Daily Times

Shuja Nawaz has authored The Battle for Pakistan. I put a few questions to him about Jinnah’s vision.

Question: Mohammad Ali Jinnah envisaged Pakistan as a secular democracy that would provide equal rights to citizens regardless of their religion. He thought that Hindu-Muslim communal violence in the pre-partition India would be replaced with peaceful co-existence between the new nation states. However, the pre-partition violence was replaced with Indo-Pakistani warfare. In Pakistan, the military becamethe dominant institution. Minorities werevilified and attacked. The word secular became a third rail. Why did Pakistan deviate so much from Jinnah’s vision?

Nawaz: The partition of the British India was unnecessarily hurried and badly managed by the British, leading to unfinished issues related to division of assets as well as demarcation of boundaries. Pakistan did not receive all that was its due, and the accession of Kashmir created an unending conflict between India and Pakistan, and within Pakistan, between the military and the civilian institutions, and within,between the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Many of the insiders represented feudal groups that had favoured remaining in the Indian Union. The Islamic groups opposed the idea of a nation state based on religion. Pakistan lacked cohesive and visionary leadership after Jinnah’s demise. Debate ensued about what kind of PakistanJinnah wanted. Even his own image was reshaped to reflect an Islamic bent that his liberal lifestyle and outlook belied.

Question: What, if anything,can be done to restore Jinnah’s vision?

Nawaz: The optimist in me thinks the direction can be reversed even now by truly modernising the education system, leapfrogging obstacles via technology, and allowing the use of local languages, at the early stages, and with well-trained teachers, to build a cognitive base for students in all parts of the country. Religion also needs to be better taught and understood but not imposed in a doctrinaire manner.We need to emphasise the benefits of pluralism as a centripetal force for holding Pakistan together. A good start might be the 2006 Education Policy drafted during the Musharraf regime that was then abandoned by him to curry favour with the clergy. Civilian supremacy is also a necessary condition, but it should be based on performance and service to the nation. Furthermore, no armed groups should be tolerated. Police should be reshaped and strengthened to serve as a service organisation. Finally, transparency and accountability, from top to bottom, need to become common and regular.

Debate ensued about what kind of Pakistan Jinnah wanted. Even his own image was reshaped to reflect an Islamic bent that his liberal lifestyle and outlook

The rot created by decades of autocratic and corrupt rule, civil and military, has deep roots and change will not be easy nor possible overnight. It does not need a messiah but the willing participation of an informed and active population acting in its own best interests.

Question: What are the odds that this will happen in our lifetime?

Nawaz: Pakistan cannot afford to waste any more time. Its population growth rate needs to be reduced, and a growth-oriented economy is needed to overcome its current challenges. Successive targets for the next two decades can and should be set and achieved. I hope to be around to see it happen.

Question: The Abbottabad Commission concluded: “We have no national security policy, because we do nothave any national economic, population, educational, health, social, environmental, or nation-building policies. They exist in declaratory and normative terms and hundreds of unread documents. But not in reality.” The commission quoted from my book, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: “National security does not reside solely in the military’s combat effectiveness but in a complementary set of five dimensions that include four non-military dimensions and one military dimension. The non-military dimensions are political leadership, social cohesion, economic vitality, and strong foreign policy. One cannot rely on hard military assets to prevail in a strategic conflict; the ‘soft assets’, the four non-military dimensions, may, in fact, be the decisive ones.” Several years have elapsed since the commission issued its report. Have you detected any changes in the strategic culture of Pakistan?

Nawaz: First, the Abbottabad Commission report, like many such previous efforts, has been confined to the dustbin of history. The report was never released formally. There was no public debate or discussion. The parliamentary session involving the DGISI and others was used to deflect from introspection to blaming the Americans. Victimhood remains Pakistan’s most frequently played card. Instead, Pakistan should be acting in its own interests and making changes accordingly. I do not detect any major policy change since that fateful year of 2011. Rhetoric, plentiful, abiding actions, rare. As the then DGISI was reported to have said to the commission, Pakistan tends to sell itself too cheaply. Its leaders compromise themselves and do not trust their own population with the hard facts.

Question: You stated in a conversation with the National Public Radio’s Steve Inskeep at the Atlantic Council that General Bajwa has a copy of your book. Your book has some highly critical commentary on decision making in the Pakistani military. How do you think he will take to that criticism? Will any changes take place in how the army relates to the civilian government and how it defines national security?

Nawaz: Both the army chief and the prime minister were handdelivered copies of the book before the Pakistan edition was produced. They raised no issue related to the substantive content of my bookwith me at that time or since then.Both the prime minister and the army chief have talked publicly and in closed-door sessions about doing many things that would improve the situation in Pakistan and with its neighbours. But they cannot control exogenous factors. India and Afghanistan are on their own sad and self-destructive trajectories. And the United States talks about regional stability but is largely interested in President Trump’s desire for a safe exit from an endless war in Afghanistan. It does not have a Pakistan policy per se. Nor has it had one since 2001.

How and when the civil-military relationship in Pakistan changes depends a lot on how the politicians handle governance and the economy. They have ceded so much ground to the military, often voluntarily, that the relationship remains a misalliance between unequal partners. Plus, the internal lack of democracy inside the autocratic political parties that operate as family enterprises reduces their ability to take principled stands on democratic values. Parliament too seems to have abrogated its own powers to oversee government and the nation’s armed forces. They complain but always after the fact. And they seem eager to make deals behind closed doors. Pakistanis deserve much better.

The writer can be reached at ahmadfaruqui@gmail.com