Daily Times

“R elying on luck, however does not constitute policy”, so said David Galula, a French specialist in counterinsurgency warfare. In the Asian sub-continent, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are two nations that have borne the brunt of insurgency and terrorism. Have both left too much to luck? Both have been surprised by devastating insurgencies and terrorism. Sri Lanka first, in the early part of 80s and then 90s. Pakistan second, from the beginning of the new millennium. While Pakistan has done much to contain the scourge of insurgency and still has some way to go, Sri Lanka was expected to have eradicated insurgent activities with the successful conclusion of the civil war in 2009. However, the Easter Sunday carnage in Sri Lanka on the 21st of April 2019 has proven otherwise. It racked up a death count of over 350. If ever there was an indication that insurgency can make a comeback to the shores of Sri Lanka – this is it! The actors – or rather non-state actors – may change but the process of stopping a budding insurgency and ensuring national unity remains the same. That is, eliciting a counter insurgency policy from the established national security framework. This is important because in order to be successful, the counter insurgency policy can’t act in isolation and opposite to the national security policy which is part of the national security framework. Many a policy failed because of that reason alone!

But first, a quick recap of the difference between insurgency and terrorism. Insurgency is the power asymmetry between two belligerent groups where the weaker of the two groups will do whatever it takes to change the dynamics of power and seize authority away from the stronger group. Therefore, insurgency is a policy with the overarching objective of transfer of power! As insurgents even use armed conflict to achieve this goal hence terrorism is only one of the strategies that executes the policy of the insurgents. Consequently, insurgency and terrorism work in tandem and there is almost no historic reference of terrorism without insurgency. Sri Lanka is a prime example – a separatist insurgency in the form of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) lead to acts of violence and terrorism against the state and its citizens. In the sequence of events generally insurgency comes first, and terrorism comes second. Hence the need to have a counter insurgency policy at hand to arrest the nefarious designs of the insurgents before it turns into a full-fledged civil war. Sri Lanka could again be at the brink of one! Especially if a new insurgency takes hold. Consider.

It is still early days for a new round of sustained insurgency and resulting collateral damage. But this is exactly the time when the powers that be in Sri Lanka need to exercise caution and invest into a realistic and efficient counter insurgency policy

Mao Tse-Tung classified insurgents as fish and the people water in which these fish swim and prosper. Without the support of the people, the insurgents are fish out of water. However, enough support and the insurgency may start to gather pace. In the case of Sri Lanka, local support in the shape of radical elements of the Taweheed Movement and global support from fundamental outfits such as ISIS and Islamic State means that there may be enough water for the insurgent fish to survive! Thus, this is the time to ensure national cohesion and setup an effective counter insurgency policy.

Previously, a national security framework was recommended for Sri Lanka which contained – as its final thread – the national security policy embodied in one sentence – peaceful existence, internally first and externally second, by ensuring upward economic and social mobility via regional and global harmony. The following were the three objectives enshrined in this national security policy. One, exist respectably in a difficult region by ensuring writ of the state to protect its united people from all threats – domestic and foreign. Two, transform Sri Lanka into an economic giant so that to increase the quality and standard of living for all Sri Lankans. Three, borrow from the French – liberty, equality and fraternity.

Keeping the preceding paragraph in mind, Sri Lanka’s counter insurgency policy can be stated as – retract where probable, eradicate where required. The overarching goal of this policy will be to ensure that insurgent ideology is retracted where possible – through overt and covert means – but while maintaining the leverage of force where needed. If one word were to encapsulate this, it would be pre-emption. That is, the policy would pre-empt any adverse skewing of power between the Sri Lankan government and the relevant insurgent groups by ensuring that the following three policy objectives are met. First – choke support for insurgents using any means possible. Second – educate potential insurgents and win the hearts and mind of local populace to further isolate would be miscreants. Third, defeat all non-amenable and non-state actors.

Additionally, this recommended counter insurgency policy for Sri Lanka will also guard and further the three national interests as defined by previous op-eds. First, Sri Lanka should become a harmonious country nation-wide. Second, it must develop into a secure state especially with regards to its economy, territory, society and citizens. Third, create favourable external conditions by acting as a democratic and credible partner and promoting an ethically firm and law-abiding world.

Preceding opinion pieces have differentiated between policy and strategy as policy being a specific course of action to get to the end state and strategy being the execution arm to ensure that vision is fulfilled. Sri Lanka’s counter insurgency policy is no different. After defining the end state – in the form of policy objectives – it stands to reason that a core strategy be defined to achieve those aims. For Sri Lanka, it is to FORM a conducive environment that can lead to a positive outcome for the state. Here each letter of the word FORM reflects a specific tactical activity. One, fight back insurgent thought in each sphere – social, political and economic. Two, order all instruments of state to work towards the previously defined national identity of a ‘Sri Lanka-Sri Lanka’. Three, reform and help any individual even with the slightest of insurgency leanings because of suffering from a sense of deprivation. Four, manoeuvre against the unwilling decisively and through unyielding operations.

In the above Sri Lankan paradigm, Southwards – the counter insurgency policy will leverage the FORM strategy to reach its objectives. Northwards – it will link to the national security policy and national interests. Therefore, ensuring that all spokes of the national security framework act in unison.

It is still early days for a new round of sustained insurgency and resulting collateral damage. But this is exactly the time when the powers that be in Sri Lanka need to exercise caution and invest into a realistic and efficient counter insurgency policy! One that works in harmony with the rebooted national security framework. It would be of no great use to shut the stable doors after the horses have bolted! Sri Lanka tried that last time around and it didn’t turn out well and lead to decades of misery and turmoil!

The writer is Director Programmes for an international ICT organization based in the UK and writes on corporate strategy, socio-economic and geopolitical issues