Afghanistan has now entered the post-2014 phase of withdrawal of foreign forces from its land, though a residual US combat force (around 10,000 soldiers) will stay behind to oversee security and defence of the country against the Taliban insurgents and al Qaeda operatives, as per the US-Afghanistan security pact. With the month of March approaching, the weather in Afghanistan is opening up and so is its political situation. Before March, talks are considered the best opportunity to seize, lest a round of war overshadows it. Nevertheless, this time the prospects of peace through negotiations with the help of Pakistan seem brighter than before, as both the Kabul government and the Taliban are equally agreed to negotiate with each other. There are two major developments on this front. First, the government in Kabul, headed by President Ashraf Ghani, is disposed to see the role of Pakistan in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table. By so doing, President Ghani seems to have accepted the point that the Pakistan-sponsored Taliban will hold talks with the Kabul government and may negotiate their terms. Second, President Ghani has no objection to the opening of the Doha talks in Qatar between the US and the Taliban. With this, President Ghani seems to have accepted that the US could settle its terms of reference with the Taliban directly. Both these developments could not take place smoothly during the reign of President Ghani’s predecessor, Hamid Karzai, who remained opposed to any such negotiations. Karzai had ostensibly ruled out the role of any third party involvement in Afghan affairs, even if that party were willing to arrange talks between the Kabul government and the Taliban. Karzai wanted to make sure that no hint of a parallel government or Afghan representation staged by the Taliban go public. President Ghani, however, seems to have compromised on this point: President Ghani sees it as a possibility to achieve the end — peace — in Afghanistan. In the past, the Taliban were not willing to talk to the Kabul government of President Karzai, considering it a puppet. This time, the Taliban seem to have changed their policy and have shown their readiness to talk to President Ghani’s government. President Ghani is also providing them with all options to come out openly. Secondly, in the past, the Taliban were not inclined to talk to US officials under the pretext that Afghanistan was under foreign occupation and negotiations would not be undertaken with a foreign occupant. However, currently, Pakistan is persisting with its efforts to promote talks on both levels: between the Taliban and US officials in Doha and between the Taliban and the Kabul government in Kabul. The Taliban also seem to have accepted the pressure exerted by Pakistan to hold such talks. Pakistan is under stress from two forces. The first is internal. The massacre that took place at a school in Peshawar in December last year made Pakistan realise the urgency in settling its part of the Afghan problem. Pakistan wants now the handing over of the culprits (including Mullah Fazlullah) who ordered or planned the massacre and in that, the Kabul government has seen an opening to nudge Pakistan to bring its sponsored Taliban to the negotiating table. That strategy seems to have been working in President Ghani’s favour. Pakistan now understands that a calm Afghan border can help it fight against its part of the Taliban, called the Pakistani Taliban. In fact, both Pakistan and Afghanistan are demanding from each other the miscreants who launch attacks on their lands from across their mutually shared border. Nevertheless, an interesting point is that Pakistan wants to fight the Pakistani Taliban but has been making a peaceful arrangement between the Afghan Taliban and the Kabul government. Will Pakistan be successful in establishing this paradox? That is yet to be seen. The second force pressurising Pakistan to facilitate Taliban-Kabul government talks is a new factor in regional politics. It is China that sees an overarching engagement of Pakistan with the Islamic militants as a threat to its own developmental future in the region. Pakistan gives respect to the Chinese point of view and has been trying to oblige it. All three parties — the US, the Kabul government and Pakistan — have been using the word reconciliation for any future arrangement between the Taliban and President Ghani’s government in Kabul. It is yet unknown if the Taliban mean the same, as reconciliation would mean acceptance of the Afghan Constitution, the recently held presidential elections, the consequent government, the Constitution-based democratic future of Afghanistan sans any semblance of a caliphate under the Taliban’s declared title of Ameer-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful) for Mullah Umar. Reportedly, a few skirmishes between the Taliban and the supporters of Daesh have taken place in Afghanistan. The change in the orientation of certain Afghans from being pro-Taliban to pro-Daesh is a point of concern for both the US and Pakistan, as under the banner of Daesh, al Qaeda operatives can take refuge and forward their own disruptive agenda. Apparently, the US is keeping its options open by not declaring the Taliban a terrorist organisation. This shows that the US considers the Taliban a force still to be reckoned with in Afghanistan and is willing to negotiate with it the peace prospects in Afghanistan. Secondly, the US is showing to the Taliban that it can do more on this front and extend legitimacy to those Taliban leaders barred earlier at the platform of the United Nations. On the other hand, the Taliban are keen to get certain demands fulfilled by the US such as the release of a few Taliban commanders from US custody in Guantanamo. The release now seems possible. However, the demand the US will not meet concerns vacating Afghanistan absolutely. In this way, the opening of the door of negotiations is no doubt the first step but not the final step towards the mammoth goal of reconciliation. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com