Quickly becoming increasingly dangerous for the region and for Pakistan, the Yemen situation has inherent contradictions and complications that need to be addressed. The Saudis have not minced words in claiming our help, and fast. We can understand their impatience; this is a rather straightforward transaction for them. They pay us for the manpower that we provide and our task is not to question why but to do and die! Millions of our fellow countrymen work very hard under difficult conditions to earn their bread and butter in Arab countries and we are very grateful for this. The apparent bonhomie of religious affinity notwithstanding, our client-patron relationship in both the civil and military arenas is basically transactional in nature.Defence Minister Khawaja Asif’s statement in the National Assembly lacked clarity, probably deliberately so, with dangerous connotations inherent in its ambiguity. Sunnis and Shias alike in Pakistan are passionate about defending the holy lands, the fundamental contradiction being that defending the Kingdom is quite different from what the Saudis are asking for: to become an integral part of the coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm, attacking the Houthi rebel forces in Yemen. The Houthis are supported by Iran but are more akin to Sunnis despite being from the Zaidi Shia Sect. Their rebellion has been joined by mainly Sunni army units that are loyal to former President Abdullah Saleh (North Yemen 1978 to 1990 and unified Yemen 1990 to 2012). Reasoning out all the ramifications, we need to unambiguously define the extent of our involvement. The unfortunate truth is that the sectarian connotations (in spite of Mushahid Hussain’s best attempts to spin it as a proxy war between nations rather than sects) make it seem increasingly like a proxy sectarian conflict between the Sunni coalition and Shia Iran. Just before the visit of the Iranian foreign minister to Pakistan, the Prime Minister (PM) cautioned Iran about Yemen. Was it prudent or responsible to give the impression of taking sides?Parliamentarians have almost unanimously endorsed the inherent danger in aggression against someone who is not our enemy, which could very well split apart our community. Our armed forces are truly well integrated without even the hint of a divide or differentiation on sectarian or ethnic bases but just look at what happened to the Iraqi army. When asked to remove Shias from our main task force in Tabuk in the 1980s, General Ziaul Haq’s reference to his Corps Commanders was immediately vehemently objected to, avoiding the disintegration of the fabric holding our armed forces together. Since General Raheel Sharif insists that parliament will decide and devise a viable means of giving effective support to the Saudis without attracting any adverse reactions, our parliamentarians have correctly identified what seems to be a hidden Sharif agenda. The Sharif government and civil society are on different tracks regarding this issue. Negative interpretations of the political spin being given to this dilemma would be catastrophic because of the prevailing perceptions.When it comes to relationships between nations, the cardinal principle of morality sometimes fails to assert the right to pursue one’s own national interest. Along with the Saudis, we must overcome this inherent complexity while addressing extremes carefully. Pakistan’s foreign policy is often dictated by emotion rather than our own national interest. Individual interests seem to ride roughshod over national interest. General Musharraf became, and still is, very popular in the west for blundering into the war against terrorism after one phone call from Colin Powell. We are still reeling from recurring costs to our nation, both in terms of human and material damage because the war became self-serving. Having blithely committed his soldiers to death and injury, our commander did not once visit his troops engaged in combat in FATA or Swat, a first for any Pakistani Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The Sharifs’ connections to the Saudi monarchy clearly fall into this grey area of personal relationships overwhelming national interests; Saudi expectations could lead to a lasting misunderstanding.Few nations put themselves in harm’s way for others when push comes to shove. However, our alliances and deep-rooted friendships remain romantic illusions rather than any practical demonstrations of standing shoulder to shoulder. Not a single soldier, airman or sailor from amongst our friends has put his life on the line for us. Nations do sacrifice young men defending their own vital interests but our leaders have a penchant for letting them die for others. While an exception has to be made for the Kingdom, our forces must be used for defensive and not offensive purposes.The Saudi armed forces consist of the army and an equally well-equipped Saudi National Guard (SANG). Three armoured brigades, five mechanised brigades, one airborne brigade and one royal guard brigade comprise the army. SANG has three mechanised brigades and three infantry brigades. The air force has seven fighter/ground attack squadrons and six fighter squadrons, and the Navy has 11 surface and 65 patrol and coastal combatant vessels. There is a ballistic missile force consisting of about 100 Douglang intermediate range ballistic missiles. Air defence has state of the art radar systems in place at about 164 sites and the Saudis are well protected aerially. Similarly, they have far more patrol combatant vessels than are really needed for protecting the Saudi coastline. The danger is that by sending combat aircraft and naval surface combat vessels, Pakistan would be perceived as part of the so-called Sunni coalition.We can initially place one mechanised brigade with Saudi supplied weapons and equipment in the proximity of the Yemen border, as was done during the 1991 Gulf war (Operation Desert Storm). Using a mix of personnel from our large reservist pool, we can pre-position arms, vehicles and equipment for two more mechanised brigades and skeleton advance parties can await the already earmarked units and personnel of the task force embarking from the airports to be quickly airlifted if anyone crosses the Saudi border or aggression is imminent. A divisional HQ can be put in place for quickly marrying the personnel as they arrive with the equipment and transitioning the force into operational status without delay. Beefing up Saudi security within the Kingdom, the clear and unambiguous mandate must be to not have a single Pakistani soldier cross the border under any circumstances. We must relieve the Saudi armed forces to be available for their own mission but we cannot become an instrument of aggression or get embroiled in someone else’s civil war. We have to be part of the solution and not become part of the problem. With the complicated contradictions inherent, this potentially detrimental and dangerous situation needs to be handled with extreme care. The writer is a defence analyst and security expert