominent Urdu-speaking ‘executives’ with an exaggerated self-esteem who also enjoy a small independent following. They are waiting to project themselves as the champions of Mohajir rights. With the support of powerful lobbies, in my opinion, they will attack the party soon, offering their services to lead the community or, in case of failure, at least divide its vote bank to increase their own. If the leadership is unable to endure these assaults from all directions, the party will eventually split in two, three or maybe even four groups, each claiming to follow their leader Altaf Hussain. That said, at a certain level what happens to the MQM is not too big a concern for me either; it is the party’s problem. My only concern is the long-term peace in the city. Everyone realises that violence is not going to make the city a better place to live in. It is eating up its foundations. People with resources are leaving and investment is evaporating. Under these circumstances, the most effective political strategy for the MQM would not be to play the ethnic card; instead, it needs to stand up for inter-ethnic harmony, promising to revive the tolerant culture of the city, reignite its free spirit and revitalise it as a vantage point for all ethnicities as it was before they first came into power. It may be too much to long for, I know. Despite that, “All dreams that became a reality, were once just a dream,” and nothing more. The writer is a US-based freelance columnist. He tweets at @KaamranHashmi and can be reached at skamranhashmi@gmail.com